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Dóra Fazekas Carbon Market Implications for new EU - UniCredit ...

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(1) Command and control measures are those activities imposed on industry through government<br />

legislation, particularly <strong>for</strong> pollution abatement purposes. In command and control measures<br />

authorities establish the behavior that should be adopted by the actors, by making it mandatory,<br />

allowing <strong>for</strong> little flexibility in the means of achieving policy goals. Command-and-control<br />

regulations tend to <strong>for</strong>ce firms to take on similar shares of the pollution-control burden, regardless<br />

of the cost. They often do this by setting uni<strong>for</strong>m standards <strong>for</strong> firms, the most prevalent of which<br />

are per<strong>for</strong>mance- and technology-based standards.<br />

(2) <strong>Market</strong> based instruments allow more freedom <strong>for</strong> actors to respond in ways they deem most<br />

beneficial to themselves. Robert Stavins (2001) defines market-based instruments as ”regulations<br />

that encourage behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives regarding<br />

pollution control levels or methods (p. 358.). Economic instruments encourage behavior through<br />

price signals rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods.<br />

These instruments are based on the correction of prices in existing markets, which present<br />

distortions, or in the creation of <strong>new</strong> markets that enable the internalization of environmental<br />

externalities. In theory, if properly designed and implemented, market-based instruments allow any<br />

desired level of pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest overall cost to society, by providing<br />

incentives <strong>for</strong> the greatest reductions in pollution by those firms that can achieve reductions with<br />

least cost (Stavins, 2003).<br />

Two main groups of these instruments are quantity-based instruments, like standards and tradable<br />

permits on the one hand, and price-based instruments, like taxes or subsidies and fees, on the other<br />

hand. Both types of instruments are cost effective, but they differ in what is fixed and what is<br />

variable. For permits, the quantitative target is fixed, which provides a straight<strong>for</strong>ward measure of<br />

environmental progress as well as compliance, and the price of the permits is variable. For price-<br />

based instruments the monetary incentive is fixed <strong>for</strong> a certain period of time, reducing uncertainty<br />

<strong>for</strong> investors, but taxes/subsidies offer no guarantee that the environmental impact will be limited to<br />

a certain level or a certain amount of permits used.<br />

<strong>Market</strong> based instruments are of vital importance from the point of view of this dissertation as the<br />

European Union is aiming at reducing GHG emissions by establishing a market <strong>for</strong> emissions<br />

allowances. There has been an important shift in policy towards the use of market mechanisms, the<br />

key argument <strong>for</strong> the use of market mechanisms is now widely recognized, namely that in<br />

comparison with conventional C&C regulation, they have the potential to reduce the economic<br />

costs associated with a given level of environmental protection (OECD, 1999).<br />

(3) Decentralized approaches rely on policies that allow the individuals involved in environmental<br />

pollution to work it out. This category of instruments includes mainly the so-called voluntary<br />

14

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