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CUSTOMER AGREED REMUNERATION - CRA International

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<strong>CUSTOMER</strong> <strong>AGREED</strong> <strong>REMUNERATION</strong><br />

This evidence suggests that low income consumers might be at risk of not being served<br />

under CAR. However, there are a number of reasons to be slightly sceptical that the<br />

removal of cross-subsidies will lead to the removal of advice to low income consumers<br />

including that:<br />

• Advisers could increase their profitability today by not serving these consumers.<br />

Indeed, in a number of interviews, intermediaries suggested that this had already<br />

occurred;<br />

• Price discrimination already occurs through active consumers requesting rebates,<br />

although CAR will encourage a further move in this direction; and<br />

• Advisers already choose to serve some clients that are not economic to serve in the<br />

short-term because they believe that they will be economic to serve over the longer<br />

term.<br />

Thus although there is a risk of the cross-subsidy being removed and consumers with<br />

small investments no longer being served, other reasons suggest that CAR is unlikely to<br />

have a dramatic effect on the supply of advice. However, this does indicate that CAR is<br />

unlikely to reverse the trend for IFAs to serve fewer lower value clients.<br />

3.4 The role of nationals, networks or service providers<br />

The impact of CAR could also change the relationships between intermediaries. Large<br />

numbers of intermediaries are members of nationals, networks or service providers.<br />

These offer individual IFAs a range of services including assistance with compliance,<br />

advice on business development, and the benefits of being part of a larger group that can<br />

exploit bargaining power with the providers. The latter has typically been seen through<br />

enhanced commission rates. Evidence provided by interviewees suggested that this was<br />

the second most important reason for using a network or service provider after<br />

compliance related issues.<br />

For those networks or service providers for whom the negotiation of higher commission<br />

rates represents a key element of why individual IFAs join them, a movement to CAR<br />

potentially leads to the loss of this comparative advantage. CAR means that advisers,<br />

rather than the provider, will set the charge for advice, therefore the negotiating power of<br />

the intermediary with providers cannot directly be used to influence the amount of the<br />

advice charge. To the extent that members joined to access enhanced commission this<br />

could lead to a loss of membership.<br />

This could result in the market changing in a number of ways:<br />

• It could lead to intermediaries choosing to leave nationals, networks or service<br />

providers if they joined them in order to receive enhanced commission; or<br />

• Intermediaries might remain members but focus on the compliance services being<br />

provided to them.<br />

Figure 10 below provides details on whether intermediaries would change their<br />

membership of nationals, networks and service providers.<br />

29

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