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16 <strong>SENATE</strong> Thursday, 13 October 2016 mandates a composition of six members and five senators on a parliamentary joint committee. Removing the current constraints will provide parliament with greater flexibility in determining its membership of the joint committee, but the bill does not amend the requirement for the government to hold a majority. This provision is important because it means that senators can be equally represented on this committee. There is no reason why the House of Representatives needs to be disproportionally represented on this committee. As I have said previously, national security is a job for all parliamentarians, not just members of the House of Representatives. Again, to clarify, the bill does not amend the requirement for the government to hold the majority, but it does mean there are fewer constraints placed on the choice of members for the committee based on the chamber in which they sit. There are a number of other amendments that this bill provides, and, in the interest of time, I will only very briefly refer to them. The bill also provides for the parliamentary joint committee to conduct own-motion inquiries after consultation with the responsible minister. It may be that matters come to the attention of the joint committee that equally require examination that the minister may not have necessarily considered such a priority, so I think it is a good move to give the committee the power to conduct inquiries on its own motion. The bill authorises the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to provide the joint committee with a copy of any report on a matter referred to it by the committee. That is an important step to make sure that the joint committee stays informed of all developments on these matters. The bill requires the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security to give the joint committee a copy of any report provided to the Prime Minister or a minister within three months. The bill gives the joint committee the function of conducting pre-sunset reviews of legislation containing sunset provisions and adds the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the National Security Adviser to officers that are able to be consulted by the parliamentary joint committee. Again those two roles, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the National Security Adviser, are obviously key to our intelligence community's response to developments, and it is important that the joint committee has the ability to consult those particular officers and inform its deliberations. These amendments are quite modest and process based, but they are very important. In wrapping up, I just want to go back to some of the points that I made earlier in my speech. There is not one person in this parliament who disputes that one of our most important roles is to protect the safety of our people, but equally—and perhaps this reflects my background as a lawyer—I would place a very high premium on protecting the human rights and civil liberties of Australian citizens. Fortunately, in recent years we have not seen many examples of the abuse of these kinds of powers by our intelligence agencies, but it is important to make sure that our parliament does retain a bit of a check and balance on the actions of agencies that have such far-reaching and intrusive powers into our community. Perhaps it is a function of growing up as a child in Queensland in the Bjelke-Petersen era, when the Queensland government of the day had the Special Branch of the police force, which was essentially operating as a secret police service, spying on Queensland citizens, preparing files on them and conducting extremely intrusive investigations into Queensland citizens for no reason other than their political beliefs. So it is vital that, if we are going to enhance the powers of our intelligence agencies in order to protect our safety, in parallel we have a responsibility to the Australian people to also enhance the powers of this parliament to oversight the actions of those intelligence communities. Australians—not just me but Australians generally, I think—place a very high premium on their freedoms and their human rights. They expect them to be protected, and it is incumbent upon us as members of parliament to make sure that those protections remain in place and are strengthened as the legislation which provides powers to our intelligence communities also expands. I think it is through that combination—the combination of providing our intelligence agencies with the powers that they need and also providing Australians with protections from the abuse of those kinds of powers—that we strike the right balance to protect Australians well into the future and make sure that all Australians remain safe from these terrible terrorist attacks that are becoming all too common right across the world. Senator HUME (Victoria) (11:40): I rise today to speak on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill, the PJCIS Amendment Bill 2015. This is a bill that proposes significant changes to the Intelligence Services Act 2001, the ISA. Firstly, it proposes to change the composition of the PJCIS. Secondly, this bill proposes to expand the powers and functions of the PJCIS by allowing the PJCIS to conduct a review into operational activities of the Australian intelligence agencies and the Australian Federal Police. It proposes to expand the powers and functions of the PJCIS by authorising the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM, to provide the PJCIS with a copy of any report on a matter referred to it by the PJCIS and requiring the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, the IGIS, to give the PJCIS a copy of any report provided to the Prime Minister or the minister within three months. The bill proposes allowing the PJCIS to CHAMBER
Thursday, 13 October 2016 <strong>SENATE</strong> 17 conduct its own-motion inquiries, and it also proposes allowing the PJCIS to conduct pre-sunset review of legislation. The government's position on this bill is not one of support. The well-regarded work that the PJCIS has conducted over many years is generally viewed as one of the most successful examples of effective bipartisanship throughout successive Australian parliaments. The PJCIS also has an impressive track record of conducting both insightful and thorough investigations. In light of these facts, the government is of the opinion that there is no need to amend the PJCIS's structure or powers. Furthermore, the government has serious concerns about the content of this bill. Specifically, expanding the powers of the PJCIS will compromise the existing and appropriate divide between parliamentary and independent oversight by enabling own-motion inquiries and receipt of reports on operational activity from the IGIS. The government has serious concerns about the bill seeking to provide the PJCIS with powers, including operational oversight and pre-sunset legislative review, which would duplicate and overlap with those of the IGIS and INSLM. The government has serious concerns that the bill does not provide adequate protection of operational activities, including methods and sources, to ensure any reviews that the PJCIS conducts, or any reports the INSLM or IGIS are required to provide to the PJCIS, do not prejudice the operational activities of the agencies and international relations. The amendments this bill seeks to make are unnecessary, and they compromise the important distinction between the appropriate parliamentary oversight of the Australian Intelligence Community's administration, as outlined in the Intelligence Services Act 2001, and the operational oversight that is more appropriately performed by independent statutory roles such as the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security For those of my colleagues who are not aware of the beginnings of the PJCIS, the committee has existed in its current form since the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies by Mr Philip Flood AO, known as the Flood inquiry, in 2004. Among his findings, Flood recommended that the membership of the existing Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD—the PJCAAD—should be extended to include the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, the DIGO, which has since been renamed the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation; the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the DIO; and the Office of National Assessments, the ONA. Following the passage of the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill in 2005, the committee was reestablished as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security—the PJCIS. The functions of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security are outlined in the Intelligence Services Act 2001—the IS Act. Section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act provides that the functions of the committee are to: review the administration and expenditure of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and Office of National Assessments (ONA), including their annual financial statements review any matter in relation to ASIO, ASIS, AGO, DIO, ASD or ONA referred to the Committee by the responsible Minister or a resolution of either House of the Parliament monitor and to review the performance by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) of its functions under Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (terrorism) review, by 7 March 2018, the operation, effectiveness and implications of the following: Division 3 of Part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO questioning and detention powers) Division 3A of Part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914 (police powers in relation to terrorist acts and terrorism offences) Division 104 and 105 of the Criminal Code (control orders and preventative detention orders) sections 119.2 and 119.3 of the Criminal Code ("declared area" provisions) review, by 13 April 2020, the mandatory data retention regime, as provided for under section 187N of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 review—for the sole purpose of assessing and making recommendations on the overall operation and effectiveness of the mandatory data retention regime—any matter that relates to the retained data activities of ASIO and is included in ASIO's annual report review—for the sole purpose of assessing and making recommendations on the overall operation and effectiveness of the mandatory data retention regime—any matter that relates to the retained data activities of the AFP in relation to offences against Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (terrorism) and is set out in the AFP's annual report on access to telecommunications data CHAMBER
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