SENATE
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2 <strong>SENATE</strong> Thursday, 13 October 2016<br />
and was restored to the Notice Paper again to enable it to be advanced in the new parliament. This bill brings<br />
together a series of proposals designed to improve the operation of this significant joint statutory committee. The<br />
proposals are designed to make it more accountable and adaptable to the needs of the parliament and are also<br />
designed to enable the committee to have a greater amount of discretion in the way it conducts oversight of our<br />
intelligence and security agencies.<br />
At the outset, I want to acknowledge the role of former senator John Faulkner in initiating the drafting and<br />
consultation on this bill. I might interpose here that Mr Faulkner recently gave up some of his time to come and<br />
address new senators on the way in which estimates runs. The bill is one of the legacies of Mr Faulkner's long<br />
parliamentary career and his determination to support and enhance parliamentary oversight of our intelligence and<br />
security agencies. Then Senator Faulkner first prepared this bill for introduction in 2014, presenting it to the<br />
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for consideration and comment, but retired before he<br />
was able to introduce the bill into the Senate. Labor is pleased to pursue the reforms contained in this bill<br />
originated by Mr Faulkner. John Faulkner served in the cabinets of two Labor governments and under three prime<br />
ministers and as Minister for Defence. He understood better than most the importance of being strong on national<br />
security, but he also understood that strength on national security does not come from tough rhetoric—it does not<br />
come from chest thumping or inflammatory statements; it comes from having intelligence and security agencies of<br />
the highest calibre that can be trusted to protect the rights and the liberties of the Australian people without<br />
trampling upon them. John Faulkner also understood that effective and rigorous parliamentary oversight is critical<br />
to the maintenance of public support of our national security architecture, particularly in these times.<br />
This bill serves both those objectives. Effective scrutiny and oversight strengthen public support for our<br />
agencies and they also strengthen the agencies subject to oversight. As elected representatives gather in the<br />
national parliament, we can never outsource our duty to ensure the security of our nation and the people who<br />
entrust us with the responsibility of governing. This is as true when we are in times of relative peace as it is when<br />
we see emerging threats to our national security. This parliament must not deny our intelligence and security<br />
agencies the necessary powers and resources to protect Australian citizens and Australian interests. However, it<br />
must be recognised that these powers can impinge upon the values and freedoms on which our democracy is<br />
founded—values and freedoms which the Australian people correctly expect parliament to protect. As with so<br />
many things, this parliament must find the right balance between the security imperatives of our nation and the<br />
liberties and the freedoms of our people. The central plank of the intelligence and security framework is strong<br />
and effective accountability. Enhanced powers demand enhanced safeguards. Public trust and confidence in our<br />
security and intelligence agencies can only be ensured fully through strong and rigorous oversight and scrutiny.<br />
I want to talk about the environment that we are confronted with. We know that over the last 15 years in<br />
particular this parliament has scrutinised and passed many pieces of legislation which have contributed to the<br />
development of a legislative architecture relating to our security and intelligence agencies. This has been in<br />
response to developments in the security situation, which has altered in new and significant ways over time. It also<br />
reflects changes in technology, which means that our intelligence and security agencies must operate in a higher<br />
level of sophistication with specialist expertise. There has generally been a high level of cooperation in the<br />
parliament to secure bipartisan agreement on national security legislation. Of course, bipartisanship does not mean<br />
taking an uncritical approach to proposals or additional or amended national security language or legislation.<br />
In order to ensure rights and liberties are protected, it is essential that all parties approach legislative proposals<br />
with a discerning eye. In the current parliament, this Senate has dealt with a number of very significant pieces of<br />
national security legislation, and all have been subject to scrutiny by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on<br />
Intelligence and Security. Each piece of legislation has been amended as a result of recommendations of the<br />
committee, sometimes quite extensively. This is an example of the process of parliamentary scrutiny at work.<br />
Likewise, the addition of other perspectives in the Senate debate ensures all views are ultimately considered and<br />
represented before the legislation comes to a vote.<br />
As agencies continue to seek, and are granted, additional powers to meet contemporary threats, so too must<br />
scrutiny and oversight keep pace. In recent years Australia has benefited from professional and well-run<br />
intelligence and security agencies. Labor acknowledges their work. They have demonstrated respect and<br />
understanding of the role of the parliament, the government of the day and our laws. But the personal integrity and<br />
quality of leaders of our agencies, as important as this is, are not reliable, effective safeguards against the abuse of<br />
security powers. It is the responsibility of parliament to prescribe safeguards that keep pace with the expansion of<br />
security powers that have been deemed necessary.<br />
The purpose of this bill is to ensure that the adequacy and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of<br />
intelligence and security agencies is in keeping with the development and enhancement of additional powers we<br />
have afforded to these agencies. It amends the Intelligence Services Act 2001, the Independent National Security<br />
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