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News<br />

Pictured: Guy’s Hospital,<br />

near London Bridge.<br />

While not directly hit by<br />

Wannacry, on advice its<br />

community staff shut<br />

devices to prevent<br />

infection; and patients<br />

were diverted from<br />

other places<br />

Photo by Mark Rowe<br />

More details<br />

Further plans from<br />

Holyrood for the Scottish<br />

private and charity<br />

sectors are promised.<br />

Visit www.gov.scot/<br />

cyberresilience. For more<br />

from the NCSC, such as<br />

a ‘Small Business Guide’,<br />

visit www.ncsc.gov.uk.<br />

For the National Audit<br />

Office’s 52-page report on<br />

Wannacry and the NHS,<br />

visit www.nao.gov.uk.<br />

Steve Gardner of OCS<br />

after wannacry hit:<br />

SCOTS HAVE A PLAN<br />

Scotland’s public bodies should work<br />

towards becoming exemplars in<br />

cyber resilience. So says a Scottish<br />

Government ‘action plan’ that sets out<br />

how Holyrood, Scottish public bodies<br />

and partners will take to further cyber<br />

resilience. The 50-page document<br />

admits that the Wannacry attack ‘had<br />

an impact on some areas of the NHS<br />

in Scotland’, and ‘underlined the<br />

potential seriousness of the cyber<br />

threat’. On what to actually do, the<br />

document does not go into specifics,<br />

for instance calling for ‘coherent<br />

action’. It airs common security<br />

ideas; ‘in time, cyber resilience<br />

should be ‘baked into’ Scottish public<br />

sector processes and infrastructure’.<br />

It emphasises cyber resilience is ‘as<br />

much a cultural issue as a technical<br />

one’. Generally the Scots fall into line<br />

with what the UK overall is doing,<br />

such as ‘active defence’, and the CISP<br />

(Cyber Security Information Sharing<br />

Partnership) run by the London-based<br />

NCSC (National Cyber Security<br />

Centre). p<br />

Among the speakers ...<br />

Richard Bond, Senior Consultant,<br />

in the Resilience, Security and Risk<br />

arm of Arup (featured page 41) is<br />

among speakers at a London First<br />

breakfast briefing on ‘designing cities<br />

for a safe future’ on January 30; as<br />

are Chris Stephens, Security Advisor,<br />

Crossrail; Carolyn Dunlop, Risk<br />

Director, Debenhams, and chair of the<br />

Crowded Spaces Industry Exchange;<br />

and former British Army officer now<br />

crisis consultant John Deverell ...<br />

Jitender Arora, Head of Operational<br />

Risk and Security Executive,<br />

Coventry Building Society spoke at<br />

a recent BSI information resilience<br />

conference in Manchester ... Ian<br />

Mansfield of VSG and Steve Gardner,<br />

Head of Security for OCS spoke to<br />

facilities managers at a UBM-hosted<br />

evening briefing on terrorism. p<br />

BP renews: BOSS, the British Oil<br />

Security Syndicate, reports that BP<br />

Oil UK has renewed its longstanding<br />

membership for 2018. Covering BP’s<br />

company-owned 320 UK forecourts,<br />

retailers get access to BOSS Payment<br />

Watch, for ‘no means of payment’<br />

recovery, if drivers claim they are not<br />

carrying money to pay for fuel. p<br />

VERDICT: ‘NHS<br />

NEED TO GET THEIR<br />

ACT TOGETHER’<br />

The Department of Health (DoH)<br />

was warned about the risks of cyber<br />

attacks on the NHS, a year before<br />

the WannaCry virus hit hospitals so<br />

badly that it had to cancel thousands<br />

of appointments; and five NHS trusts,<br />

in London, Essex, Hertfordshire,<br />

Hampshire and Cumbria, had to<br />

divert patients to other accident and<br />

emergency departments. Of 236<br />

trusts in total, 37 were infected and<br />

locked out of devices, according<br />

to a National Audit Office (NAO)<br />

report. Separately, as featured in the<br />

August issue of Professional Security,<br />

NHS institutions will still be using<br />

unsupported IT systems for months,<br />

the Government has admitted.<br />

They were told in 2014<br />

The DoH and Cabinet Office wrote<br />

to trusts in 2014, saying it was<br />

essential they had ‘robust plans’ to<br />

migrate away from old software, such<br />

as Windows XP by April 2015. In<br />

March and April 2017, NHS Digital<br />

had issued critical alerts warning<br />

hospitals to patch their systems.<br />

However, before Friday, May <strong>12</strong>,<br />

CYBER, A TEAM SPORT<br />

Cyber risk to the UK continues to<br />

rise in severity and impact, according<br />

to an audit firm. But nearly one in<br />

five (17pc) admit they don’t prepare<br />

or drill for cyber attacks, and a bare<br />

half (49pc) conduct penetration tests,<br />

according to the PwC survey. New<br />

forms of attack require new ways of<br />

working, said Richard Horne, cyber<br />

security partner at PwC: “Cyber<br />

security needs to be viewed as a<br />

‘team sport’ rather than just an issue<br />

for the IT team. To be most effective,<br />

everyone in an organisation should be<br />

considering the security implications<br />

of their actions.” p<br />

the day that the malware hit the<br />

world, the Department had no formal<br />

mechanism for assessing whether<br />

local NHS bodies had complied with<br />

their advice and if they were prepared<br />

for a cyber attack. Amyas Morse, head<br />

of the NAO, said: “The WannaCry<br />

cyber attack had potentially serious<br />

implications for the NHS and its<br />

ability to provide care to patients. It<br />

was a relatively unsophisticated attack<br />

and could have been prevented by the<br />

NHS following basic IT security best<br />

practice. There are more sophisticated<br />

cyber threats out there than WannaCry<br />

so the Department and the NHS need<br />

to get their act together to ensure the<br />

NHS is better protected against future<br />

attacks.”<br />

What it did<br />

The cyber attack could have caused<br />

more disruption but for a researcher<br />

activating a ‘kill-switch’, the report<br />

points out. The attack led to disruption<br />

in at least 34pc of trusts in England<br />

although the DoH and NHS England<br />

could not tell the NAO the full extent<br />

of the disruption. As the NHS had not<br />

rehearsed for a national cyber attack<br />

it was not clear who should lead<br />

response. And as for crisis comms,<br />

NHS Improvement did communicate<br />

with trusts’ chief executives ... by<br />

telephone. p<br />

Fraud billions<br />

Fraud against the private sector<br />

costs the UK £140 billion a year,<br />

and public sector an estimated £40.4<br />

billion in 2017. That’s according to<br />

a study by accountancy firm Crowe<br />

Clark Whitehill, credit checking<br />

agency Experian and the Centre for<br />

Counter Fraud Studies at Portsmouth<br />

University. Jim Gee, head of forensics<br />

and counter fraud at the accountants,<br />

said: “The cost of fraud is clear – not<br />

just the proportion which is detected,<br />

nor a guestimate but accurate<br />

information about the total cost to UK<br />

plc, just like any other business cost.<br />

And that cost is £190 billion.” p<br />

34 DECEMBER 2017 PROFESSIONAL SECURITY www.professionalsecurity.co.uk<br />

p34 News 27-<strong>12</strong>.indd 1 18/11/2017 14:43

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