SENATE

Thursday, 13 October 2016 SENATE 3
Legislation Monitor Act 2010 and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. As legislative
changes extending the powers of security agencies are implemented, the requirement for reliable and effective
external oversight becomes more critical. If these changes which extend the powers of the agencies are given
effect but are not accompanied by adequate safeguards, it will be more challenging to maintain an essential level
of trust in the community about the agency's operations. Trust is essential if our agencies are to be effective.
Not only are these safeguards important to protect the public interest but they also create an environment that
protects the agencies themselves. It is to the parliament that these agencies are accountable and it is parliament's
responsibility to provide oversight of their priorities and their effectiveness. It is not sufficient for the parliament
to simply put in place a legislative framework for the oversight of agencies without conducting oversight itself. If
the parliament is not a check and balance, it will not be possible to ensure agencies meet the requirements and the
standards that the parliament itself has set. The parliament has no better or more authoritative forum than the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to do this job.
Just as the legislation governing our intelligence and security agencies must be under constant review, so too
must be the legislation governing the operation of the committees. Just as we would expect amendments to be
brought to the parliament to correct deficiencies and enhance the operation of our intelligence and security
agencies, so too must the parliament assess the effectiveness of its own committee. Labor's submission to the
Senate today is that the legislation governing the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security can
be improved. We present this bill as a means of doing so.
I want to briefly traverse the key measures in the bill. This bill removes current constraints on the membership
of the committee to provide that, except for a minimum representation of one government member and senator
and one opposition member and senator, the balance on the 11-member committee can be drawn from either
chamber. Currently, the Intelligence Services Act 2001 mandates a composition of six House of Representatives
members and five senators from the committees. Removing this current constraint will enable greater flexibility in
determining PJCIS membership.
I note that the bill does not amend the requirement for the government to hold a majority. In relation to this
provision, there is no reason why senators should be in the minority. I suggest to the Senate it should be left to the
parties to draw members from the best available representatives. Because of the nexus that currently exists
between the Senate and the other place, as well as between the parties, for example, in the past some senators on
both sides have had to relinquish their places on the committee for a period in order to accommodate certain
members of the other place for particular inquiries by a committee. The opposition found itself constrained by
both the apportionment of membership between the Senate and House and the desire by the government to
allocate its six members across the chamber in a particular way.
I reiterate: the bill does not amend the requirement for the government to hold a majority, but it does mean that
there are fewer constraints placed on the choice of members for the committee based on the chamber in which
they sit. I presume there would not be a senator who would object if this resulted in a greater number of senators
on the committee. I note the continuing requirement that, before nominating members, the Prime Minister or the
Leader of the Government in the Senate, as appropriate, is obliged to consult with the leader of each recognised
political party that is represented in the House and in the Senate, as the case may be, and that does not form part of
the government.
The bill also: provides for the committee to conduct its own-motion inquiries after consultation with the
responsible minister; authorises the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to provide the committee
with a copy of any report on a matter referred to it by the committee; requires the Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Security to give the committee a copy of any report provided to the Prime Minister or a minister
within three months; gives the committee the function of conducting presunset reviews of legislation containing
sunset provisions; and adds the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the National Security
Adviser to officers able to be consulted by the committee.
As the role of agencies and the powers afforded to them develops, the greater the potential for that power to
infringe upon individual liberties and, in turn, the greater the need for accountability in the exercise of that power.
I do not in any way suggest that our security and intelligence agencies are acting otherwise than in accordance
with the law. That is not my view. But, if powers were to be used inappropriately, there would be an erosion of
public trust. Having appropriate and effective accountability mechanisms protects both the agencies and the
public. As I said previously, it is the parliament to which the agencies are accountable, not the judiciary, and it is
the parliament's responsibility to oversee their priorities and effectiveness and to ensure agencies meet the
requirements and standards it sets.
CHAMBER