Foresight - Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft

Ekkehard Winter
Hermann Josef Abs, who was the
German Bank’s spokesman for
several years, once said that forecasts
were just like street lamps to a drunkard:
“They don’t necessarily enlighten you,
but at least you can cling to them.” This is
in fact a good description of the sceptical attitude
many participants displayed at the
workshop “Prioritätensetzung in der Forschungsfinanzierung”
(Establishing priorities
in research funding), held by the Stifterverband,
the Science Council and the Confederation
of German Industry at Schloss
Cecilienhof in Potsdam. What the organisers
had in mind was not so much a detailed debate
on methods but to discuss the impact of
foresight and prospecting methods on setting
priorities in politics, industry and science.
Winfried Schulze, a Munich historian and
head of the Science Council until the end of
January 2001, referred to the insights gained
from the evaluation of Germany’s higher education
and research system as a suitable occasion
to re-assess what was a reserved attitude
on the part of Germany in an international
comparison when it came to the issue
of foresight.
Helmuth Trischler, a science historian at
the Deutsches Museum in Munich (see page
25 pp.) gave a vivid account of the fluctuations
planning and foresight had seen in the
German science system over the past 200
years. According to Trischler, the desire to
boost the aspect of planning research was
very frequently strongly rooted in internation-
Ekkehard Winter..
Time to take down
the gates
13
al projects and in comparisons with other
countries, particularly the USA. Phases of
planning euphoria were then again followed
by disillusionment. Paul Erker, representing
economic history at the event, drew the conclusion
that, from a historical angle, there
was no evidence of R&D being planable in
enterprises. Rather, the origins of R&D planning
emerged from the defensive (competition,
new products, the collapse of markets);
it was not before the early twenties of the
twentieth century that longer term planning
horizons and systematic R&D funding could
be established. Erker recommended company
managers to “look back to look ahead”
and study the history of their own firms in
order to avoid mistakes made in the past.
“Future cannot be planned but designed”
Klaus-Dieter Vöhringer, a member of the
DaimlerChrysler AG board who is responsible
for R&D, responded by stating that “while
the future cannot be planned, we are able to
design it”. In his lecture (see page 39 pp.),
he referred to the anticipation of technological
leaps as a particularly important exercise
that was, however, on account of its very
nature, also particularly difficult to perform
when it came to strategic foresight, which covered
up to 15 years into the future at DaimlerChrysler.
The instruments involved ranged
from technical requirements such as low
fuel consumption and improved assistance
for the driver to the pursuit of megatrends