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How <strong>2016</strong> became the year of the hack – and<br />

what it means for the future<br />

Read more<br />

In practice, however, the last two months have shown that that’s cold comfort. “Also shocking is how<br />

unlikely states are to look at any of the paper, even in a surprising and close election like this,”<br />

Halderman said. “Even if a candidate can force a recount – and this is probably the most damning<br />

thing about the entire experience – there are many many opportunities for the apparent winner to try to<br />

stop them, and they will probably be successful.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> pair called for three significant changes to the electoral process as a result of their experience<br />

with the <strong>2016</strong> recount, which should help protect the state. “What we need in the US, quite badly, is<br />

some specific reform to the election process,” Halderman said. “Even if the <strong>2016</strong> election wasn’t<br />

hacked, the 2020 election might well be; we’re facing increasingly powerful and successful state<br />

attackers. We need some defence.”<br />

Firstly, Halderman called for a “common sense” hardening of voting technology, ensuring that the<br />

technological flaws which he and his colleagues have been demonstrating for over a decade are<br />

finally dealt with. Secondly, he called for a mandatory requirement for voting machines to provide a<br />

physical ballot in addition to a digital record: in Pennsylvania, for instance, 70% of digital votes<br />

leave no paper record at all.<br />

<strong>The</strong> final defence requested was for states to actually use the evidence they have, by instituting<br />

mandatory “risk-limiting audits”. By counting a small but statistically significant and randomly<br />

selected sample of paper ballots, the state can prove statistically that the vote has not been tampered<br />

with, without needing to go to the expense of initiating a full recount, and without losing the<br />

organisational benefits of digital voting machines.<br />

“I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security class could have changed the outcome of the presidential<br />

election,” Halderman said. “It really is that bad.”<br />

This article was downloaded by calibre from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/<strong>2016</strong>/dec/28/election-recounthacking-voting-machines<br />

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