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6 <strong>SENATE</strong> Thursday, 13 October 2016<br />
or are proposed to be undertaken by any of our agencies. It is not entitled to review information provided by an<br />
agency of a foreign government where that government does not consent to the disclosure of the information. It is<br />
not allowed to review aspects of the activities of ASIO, ASIS, AGO, DIO, ASD or the Office of National<br />
Assessments that do not affect an Australian person. It is not allowed to review rules relating to the protection of<br />
privacy of Australians. It is not allowed to look at individual complaints about the activities of any of our<br />
agencies. It is not able to review the content of or conclusions reached in assessments or reports made by DIO or<br />
ONA, or to review sources of information on which such assessments are based.<br />
It does not need me to go through and explain why the act that was passed several years ago made those<br />
prohibitions, because the last thing we want is individuals coming forward with a complaint which may or may<br />
not be genuine and then dragging our often secret intelligence agencies before a public parliamentary committee<br />
to respond to what may well be a frivolous complaint. I could give examples in relation to every one of those<br />
prohibitions, but I do not think it needs me to do that. Anyone who follows this area of law would understand the<br />
reasons for those prohibitions being put in place.<br />
I will indicate—I think Senator Farrell made the same observation, but perhaps not with directly the same<br />
words—the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence Services has always been one of the most successful<br />
examples of effective bipartisanship throughout successive Australian parliaments and it has an excellent track<br />
record of conducting insightful and thorough investigations. I emphasise that it is a bipartisan committee. When it<br />
comes to the safety of Australians and our nation, politics does not enter into it. It does not matter which political<br />
party you are involved in. I would say with absolute confidence that there is no politicking and no partisan<br />
approach to the way our security agencies operate, because the job they are doing is to protect all of us. As I said<br />
earlier, it is essential that they have every power to do that.<br />
This amending bill that we are dealing with today does a number of things. It expands the powers and the<br />
functions of the committee by allowing the committee to conduct a review into operational activities of the<br />
intelligence agencies and the Australian Federal Police. I shudder to think that any parliamentary committee<br />
would be asking our secret service people to explain their methods of operations: why they did things, the<br />
judgements they made or the secret information they get from other agencies from other nations with whom we<br />
have very close arrangements. It would just be a difficult constraint on those agencies. Remember, I said before—<br />
I was to emphasise this—the bad guys, the terrorists and the criminals have no constraints. They can do what they<br />
like and they are not answerable to anyone. Whilst our agencies act within the law, and the laws are made so that<br />
they do act appropriately and properly, having the agencies before a parliamentary committee to explain in detail<br />
every element of their operations, I think, would curtail them and would not only make their operations more<br />
difficult in the future but perhaps lessen their enthusiasm for protecting us properly in the case where they knew<br />
they would have to come and publicly explain their operations.<br />
The bill also seeks to provide the committee with powers including operational oversight and presunset<br />
legislative review which would duplicate and overlap those of the Independent National Security Legislation<br />
Monitor and the IGIS—the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. These agencies are subject to oversight<br />
by these two statutory organisations. What this bill seeks to do is to give the committee its own powers to almost<br />
oversee the overseers, and that seems to be inappropriate. The bill does not provide adequate protection of<br />
operational activities, including methods and sources, to ensure that any reviews the committee conducts or any<br />
reports that either of the inspectors-general might be required to provide to the committee do not prejudice the<br />
operational activities of agencies and international relations—and that is very important as well.<br />
If I could just perhaps elaborate a little further on some of those objections: the existing divide between the<br />
parliamentary committee and these independent agencies with oversight would compromise the independence of<br />
those two overseeing bodies by proposing that the committee receive direct reports from the IGIS on operational<br />
activities and could then commence its own inquiries. This would seem to be hugely double-guessing the existing<br />
agencies that are in place to oversee our security services.<br />
The longstanding position in Australia is that operational oversight of the intelligence, security and law<br />
enforcement agencies is conducted by independent statutory oversight rather than by parliament. That has been<br />
around for some time. Currently, the IGIS, which serves a crucial role in overseeing and ensuring accountability<br />
for all operational activities, reports only to the minister, as I think is appropriate. I mentioned the Flood inquiry<br />
before and I will just quote from something that the inquiry found in its 2004 investigation:<br />
Just as the advice that officials provide to ministers is not disclosed in Senate Legislation Committee hearings, the judgments<br />
of assessment agencies should not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Opening assessments to scrutiny by parliament would<br />
also weaken the instinct amongst assessors to provide forthright advice for government, which is vital for good assessment.<br />
That is what the Flood inquiry reported and advised the parliament, following a very extensive inquiry back in<br />
2004.<br />
CHAMBER