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Table 7-5. PEM encryption algorithms supported by OpenSSL Cipher String AES with 128-bit keys AES-128-CBC AES with 192-bit keys AES-192-CBC AES with 256-bit keys AES-256-CBC Blowfish BF-CBC CAST5 CAST-CBC DES DES-CBC DESX DESX 2-key Triple-DES DES-EDE-CBC 3-key Triple-DES DES-EDE3-CBC IDEA IDEA-CBC RC2 RC2-CBC RC5 with 128-bit keys and 12 rounds RC5-CBC The part of the DEK-Info field after the comma is a CBC initialization vector (which should be randomly generated), represented in uppercase hexadecimal. The way encrypted PEM representations work in OpenSSL is as follows: 1. The data is DER-encoded. 2. The data is encrypted using a key that isn’t specified anywhere (i.e., it’s not placed in the headers, for obvious reasons). Usually, the user must type in a password to derive an encryption key. (See Recipe 4.10. *) The key-from-password functionality has the initialization vector double as a salt value, which is probably okay. 3. The encrypted data is base64-encoded. The OpenSSLAPI for PEM encoding and decoding (include openssl/pem.h) only allows you to operate on FILE or OpenSSL BIO objects, which are the generic OpenSSLIO abstraction. If you need to output to memory, you can either use a memory BIO or get the DER representation and encode it by hand. The BIO API and the FILE API are similar. The BIO API changes the name of each function in a predictable way, and the first argument to each function is a pointer to a BIO object instead of a FILE object. The object type on which you’re operating is always the second argument to a PEM function when outputting PEM. When read- * OpenSSLuses PKCS #5 Version 1.5 for key derivation. PKCS #5 is an earlier version of the algorithm described in Recipe 4.10. MD5 is used as the hash algorithm with an iteration count of 1. There are some differences between PKCS #5 Version 1.5 and Version 2.0. If you don’t care about OpenSSLcompatibility, you should definitely use Version 2.0 (the man pages even recommend it). 358 | Chapter 7: Public Key Cryptography This is the Title of the Book, eMatter Edition Copyright © 2007 O’Reilly & Associates, Inc. All rights reserved.
ing in data, pass in a pointer to a pointer to the encoded object. As with the DER functions described in Recipe 7.16, OpenSSL increments this pointer. All of the PEM functions are highly regular. All the input functions and all the output functions take the same arguments and have the same signature, except that the second argument changes type based on the type of data object with which you’re working. For example, the second argument to PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey( ) will be an RSA object pointer, whereas the second argument to PEM_writeDSAPrivateKey( ) will be a DSA object pointer. We’ll show you the API by demonstrating how to operate on RSA private keys. Then we’ll provide a table that gives you the relevant functions for other data types. Here’s the signature for PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey( ): int PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(FILE *fp, RSA *obj, EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb callback, void *cb_arg); This function has the following arguments: fp Pointer to the open file for output. obj RSA object that is to be PEM-encoded. enc Optional argument that, if not specified as NULL, is the EVP_CIPHER object for the symmetric encryption algorithm (see Recipe 5.17 for a list of possibilities) that will be used to encrypt the data before it is base64-encoded. It is a bad idea to use anything other than a CBC-based cipher. kstr Buffer containing the key to be used to encrypt the data. If the data is not encrypted, this argument should be specified as NULL. Even if the data is to be encrypted, this buffer may be specified as NULL, in which case the key to use will be derived from a password or passphrase. klen If the key buffer is not specified as NULL, this specifies the length of the buffer in bytes. If the key buffer is specified as NULL, this should be specified as 0. callback If the data is to be encrypted and the key buffer is specified as NULL, this specifies a pointer to a function that will be called to obtain the password or passphrase used to derive the encryption key. It may be specified as NULL, in which case OpenSSL will query the user for the password or passphrase to use. Representing Keys and Certificates in Plaintext (PEM Encoding) | 359 This is the Title of the Book, eMatter Edition Copyright © 2007 O’Reilly & Associates, Inc. All rights reserved.
