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GLOBAL INVESTOR 2.07 Basics — 24<br />
Table 1<br />
External and local leverage ratios<br />
The stock of sovereign external debt as a proportion of GDP in large Latin<br />
American credits is generally lower than that of Eastern European credits.<br />
Nevertheless, Mexico (BBB/BBB) and Brazil (BB/BB) are rated lower<br />
than credits such as Hungary (BBB+/BBB+) and Poland (BBB+/A-), as<br />
investors still perceive a meaningful policy direction risk in Latin America.<br />
Source: Credit Suisse<br />
Sovereign debt<br />
% of GDP<br />
LATAM<br />
1998<br />
External<br />
2000<br />
External<br />
1998<br />
Domestic<br />
2000<br />
Domestic<br />
Brazil 11.7 6.8 33.9 55.1<br />
Mexico 22.0 8.2 9.1 16.5<br />
EMEA<br />
Russia 61.1 4.4 8.7 4.1<br />
Turkey 26.4 22.4 18.5 45.2<br />
Poland 20.3 19.5 20.2 31.4<br />
Hungary 24.1 22.1 37.0 46.4<br />
South Africa 2.2 4.6 46.7 28.7<br />
ASIA<br />
Indonesia 72.2 21.9 47.1 12.9<br />
Philippines 35.3 40.8 32.3 38.3<br />
Table 2<br />
Selected economic indicators<br />
Most credits have been successful in bringing down inflation and continue<br />
to converge to inflation rates observed in developed markets. The notable<br />
exception is Russia where the price level remains relatively elevated at close<br />
to 9%. External performance is not homogeneous with commodity exporters<br />
such as Russia and Brazil exhibiting large and growing current account<br />
surpluse s. The remaining credits show deficits, which can be large as in the<br />
case of Turkey and Hungary. Source: Credit Suisse<br />
Population<br />
(million)<br />
Per capita<br />
GDP<br />
(USD)<br />
General<br />
government<br />
debt<br />
(% GDP<br />
2006)<br />
Current<br />
account<br />
balance<br />
(% GDP<br />
2006)<br />
Consumer<br />
Price Index<br />
(%)<br />
Brazil 179.6 3021 72.0 1.2 3.1<br />
Hungary 10.1 5129 68.5 –7.6 6.5<br />
Mexico 108.9 6125 34.3 –0.5 4.1<br />
Russia 142.8 2116 10.6 10.4 9.0<br />
Poland 38.5 4927 48.8 –1.7 1.4<br />
Turkey 74.1 2101 61.7 –8.7 9.7<br />
South Africa 48.4 2569 31.6 –5.8 5.8<br />
push in the development of local capital markets. Brazil is probably<br />
the most notable example of this effort, which intensified as a result<br />
of the “Lula crisis” in 2002, when Brazilian spreads on hard<br />
currency bonds rose to almost 2500 basis points. As a proportion<br />
of gross domestic product (GDP), local markets now stand at 55%<br />
(see Table 1), or 13 percentage points higher than in 2002. Similarly,<br />
the total outstanding stock of local sovereign debt currently<br />
amounts to an impressive USD 500 billion, most of which is in the<br />
form of fixed-rate bonds or instruments tied to the short-term<br />
benchmark rate (Selic, the Banco Central do Brasil’s overnight<br />
lending rate).<br />
Despite the fact that policymakers have not recently shown<br />
much interest in further domestic market development, Turkey has<br />
experienced one of the fastest growth rates in this space since<br />
1998. In nominal terms, Turkey’s local market is about a third of the<br />
size of Brazil’s market or approximately USD 175 billion. However,<br />
Turkey is a good example for policymakers of how a reasonably<br />
developed and healthy local market does not amount to having an<br />
insurance policy that will completely insulate the credit from adverse<br />
shocks. In the absence of a strong anchor, external imbalances<br />
can and usually do lead to foreign exchange volatility, with<br />
adverse consequences for inflation dynamics. After the speculative<br />
attack on the Turkish lira last summer, local short-term yields rose<br />
by more than 900 basis points to almost 25%, and the currency<br />
depreciated by approximately 35% in less than two months. However,<br />
it is reasonable to make the argument that increased reliance<br />
on local debt protected the fiscal accounts from sharp deterioration,<br />
given the limited impact of external debt service payments on<br />
government expenditures.<br />
Local yield curves normally have a relatively low duration issuance<br />
profile. Issuance has traditionally concentrated on shortduration<br />
securities with the occasional long-duration bond, where<br />
liquid ity is not always available. The need to finance a varied number<br />
of long-term projects and in particular the desire to develop a<br />
mortgage market that allows the rapid development of the housing<br />
sector, has encouraged governments to start issuing longer-dated<br />
securities. To ensure that key maturities develop as benchmarks,<br />
issuance amounts now tend to be larger than in the past, and retaps<br />
of specific bonds are commonplace. Mexico and Russia are<br />
some of the credits with the most established yield curves at the<br />
long end. While the duration extension of the Russian curve does<br />
not appear to be highly related to the development of the housing<br />
market, the Mexican curve has extended partly in response to a<br />
carefully crafted plan by the government to make housing affordable<br />
for the average Mexican over the next few decades. In the last<br />
12 months, Mexico has issued approximately USD 11 billion in pesodenominated<br />
government bonds (MBONOS) with maturities ranging<br />
from 2023 up to 2036. Similarly, Russia has issued a fair amount of<br />
long-duration securities, with the lion’s share of the issuance concentrated<br />
in the 2021, 2024 and 2036 government bonds (RFLBs).<br />
Investors have noticed improved EM fundamentals<br />
Demand for EM domestic bonds has gradually increased as investors<br />
have come to realize that the meaningful improvement in economic<br />
fundamentals may be long-lasting. High growth rates, sound<br />
fiscal accounts and large external surpluses have encouraged investors<br />
to migrate from hard currency debt into local currency instruments.<br />
Credit risk perceptions have improved so much that investors<br />
are now willing to add currency and local regulatory risk