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Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

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Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro<br />

The grim realities<br />

of rebuilding Iraq<br />

Defense Secr<strong>et</strong>ary Donald Rumsfeld<br />

On Tuesday, an explosion and other Pentagon officials had<br />

ripped through a dining been claiming that many tens of<br />

tent at lunch hour on an. thousands of Iraqis were being<br />

American military base trained to take over frontline securi-<br />

. near Mosul, killing at least 24people ty duties, allowing American forces<br />

. and injuring 57.The day before, Pres- first to pull back from major cities<br />

i<strong>de</strong>nt George W. Bush finally ac- and then, at a later phase, come home.<br />

knowledged that many of the more Last week, at ~ me<strong>et</strong>ing with Amerthan<br />

100,000Iraqi trainees Washing- ica's two top military comman<strong>de</strong>rs<br />

ton had been counting on to take responsible for Iraq, Bush got a canover<br />

basic security tasks were far did evaluation of the actual combat<br />

from being up to the job.And on Sun- readiness of these Iraqi trainees, who,<br />

. day, car bomb attacks killed more now officially number about ll4,000.<br />

: than 60 people in the Shiite holy cit- Bush was admirably blunt about it at<br />

, ies of Najaf and Karbala, while in his news conference on Monday,not-<br />

•Baghdad, unmasked assassins ing that while a few good generals<br />

I brazenly dragged three election offi- and some good foot soldiers had<br />

cials out of their cars in full daylight been trained, "the whole command<br />

: and executed them on the spot. structure necessary to have a viable<br />

\ This is not just pre-election may- military is not in place:~<br />

hem. It is stark evi<strong>de</strong>nce that with a We are glad to hear Bush acknowlcrucial<br />

election now less than six edge this sobering reality, but we are<br />

weeks away, America's effort to still waiting for him to explain who<br />

bring into being a new Iraqi govern- will have to fill in for these noncomment<br />

representing all major pop~la- bat-ready Iraqis and for how long.<br />

, tion groups and capable of <strong>de</strong>fendmg Given the lack of other countries<br />

. itself and its citizens still has a very willing to put up their hands as vol-<br />

. long way to go. Some 21months after unteers, the only answer seems to be<br />

the American invasion, U.S.military more American troops, and not just<br />

forces remain essentially alone in through the spring, as currently<br />

battling what seems to be a growing planned. Since the first days of the<br />

'.insurgency, with no clear prospect of occupation, American troops have<br />

<strong>de</strong>cisive success any time in the fore- been too light on the ground in Iraq,<br />

. seeable future. . allowing the looting and sabotage<br />

Washington has no significant in- that soon turned into insurgency to<br />

ternational military partners be- g<strong>et</strong> a costly head start.<br />

si<strong>de</strong>s Britain, and no Iraqi military And facing the need for an expansupport<br />

it can count on. The election <strong>de</strong>d American military presence<br />

that once looked as if it might pro- means more than a simple reshuffduce<br />

a government with nationwi<strong>de</strong> ling of <strong>de</strong>ployments. If more troops<br />

legitimacy increasingly threatens to in Iraq are not going to translate into<br />

intensify divisions b<strong>et</strong>ween the a dangerously exhausted and overgroups<br />

that ~re. expected to pa~~ic- str<strong>et</strong>ched Army, Marine Corps and<br />

ipate enthusiastically - the Shutes National Guard, these forces need to<br />

and Kurds - and an estranged and be expan<strong>de</strong>d through stepped-up reembattled<br />

Sunni community, which cruitment. That means bigger spendat<br />

this point appears likely to stand ing on the least politically attractive<br />

aloof. part of the military budg<strong>et</strong>, basic<br />

There may still be time for Wash- personnel salaries, and less for<br />

ington to try to salvage the election, costly new weapons systems.<br />

but that would require paying much Another harsh reality that needs<br />

more serious attention to legitimate to be confronted head-on is the pros-<br />

Sunni grievances and showing an pect for the Iraqi elections. The Jan.<br />

openness to postponing the election 30 elections were supposed to usher<br />

for several months, if that had a rea- in a legitimate national government<br />

sonable chance of attracting broa<strong>de</strong>r and a broadly representative as-<br />