Page 3 and 4:
Secure Programming Cookbook ΤΜ fo
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Secure Programming CookbookΤΜ for
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Table of Contents Foreword . . . .
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5.8 Using a Generic OFB Mode Implem
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8.10 Performing Password-Based Auth
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12.10 Restructuring Arrays 672 12.1
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they are in the top 50% of safe dri
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think you are in, you will probably
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the C programming language, with so
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igger risks than anticipated. You s
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Recipe Compatibility Most of the re
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The O’Reilly web site for the boo
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Chapter 1 CHAPTER 1 Safe Initializa
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using the code in this recipe on Wi
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variables you preserve, be sure to
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ptr = (char *)new_environ + (arr_si
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an impersonation token for a thread
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Creating a new process with a restr
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array that is the Privileges field.
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eturn 0; } if (!LookupAccountName(0
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privileges. We strongly advise agai
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#include #include #include #incl
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sockets provide a means by which fi
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The privman library provides a numb
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The potential for security vulnerab
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It’s important to remember that t
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Discussion execve( ) is the system
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should call pclose( ) to clean up t
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dup2(stdout_pipe[1], 1); close(stdo
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lpCommandLine Any command-line argu
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#include #include #include void
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and a saved user ID. * The effectiv
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See Also Recipes 1.3, 1.4, 2.8 2.2
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of the object, regardless of what t
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There are many other situations whe
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if (!(fd = opendir("."))) break; if
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spc_file_wipe( ) A wrapper around t
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if (pattern_pass(fd, buf, sizeof(bu
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CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
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2.7 Restricting Access Permissions
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eset the umask between your adjustm
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Locking files on Windows Where Unix
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NFS older than Version 3 in particu
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a loop until all the data is read.
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if (!(hResourceLock = CreateMutex(0
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generator. The code presented here
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access to the filesystem, the poten
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Chapter 3 CHAPTER 3 Input Validatio
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components of the system are truste
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try to use them. For example, what
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To combat malicious uses of “%n
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Discussion Buffer overflows get a l
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Unfortunately, strlcpy( ) and strlc
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The second problem area occurs when
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(see Recipe 3.2). The format-string
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safestr_release( ) or safestr_free(
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Solution Unfortunately, integer coe
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which the records begin. Generally,
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pointer or a different value altoge
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if (!(new_environ = (char **)malloc
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if (spc_environ) free(environ); env
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GetFullPathName( ) requires the len
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if (*c != '%' || !isxdigit(c[1]) ||
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3.10 Preventing Cross-Site Scriptin
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* These are HTML tags that do not t
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*ptr++ = *c; } while (*++c != ’>
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Finally, if you are using the LIKE
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Table 3-2. UTF-8 encoding byte sequ
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the connections to the server. The
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SPC_FD_SET read_mask; for (;;) { sp
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To ensure that you choose the right
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See Also Recipe 13.2 4.2 Generating
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This function takes the following a
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} break; default: if (isspace(p[0])
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*p = 0; return output; } } } The pu
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} return result; case -1: if (stric
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#define MAX_WORDLEN 4 /* len parame
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Discussion This function spc_words2
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4.9 Using Salts, Nonces, and Initia
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the lifetime of the key; the counte
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#include #include #include #incl
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#include #include /* This value n
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} CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, hK
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cryptographic one-way hash from a t
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HMAC_CTX c; unsigned long ctr = 0,
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database does not support binary st
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Remember to use a MAC anytime you e
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For many different reasons, it can
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A more portable but less accurate w
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Chapter 5 CHAPTER 5 Symmetric Encry
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Discussion Be sure to read this dis
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Pentium III, which should give a go
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locations where 40-bit keys or 56-b
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can arise. For general-purpose use,
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or similar mechanism is used. As wi
