SENATE

Thursday, 13 October 2016 SENATE 19
The amendments to this bill would blur the existing and appropriate divide between parliamentary and
independent oversight and compromise the independence of existing overseeing bodies by proposing that the
PJCIS receive direct reports from the IGIS on operational activities and that it could commence its own inquiries.
The longstanding position in Australia is that operational overseeing of intelligence, security and law enforcement
agencies is conducted by the overseeing independent statutory agencies, rather than by the parliament.
Currently the IGIS, which serves a crucial role in overseeing and ensuring accountability for the operational
activities undertaken by our security agencies, only reports to ministers. It is important to note that the
appropriateness of the overseeing of intelligence agencies by parliament was examined in the 2004 Flood inquiry.
That inquiry found:
Just as the advice that officials provide to ministers is not disclosed in Senate Legislation Committee hearings, the judgments
of assessment agencies should not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Opening assessments to scrutiny by parliament would
also weaken the instinct amongst assessors to provide forthright advice for government, which is vital for good assessment.
The proposals duplicate and overlap with the roles of the IGIS and INSLM.
The bill would enable the PJCIS to conduct inquiries into legislation prior to a sunset date. This is an
unnecessary duplication of the role of the INSLM, who has been granted powers that are tailored specifically to
reviewing the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia's national security legislation.
The bill would enable the committee to conduct its own review into the activities of intelligence agencies,
provided the PJCIS has first consulted the responsible minister. This is an unnecessary duplication of the role of
the IGIS. In 2014-15 the IGIS received an $840,000 increase in ongoing funding, allowing for the recruitment of
additional staff to ensure effective oversight.
The current roles of the PJCIS, IGIS and INSLM ensure there is effective overseeing of the functioning of all
aspects of Australia's security and intelligence agencies whilst minimising duplication and overlap. The current
division also respects the appropriate divide between overseeing by parliament and independent agencies. The
committee examines the administration and expenditure of all Australian intelligence community agencies, and
the committee has only a very limited ability to inquire into operational activities.
The IGIS is responsible for oversight and review of the Australian intelligence community in relation to
compliance with the law, compliance with ministerial directions and guidelines, propriety and respect for human
rights. When exercising her inquiry function the IGIS has significant powers, comparable to those of a royal
commission. The INSLM's role is to review the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia's
counterterrorism and national security legislation. This includes considering whether the laws contain appropriate
safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals, that they remain proportionate to any threat of terrorism or
threat to national security and remain necessary.
Should the committee be empowered to conduct its own reviews into the operational activities of the
intelligence and security agencies, the bill does not provide adequate protection for operational activities,
including methods and sources, to ensure reviews that the committee conducts, or any reports the INSLM or IGIS
are required to provide to the committee, do not prejudice the operational activities of the agencies and
international relations.
There is no demonstrated need for change. The PJCIS works well and has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to
conduct insightful and thorough investigations. There is no demonstrated need to amend the PJCIS structure or
powers. The government has referred each tranche of national-security-related legislation to the bipartisan PJCIS
for review following its introduction into parliament, and has accepted every recommendation made by the
committee. This consultative and collaborative approach has strengthened the transparency and accountability of
our law enforcement and national security agencies.
This bill would only impose, at best, unnecessary changes. But at worst it would compromise the existing and
appropriate divide between parliamentary and independent oversight. The risks that this bill poses have led to the
government not supporting this bill and, similarly, I urge honourable senators not to support this bill in the
chamber today.
Senator PRATT (Western Australia) (11:59): I rise today to speak on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security Amendment Bill. This gives me cause to reflect on a few issues that were very present in
my mind when I first entered this place back in 2008. In moving from the state legislature to the federal Senate, I
was very self-aware about the fact that as a member of the government, a government backbencher, I would
become part of and complicit with some significant decisions on things like sending troops to war, the
surveillance of citizens, our civil liberties and the arbitrary detention of people. These were issues that weighed
very heavily on my mind then and they are issues I take very seriously today. So when my colleagues put it to me
CHAMBER