Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro<br />
The grim realities<br />
of rebuilding Iraq<br />
Defense Secr<strong>et</strong>ary Donald Rumsfeld<br />
On Tuesday, an explosion and other Pentagon officials had<br />
ripped through a dining been claiming that many tens of<br />
tent at lunch hour on an. thousands of Iraqis were being<br />
American military base trained to take over frontline securi-<br />
. near Mosul, killing at least 24people ty duties, allowing American forces<br />
. and injuring 57.The day before, Pres- first to pull back from major cities<br />
i<strong>de</strong>nt George W. Bush finally ac- and then, at a later phase, come home.<br />
knowledged that many of the more Last week, at ~ me<strong>et</strong>ing with Amerthan<br />
100,000Iraqi trainees Washing- ica's two top military comman<strong>de</strong>rs<br />
ton had been counting on to take responsible for Iraq, Bush got a canover<br />
basic security tasks were far did evaluation of the actual combat<br />
from being up to the job.And on Sun- readiness of these Iraqi trainees, who,<br />
. day, car bomb attacks killed more now officially number about ll4,000.<br />
: than 60 people in the Shiite holy cit- Bush was admirably blunt about it at<br />
, ies of Najaf and Karbala, while in his news conference on Monday,not-<br />
•Baghdad, unmasked assassins ing that while a few good generals<br />
I brazenly dragged three election offi- and some good foot soldiers had<br />
cials out of their cars in full daylight been trained, "the whole command<br />
: and executed them on the spot. structure necessary to have a viable<br />
\ This is not just pre-election may- military is not in place:~<br />
hem. It is stark evi<strong>de</strong>nce that with a We are glad to hear Bush acknowlcrucial<br />
election now less than six edge this sobering reality, but we are<br />
weeks away, America's effort to still waiting for him to explain who<br />
bring into being a new Iraqi govern- will have to fill in for these noncomment<br />
representing all major pop~la- bat-ready Iraqis and for how long.<br />
, tion groups and capable of <strong>de</strong>fendmg Given the lack of other countries<br />
. itself and its citizens still has a very willing to put up their hands as vol-<br />
. long way to go. Some 21months after unteers, the only answer seems to be<br />
the American invasion, U.S.military more American troops, and not just<br />
forces remain essentially alone in through the spring, as currently<br />
battling what seems to be a growing planned. Since the first days of the<br />
'.insurgency, with no clear prospect of occupation, American troops have<br />
<strong>de</strong>cisive success any time in the fore- been too light on the ground in Iraq,<br />
. seeable future. . allowing the looting and sabotage<br />
Washington has no significant in- that soon turned into insurgency to<br />
ternational military partners be- g<strong>et</strong> a costly head start.<br />
si<strong>de</strong>s Britain, and no Iraqi military And facing the need for an expansupport<br />
it can count on. The election <strong>de</strong>d American military presence<br />
that once looked as if it might pro- means more than a simple reshuffduce<br />
a government with nationwi<strong>de</strong> ling of <strong>de</strong>ployments. If more troops<br />
legitimacy increasingly threatens to in Iraq are not going to translate into<br />
intensify divisions b<strong>et</strong>ween the a dangerously exhausted and overgroups<br />
that ~re. expected to pa~~ic- str<strong>et</strong>ched Army, Marine Corps and<br />
ipate enthusiastically - the Shutes National Guard, these forces need to<br />
and Kurds - and an estranged and be expan<strong>de</strong>d through stepped-up reembattled<br />
Sunni community, which cruitment. That means bigger spendat<br />
this point appears likely to stand ing on the least politically attractive<br />
aloof. part of the military budg<strong>et</strong>, basic<br />
There may still be time for Wash- personnel salaries, and less for<br />
ington to try to salvage the election, costly new weapons systems.<br />
but that would require paying much Another harsh reality that needs<br />
more serious attention to legitimate to be confronted head-on is the pros-<br />
Sunni grievances and showing an pect for the Iraqi elections. The Jan.<br />
openness to postponing the election 30 elections were supposed to usher<br />
for several months, if that had a rea- in a legitimate national government<br />