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shares many properties with CTR mod
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case, the faster of the two algorit
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parison to standard modes. As of th
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work, which severely limits portabi
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Table 5-4. Implementations for the
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Plaintext block 1 Plaintext block 2
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typedef struct { SPC_KEY_SCHED ks;
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If you are using padding and you kn
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This function has the following arg
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if (ol) *ol = out - start; return 1
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that the state function is always r
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Note that this code depends on the
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if (!il--) return 1; ctx->nonce[ctx
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one block at a time, by encrypting
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spc_memset(key,0, kl); memcpy(ctx->
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5.9 Using a Generic CTR Mode Implem
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These two functions also erase the
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we ignore that because it will alwa
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Once those bindings are made, the Z
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output Buffer into which the plaint
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eturn the number of valid bytes in
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In CBC, CFB, and OFB modes, encrypt
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void spc_pctr_do_odd(SPC_CTR2_CTX *
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5.15 Performing File or Disk Encryp
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Therefore, we’ll show you LION, b
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} RC4_set_key(&k, HASH_SZ, (char *)
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techniques from Chapter 8), the key
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communicate asynchronously (that is
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key Pointer to the encryption key t
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Table 5-6. Cipher instantiation ref
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While RC2, RC4, and RC5 support abs
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The function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl( )
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Discussion As a reminder, use a raw
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ol = 0; if (!(ret = (char *)malloc(
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The “official” RC4 key setup fu
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Discussion One-time pads are provab
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Once a provider context has been su
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Table 5-8. Symmetric ciphers suppor
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hKey Key to use for performing the
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if (!CryptAcquireContext(&hProvider
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exportable from key objects, but th
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Chapter 6 CHAPTER 6 Hashes and Mess
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Generally, you should prefer an enc
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See Also Recipes 6.7, 6.8, 6.12 6.2
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Noncorrelation It should also be co
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Let’s look briefly at the pros an
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Solution In most cases, instead of
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MAC (which we recommend), we strong
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Libraries with cryptographic hash f
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#include int main(int argc, char *
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See Also Implementations of SHA-256
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CryptAcquireContext(&hProvider, 0,
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To ensure the best security, we str
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if (!(vfy = (unsigned char *)malloc
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you might use a library such as Ope
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Otherwise, you can use the HMAC imp
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if (klen inner[i] ^= key[i]; ctx->o
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OMAC has been explicitly specified
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unsigned char c1[SPC_BLOCK_SZ]; /*
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ing the all-zero data block. Each p
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CMAC is the message-integrity compo
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To postprocess, we encrypt the hash
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6.15 Constructing a Hash Function f
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unsigned char b[SPC_KEY_SZ]; size_t
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Figure 6-2. The Mayas-Meyer-Oseas c
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c->ix = 0; c->tl = 0; } static void
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modes such as CWC and CCM are start
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authentication in a straightforward
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SPC_HMAC_Reset(&ctx); SPC_HMAC_Upda
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divide up the data stream between t
Page 335 and 336: Chapter 7 CHAPTER 7 Public Key Cryp
Page 337 and 338: The code presented in this chapter
Page 339 and 340: Because public key encryption is so
Page 341 and 342: Solution There’s some debate on t
Page 343 and 344: 7.4 Manipulating Big Numbers Proble
Page 345 and 346: There’s a similar function for as
Page 347 and 348: Additionally, you can ask for a ran
Page 349 and 350: In addition, you might wish to test
Page 351 and 352: Table 7-2. Math operations supporte
Page 353 and 354: 313, 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353,
Page 355 and 356: for (b = 0; !BN_is_odd(x); b++) BN_
Page 357 and 358: BIGNUM *dP, *dQ, *qInv; } RSA_PRIVA
Page 359 and 360: This would map to the hexadecimal v
Page 361 and 362: compute d. Without those two primes
Page 363 and 364: The constants that may be used to s
Page 365 and 366: When using OpenSSL, decryption can
Page 367 and 368: ecommend using it, unless you are c
Page 369 and 370: ture is valid. A successful check w
Page 371 and 372: et = RSA_verify(NID_sha1, hash, 20,
Page 373 and 374: #define MIN(x,y) ((x) > (y) ? (y) :
Page 375 and 376: memcpy(signedtext, decrypt, 16); if
Page 377 and 378: h_ret Optional argument that, if no
Page 379 and 380: siglen The number of bytes written
Page 381 and 382: data ready to go into the certifica
Page 383 and 384: ut it requires you to pass in the l
Page 385: LjKQ2r1Yt9foxbHdLKZeClqZuzN7PoEmy+b
Page 389 and 390: Table 7-6 lists the FILE object-bas
Page 391 and 392: Solution The correct method depends
Page 393 and 394: Use across applications For some pe
Page 395 and 396: key agreement protocol, where both
Page 397 and 398: consider slightly more sophisticate
Page 399 and 400: Kerberos does assume that the envir
Page 401 and 402: The function used to look up user i
Page 403 and 404: The group structure that is returne
Page 405 and 406: found, NULL will be returned, and G
Page 407 and 408: ReferencedDomainName = (LPTSTR)Loca
Page 409 and 410: if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGA
Page 411 and 412: if (!(spc_host_rulecount % 256)) {
Page 413 and 414: } else { if (inet_addr(tmp) = = INA
Page 415 and 416: 8.5 Generating Random Passwords and
Page 417 and 418: for this list is not insignificant.
