檢視總理信任投票在德國行政立法關係之角色 - 東吳大學

126 東 吳 政 治 學 報 /2010/ 第 二 十 八 卷 第 三 期
Resolving or Spurring Political Crisis:
Examining the Role of Confidence Votes
in the German Executive- Legislature
Relationship
Kailing Luo ∗
The German vote of confidence, which is designed to
resolve political gridlock, furnishes executive preemptive
power to deal with political conflict and respectively entitles
the Chancellor, the Bundestag, and Federal President different
institutional prerogatives to counterbalance one another. By
analyzing all cases of confidence votes in Federal Germany,
this paper uncovers substantial inconsistencies between the
intention and the enforcement of such a constitutional design.
To begin with, the confidential mechanism, at best, has a
short-term effect on curbing the conflict between the legislature
and the executive. Moreover, it is often employed to reap
electoral benefits, such as prolonging the reign of the
Chancellor and gaining more party seats. This abuse has
resulted in vast public concerns over the violation of the
constitutional and long-term instability of the German
∗ Ph.D.Student, Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University.