SSG No 10 - Shipgaz

SHIPPING AND SHIP MANAGEMENT
had her safety management certificate
granted at all.
The crew: It appears that the top officers
were not sufficiently experienced with
anchor handling in deep waters. They had,
however, found out about stability shortcomings
and kept the fuel tanks as full as
possible. The anti-rolling system was kept
active during the operation.
The operator: The commission found
deficiencies in the operator’s procedures
on several points. There were no clear
criteria for risk analyses for planning and
implementation of rig moves. In particular,
there were not sufficient margins for static/
dynamic forces from wind, weather and
current during anchor-handling operations
in deep waters. The weather requirements
were not unequivocal, and the determination
of vessel criteria with regard to bollard
pull was not realistic.
Operational leadership: The operation
turned out to be more demanding and
time-consuming than originally planned.
The Rig Move Plan had to be departed
from on several occasions, but not in
accordance with the procedures set down
in the operator’s manuals and the plans for
the operation. The commission points to
the role of the OIM (rig “captain”), who
appears to merely have considered the safety
of his own vessel, not the entire operation.
The final part of the operation was
characterized by severe failings in safety
management. The Bourbon Dolphin tried
actively to solve its problem, while the
rig remained impassive and observant.
Work on anchor # 2 began under marginal
weather conditions, as proved by the
Olympic Hercules’ struggle with # 6. The
grappling by the Highland Valiant was carried
out in an improvised way, without any
risk analysis, and it failed. The OIM was
not kept updated on the operation, and he
did nothing to obtain information.
Although there was no break of regulations,
the commission finds it hard to
accept that the operator’s representative
(the Towmaster), who was in constant contact
with the vessels, did not take the moral
and human responsibility in ensuring that
the Bourbon Dolphin was operating safely
during the last phase of the operation.
Also, both the Towmaster and the Bourbon
Dolphin’s officers should have understood
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the consequences of the instructions and
proposals given.
Proposals
In the closing, the commission points to
several initiatives for improving the safety
level during anchor-handling operations:
• Specific stability regulations for anchorhandling/tug/supply
vessels.
• Consistency between construction
details and certification.
• Requirements to the shipowners’ safety
management system, including specific
procedures for anchor handling for all vessels.
• Better overlap routines for crew shifts.
• Identify the requirements for competence
and establish the relevant training courses.
• For operators to plan for realistic forces
of nature and introduce unequivocal
weather criteria for operations.
As so often, a tragedy at sea has a wide
set of causes, some direct and many indirect.
The inquiry into the loss of Bourbon
Dolphin has provided valuable lessons that
will have consequence for anchor handling
and rig move operations in the future.
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28 SCANDINAVIAN SHIPPING GAZETTE • MAY 16, 2008