Page 419 and 420: file, it may allocate a sizable amo
Page 421 and 422: On Windows, you can use the standar
Page 423 and 424: Once getpass( ) or readpassphrase(
Page 425 and 426: ters typed by the user. Instead, th
Page 427 and 428: compute the future time at which th
Page 429 and 430: decrypt the encrypted data. To make
Page 431 and 432: On systems that support MCF through
Page 433 and 434: for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { MD5_In
Page 435 and 436: CryptHashData(hHash1, lpszKey, dwKe
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Solution Use the PBKDF2 method of c
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Verifying a password encrypted usin
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c Pointer to an integer that will r
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each of these pieces of information
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server-side part of the authenticat
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8.14 Authenticating with HTTP Cooki
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char *spc_cookie_encode(char *cooki
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• Let the salt be public, in whic
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extra Additional application-specif
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xl Pointer into which the length of
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With a valid socket descriptor in h
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11. The client and the server compu
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Some people like to use a fixed mod
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Often, you’ll want to generate a
Page 465 and 466:
Discussion Remember, authentication
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• Provide the user with some way
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if (!fgets(answer, sizeof(answer),
Page 471 and 472:
uffer = (char *)realloc(buffer, buf
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compromise. If our system has such
Page 475 and 476:
When using RSA, if you’re doing o
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see the confirmation request and th
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Upon receipt of a response to a con
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BOOL SpcConfirmationCreate(LPCTSTR
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Additionally, over time, SSPI-speci
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if (!spc_verify_cert_hostname(SSL_g
Page 487 and 488:
The next step is to call spc_accept
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Discussion Session caching is norma
Page 491 and 492:
if (BIO_do_connect(conn)
Page 493 and 494:
The next step is to connect to the
Page 495 and 496:
DWORD dwHeadersLength = 0; LPSTR lp
Page 497 and 498:
attempt to develop and debug SSL-en
Page 499 and 500:
API for encryption and decryption,
Page 501 and 502:
memcpy(in_data.data, inbuf, inlen);
Page 503 and 504:
*outlen = out_data.length - (blksz
Page 505 and 506:
so. Likewise, any process with the
Page 507 and 508:
struct sockaddr_un *addr_unix; *dom
Page 509 and 510:
error_exit: if (sock) spc_socket_cl
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different ways. On FreeBSD systems,
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msg.msg_iov->iov_base = (void *)&sy
Page 515 and 516:
it’s unique and unpredictable! Yo
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if (mysql_real_connect(mysql, host,
Page 519 and 520:
maintenance. Adding or removing ser
Page 521 and 522:
ut they shouldn’t tolerate reorde
Page 523 and 524:
