SENATE

Thursday, 13 October 2016 SENATE 13
force. It then was subject to a review by INSLM. Fortunately, there have been no prosecutions under section 35P,
as I understand it. Also, fortunately, that is something that will be rectified by the government.
The subsequent report of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor that I referred to made the
weaknesses of the joint committee's review very clear, and the fact that there is further amending legislation
before the Senate underlines the need for a more rigorous approach and a wider range of opinion represented on
the joint committee.
The need for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny and oversight is clear. In the 15 years since the tragedies, the
horrors, of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a constant legislative drumbeat has accompanied what is
commonly known as the war on terrorism. Successive governments and the parliament have repeatedly added to
and elaborated our national security and counterterrorism laws. I note it was just yesterday that we commemorated
the anniversary of the Bali bombings, where 202 innocent people, including 88 Australians, were killed by
terrorists. The parliament has passed more than 70 different bills dealing with terrorism and, more broadly,
national security issues. The exact number depends a bit on questions of definition, but the overall quantum of
legislation is clear. We now have a very extensive and complex set of counterterrorism laws. As I have previously
pointed out to the Senate, we have more counterterrorism laws than any other country. These laws are of great
significance to national security and community safety, as well as to the rights, liberties and privacy of all
Australians.
Back in October 2014, when the Senate was considering one of the long line of counterterrorism bills, I
expressed the view that enough was enough and that we did not need more laws in this field and certainly should
not enact greater powers for our intelligence and security agencies without a major expansion and strengthening of
independent oversight of those agencies. That remains my broad view, subject of course to the overarching
principle of community safety.
The record of our intelligence and security agencies in countering terrorism over the past 15 years is one of
considerable success, thankfully. They have exercised the considerable investigative powers available to them
and, in the process, thwarted many attacks on our soil and harm to Australians. Although the terrorist threat in
Australia has not been on the same scale as in some other countries, it is significant, and serious threats and plots
have been detected and thwarted. Our intelligence and security agencies have demonstrated considerable
professionalism, but like all government agencies they are far from infallible.
There also have been some very significant missteps. The case of Dr Muhamed Haneef involved the provision
of incorrect and misleading information from British police counterterrorism investigators to the Australian
Federal Police, which in turn failed to properly assess that information. A review by the Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Security of the case of Mamdouh Habib found that the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation repeatedly failed to properly document key decisions, including dealings with foreign security and
intelligence agencies. Senior officers subsequently claimed to have little or no recollection of key events. There
have been instances where agencies have failed to provide appropriate information to the IGIS, and at least one
case where an agency, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, sought to intentionally mislead the IGIS.
I would not wish to not pre-empt the findings of the inquiry by the New South Wales Coroner into matters
relating to Man Haron Monis and the Martin Place siege of December 2014 and the tragic deaths of two innocent
people, other than to say some of the evidence presented to the inquiry clearly raises serious concerns about the
investigative and analytical capabilities of ASIO and the AFP as well as the operational response of the New
South Wales police. I still cannot fathom why that man, that monster, was on the streets when he was, given his
history.
Our intelligence and security agencies have very extensive powers and resources but are not infallible, and for
that reason there needs to be very rigorous oversight and scrutiny. That is why this bill is both important and
timely. It is a significant step towards a more rigorous scrutiny regime, more along the lines of the United States
and German models of parliamentary intelligence committees, which have much more wide-ranging powers of
review. In earlier debate on this legislation, one government senator suggested that greater parliamentary scrutiny,
including the provision of highly classified IGIS reports to the joint committee 'may limit the voluntary provision
of information by Australian intelligence community agencies to the inspector-general'. If this were really the
case—and I doubt it would be so—then the need for rigorous parliamentary scrutiny would only be greater. In any
case, if the United States intelligence community can operate effectively—and clearly it does—in the environment
of oversight by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House of Representatives Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, then so too can the Australian intelligence community.
Significantly, I would highlight the scope of the US Senate committee's responsibilities, which include access
to classified intelligence assessments and access to intelligence sources and methods, programs and budgets. By
CHAMBER