sonable chance of attracting broa<strong>de</strong>r and a broadly representative as-<br />
Sunni participation. So far, Bush has sembly to draw up a constitution acstrongly<br />
resisted such an approach. ceptable to all elements of Iraq's<br />
As weeks go by without discernible. fragmented population - secular<br />
progress, hopes for a <strong>de</strong>cent outcome and religious, Shiite and Sunni, Arab<br />
g<strong>et</strong> progressively har<strong>de</strong>r to sustain. and Kurd. But things now appear<br />
Right now, the only progress hea<strong>de</strong>d toward a badly skewed result.<br />
seems to lie in the willingness of the Enthusiasm and participation seem<br />
re-elected Bush to face some hard high among Shiites and Kurds, who<br />
truths:<br />
suffered greatly un<strong>de</strong>r Sunni minor-<br />
One certainly involves Iraqi secu-' .ity rule a:p.d.!low thirst for self-govrity<br />
forces, which have always been ernment.<br />
presented as the key to American But in predominantly Sunni areas,<br />
- withdrawal. For more than a year, including Mosul, parts of Baghdad<br />
-------------------------------:----71<br />
<strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basm Öz<strong>et</strong>i<br />
;. ,,; and m:ostof central and western Iraq,<br />
'. /~ere is,a <strong>de</strong>ep and growing aliena-<br />
, .'tioll that 'threatens to <strong>de</strong>press 'elec-<br />
, ,~: tor;i}.tui'nout and provi<strong>de</strong>s a large<br />
reseryoil""bf support for the insur-<br />
. gency.Without an acceptable level of<br />
, participation across Iraq, the elections<br />
will not be able to produce a legitimate<br />
government capable of<br />
,.,standing on its own, mastering the<br />
, insurgency' and surviving without<br />
the in<strong>de</strong>finite presence oflarge numbers<br />
of American troops.<br />
The timing of last month's<br />
military assault on Falluja<br />
rested, in part, on the argument<br />
that Iraq's Sunnis<br />
really wanted to participate in the<br />
election, but we'rebeing held back by<br />
intimidation from the insurgents.<br />
, The causes of Sunni alienation from<br />
the current political process actually<br />
run far <strong>de</strong>eper, and affect large numbers<br />
of people who cannot be classified<br />
as Al Qaeda supporters, Islamic<br />
fundamentalists or sworn followers<br />
of Saddam Hussein. A broa<strong>de</strong>r feeling<br />
has begun to take root that Sunnis<br />
have no political, professional or<br />
personal future in the new Iraq being<br />
shaped by Washington and its Shiite<br />
and Kurdish allies .<br />
This feeling grew out of such earli<br />
er American mistakes as the wholesale<br />
dismissal of the old, Sunni-led<br />
Iraqi national army and the blank<strong>et</strong><br />
exclusion of even midlevel former<br />
Baathists from government jobs during<br />
the early months of the occupation.1t<br />
has fed off the continuing failure<br />
to assure that authentic Sunni<br />
nationalist politicians had an a<strong>de</strong>quate<br />
voice in the interim government<br />
and election preparations.<br />
A further level of resentment has<br />
been ad<strong>de</strong>d by the physical <strong>de</strong>struction<br />
of homes, jobs and infrastructure<br />
produced by American counterinsurgency<br />
campaigns in <strong>de</strong>nsely<br />
populated Sunni towns like Falluja.<br />
A coalition of Sunni politicallea<strong>de</strong>rs<br />
led by Adnan Pachachi, a respected<br />
mo<strong>de</strong>rate, has repeatedly called for<br />
postponing the January election for<br />
several months.to encourage broa<strong>de</strong>r'<br />
Sunni participation. His pleas need<br />
to be taken seriously, not brushed '<br />
asi<strong>de</strong> as they have been up till now by<br />
Baghdad and Washington.<br />
Leaving Iraq's Sunnis in such a<br />
sullen, resentful mood would un<strong>de</strong>rmine<br />
the creation of a new and stable<br />
Iraq and poison its relations with the<br />
rest of the Aràb world, where Sunnis<br />
strongly,predominate. Iraq's interim<br />
prime minister, Ayad Allawi, some-'<br />
how seems unable to recognize this.<br />
Instead of reinforcing him in his<br />
folly,the Bush administration should<br />
be actively encouraging him to think<br />
afresh. If postponing the election<br />
date can ensure more a<strong>de</strong>quate<br />
Sunniparticipation, it is in everyone's<br />
interest to do so.