The Intelligence Review | volume 2 | issue 4 |

feel reliant on their leader, but also revere him. So they heavily support having an
advanced military program, and applaud public rhetoric against the US. For the
most part, the citizens of the DPRK view having a national nuclear arms program
as crucial for their defense against Western power.
In terms of national security, the DPRK has everything to gain by finding ways
around sanctions and expanding its nuclear and missile programs. But it truly has
everything to lose by engaging in full-scale conflict. Any conflict that would bring
the UN against the DPRK would almost certainly involve the US, South Korea,
Japan, Russia, and China, which could have long-term global implications. These
parties understand the notion that any war involving the DPRK could have
potentially devastating consequences, as nuclear or chemical weapons could be
utilized. In order to properly handle the DPRK threat, the US must find a way to
agree on a cap in the production of nuclear materials, because there are no other
realistic options. Rhetoric and propaganda from both the US and North Korean
sides have always been heated, but the key to solving the differences between the two
countries will be through patience and diplomacy, which comes with communication.
The DPRK and the Trump Presidency
The most realistic hope for a resolution resides in the will of US President Donald
Trump and his foreign policy advisors. But the Trump team must remain
conscious of what the DPRK desires. When President Trump was campaigning
for the 2016 election, Kim Jong-un displayed hints of admiration for the realestate
mogul. But that feeling soon faded after the DPRK conducted a nuclear
test in early September 2016 (Thiessien 2016; UNSC 2016). As President Trump
began melding his foreign policy, he made clear that he intended to deal with the
DPRK diplomatically. By early January, 2017, Kim Jong-un and President-Elect
Trump had exchanged public insults, leading many to believe that a DPRK
provocation would be imminent (Manchester 2017). The day before Trump’s
inauguration, the US Intelligence Community acknowledged activity in a missile
factory outside of Pyongyang, which renewed concerns that Kim Jong-un
intended to launch a missile during the inauguration. While such an event never
materialized, the DPRK did launch a missile on February 11, as President Trump
was meeting with Japanese President Shinzo Abe at his golf club in Mar-a-Lago,
Florida (McKirdy 2017).
Three days after that meeting in Florida, Kim Jong-un’s exiled half-brother, Kim
Jong-nam, was assassinated with the use of VX nerve agent, a chemical banned
by the UN, while waiting to board a flight at the Kuala Lumpur International
Airport, Malaysia (Manchester 2017). Immediately after his murder, South
Korean and Malaysian authorities accused the DPRK of orchestrating the
assassination and began searching for the North Koreans responsible. Kim Jongnam
had been outspoken against the regime, and was exiled by his father in 2001.
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