The Intelligence Review | volume 2 | issue 4 |

Russia. On August 21, 2017, the US embassy in Moscow stopped issuing travel visas
to Russians (Erickson and Vitkovskaya 2017). The two countries also engaged in
tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions in March of 2018, following the alleged poisoning
of Sergei Skripal, a Russian former spy living in Britain, allegedly on orders of the
Kremlin. Although the Skripal incident and the controversy surrounding the 2016
election are important to US-Russian relations, they are unlikely to have a major
impact on how the two countries interact in Syria.
Currently, the public facade of the relationship between Presidents Trump and
Putin is one of friendliness and agreeance; however this relationship has yet to be
reflected in policy. Sanctions tied to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014
have not been lifted, and despite the promise of free elections in Syria, Russia has
repeatedly demonstrated its support for the Assad regime to remain in place.
Russia announced on November 30, 2017, that it had begun preparations to
downsize its military presence in Syria due to significant progress in defeating ISIS
(Anon. 2017b).
Future Trajectories
There are multiple possible scenarios that could conclude the conflict in Syria
after the defeat of ISIS; however, two of these are the most likely. The first
scenario is that a free election is held “with all Syrians eligible to participate”, as
outlined in the joint US-Russian statement discussed earlier (US Department of
State 2017). This scenario would follow the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR
2254, which calls for constitutional reform in addition to elections under UN
supervision. If free elections are indeed held, rebel opposition groups currently
fighting in Syria would be eligible to run for office. It can be assumed that President
Assad, Syria’s current leader, would also run in the election. Based on the current
political landscape in Syria —and assuming the absence of US or Russian
influence— it can be stated with a moderate degree of confidence that the result
of the election would keep Assad in power. Syrian rebel groups are numerous and
hold considerable territory, but refuse to consolidate due to differences in ideology.
Instead of stockpiling their votes behind one opposition candidate, they would
spread their votes among multiple candidates, thus preventing any of them from
gaining a majority victory.
This analysis was based on the assumption that the US and Russia would not
interfere with the election at all. This assumption is naive in the sense that both
powers have made it perfectly clear who they want to have a strong say in Syria.
It is likely that if free elections are held, the US and Russia would attempt to sway
the vote, with the US supporting the opposition and Russia supporting the Assad
regime. The results of such an election could affect US-Russian relations for
decades, depending on which faction “wins”.
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