Sunni participation. So far, Bush has sembly to draw up a constitution acstrongly<br />

resisted such an approach. ceptable to all elements of Iraq's<br />

As weeks go by without discernible. fragmented population - secular<br />

progress, hopes for a <strong>de</strong>cent outcome and religious, Shiite and Sunni, Arab<br />

g<strong>et</strong> progressively har<strong>de</strong>r to sustain. and Kurd. But things now appear<br />

Right now, the only progress hea<strong>de</strong>d toward a badly skewed result.<br />

seems to lie in the willingness of the Enthusiasm and participation seem<br />

re-elected Bush to face some hard high among Shiites and Kurds, who<br />

truths:<br />

suffered greatly un<strong>de</strong>r Sunni minor-<br />

One certainly involves Iraqi secu-' .ity rule a:p.d.!low thirst for self-govrity<br />

forces, which have always been ernment.<br />

presented as the key to American But in predominantly Sunni areas,<br />

- withdrawal. For more than a year, including Mosul, parts of Baghdad<br />

-------------------------------:----71<br />

<strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basm Öz<strong>et</strong>i<br />

;. ,,; and m:ostof central and western Iraq,<br />

'. /~ere is,a <strong>de</strong>ep and growing aliena-<br />

, .'tioll that 'threatens to <strong>de</strong>press 'elec-<br />

, ,~: tor;i}.tui'nout and provi<strong>de</strong>s a large<br />

reseryoil""bf support for the insur-<br />

. gency.Without an acceptable level of<br />

, participation across Iraq, the elections<br />

will not be able to produce a legitimate<br />

government capable of<br />

,.,standing on its own, mastering the<br />

, insurgency' and surviving without<br />

the in<strong>de</strong>finite presence oflarge numbers<br />

of American troops.<br />

The timing of last month's<br />

military assault on Falluja<br />

rested, in part, on the argument<br />

that Iraq's Sunnis<br />

really wanted to participate in the<br />

election, but we'rebeing held back by<br />

intimidation from the insurgents.<br />

, The causes of Sunni alienation from<br />

the current political process actually<br />

run far <strong>de</strong>eper, and affect large numbers<br />

of people who cannot be classified<br />

as Al Qaeda supporters, Islamic<br />

fundamentalists or sworn followers<br />

of Saddam Hussein. A broa<strong>de</strong>r feeling<br />

has begun to take root that Sunnis<br />

have no political, professional or<br />

personal future in the new Iraq being<br />

shaped by Washington and its Shiite<br />

and Kurdish allies .<br />

This feeling grew out of such earli<br />

er American mistakes as the wholesale<br />

dismissal of the old, Sunni-led<br />

Iraqi national army and the blank<strong>et</strong><br />

exclusion of even midlevel former<br />

Baathists from government jobs during<br />

the early months of the occupation.1t<br />

has fed off the continuing failure<br />

to assure that authentic Sunni<br />

nationalist politicians had an a<strong>de</strong>quate<br />

voice in the interim government<br />

and election preparations.<br />

A further level of resentment has<br />

been ad<strong>de</strong>d by the physical <strong>de</strong>struction<br />

of homes, jobs and infrastructure<br />

produced by American counterinsurgency<br />

campaigns in <strong>de</strong>nsely<br />

populated Sunni towns like Falluja.<br />

A coalition of Sunni politicallea<strong>de</strong>rs<br />

led by Adnan Pachachi, a respected<br />

mo<strong>de</strong>rate, has repeatedly called for<br />

postponing the January election for<br />

several months.to encourage broa<strong>de</strong>r'<br />

Sunni participation. His pleas need<br />

to be taken seriously, not brushed '<br />

asi<strong>de</strong> as they have been up till now by<br />

Baghdad and Washington.<br />

Leaving Iraq's Sunnis in such a<br />

sullen, resentful mood would un<strong>de</strong>rmine<br />

the creation of a new and stable<br />

Iraq and poison its relations with the<br />

rest of the Aràb world, where Sunnis<br />

strongly,predominate. Iraq's interim<br />

prime minister, Ayad Allawi, some-'<br />

how seems unable to recognize this.<br />

Instead of reinforcing him in his<br />

folly,the Bush administration should<br />

be actively encouraging him to think<br />

afresh. If postponing the election<br />

date can ensure more a<strong>de</strong>quate<br />

Sunniparticipation, it is in everyone's<br />

interest to do so.

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