#define SPC_CLIENT_DISTINGUISHER 0x
Page 525 and 526:
} static void spc_ssock_write( int
Page 527 and 528:
while (mlen) { if ((r = read(fd, ms
Page 529 and 530:
In such cases, you need to be able
Page 531 and 532:
Discussion One of the big motivator
Page 533 and 534:
A digital certificate contains info
Page 535 and 536:
Certificate revocation What happens
Page 537 and 538:
cate as long as it still has its pr
Page 539 and 540:
Currently, OCSP is not nearly as wi
Page 541 and 542:
ple is the permissible uses for a c
Page 543 and 544:
automated email to the address you
Page 545 and 546:
The type of code-signing certificat
Page 547 and 548:
10.3 Using Root Certificates Proble
Page 549 and 550:
Table 10-1. CA certificates, their
Page 551 and 552:
ights of the entity tied to that ce
Page 553 and 554:
10.5 Performing X.509 Certificate V
Page 555 and 556:
sk_X509_free(spc_store->crls); sk_X
Page 557 and 558:
X509_LOOKUP *lookup; store = X509_S
Page 559 and 560:
CertGetIssuerCertificateFromStore(
Page 561 and 562:
HCERTSTORE hCertStore; PCCERT_CONTE
Page 563 and 564:
See Also Recipe 10.11 10.7 Verifyin
Page 565 and 566:
SPC_X509STORE_SSL_VERIFY_NONE This
Page 567 and 568:
verify_flags |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_
Page 569 and 570:
int spc_verify_cert_hostname(X509 *
Page 571 and 572:
for (i = 0; !bResult && i < pNameIn
Page 573 and 574:
only work you really need to do is
Page 575 and 576:
digest = EVP_sha1( ); fingerprint_l
Page 577 and 578:
if (cert && (uri = get_distribution
Page 579 and 580:
"\xb3\x9c\x25\xb1\xc3\x2e\x32\x53\x
Page 581 and 582:
headerlen -= (*datalen + 2); if (*d
Page 583 and 584:
In this recipe, we have used a numb
Page 585 and 586:
{ "\x8d\x26\xff\x2f\x31\x6d\x59x\29
Page 587 and 588:
LocalFree(pvStructInfo); return 0;
Page 589 and 590:
lpFullBuffer = lpNewBuffer; lpBuffe
Page 591 and 592:
of tunable variables that affect th
Page 593 and 594:
SPC_OCSPRESULT_CERTIFICATE_VALID =
Page 595 and 596:
* All done. Set the return code bas
Page 597 and 598:
Solution There are essentially thre
Page 599 and 600:
the byte is even, he reduces the nu
Page 601 and 602:
See Also Recipes 11.16, 11.18, 11.1
Page 603 and 604:
11.3 Using the Standard Unix Random
Page 605 and 606:
a pointer to data. Instead, they re
Page 607 and 608:
if (errno = = EINTR) continue; perr
Page 609 and 610:
Here we show how to use this functi
Page 611 and 612:
attacks are a realistic threat, you
Page 613 and 614:
This function never fails (save for
Page 615 and 616:
Using a stream cipher as a generato
Page 617 and 618:
One very safe way to use a cryptogr
Page 619 and 620:
out Buffer into which the random da
Page 621 and 622:
1. Figure out how big a seed you ne
Page 623 and 624:
0x00 Query the amount of entropy be
Page 625 and 626:
strncpy(a.sun_path, EGD_SOCKET_PATH
Page 627 and 628:
} } while (nb = = -1); } } } See Al
Page 629 and 630:
nbytes Number of bytes of entropy t
Page 631 and 632:
See Also • EGADS by Secure Softwa
Page 633 and 634:
If the generator is not seeded with
Page 635 and 636:
Discussion In all cases, you will s
Page 637 and 638:
Solution Because of the way that fl
Page 639 and 640:
double spc_rand_cunifvariate(double
Page 641 and 642:
See Also Recipe 11.11 11.16 Compres
Page 643 and 644:
It would be nice if you did not hav
Page 645 and 646:
For this reason, we think the full
Page 647 and 648:
} int cur_val, i, j, runsz; unsigne
Page 649 and 650:
See Also • NIST Cryptographic Mod
Page 651 and 652:
ecause even if a source does fail c
Page 653 and 654:
you use a seed file, you can just c
Page 655 and 656:
• If you have to accept data from
Page 657 and 658:
with a high-resolution clock (i.e.,
Page 659 and 660:
Collecting entropy from the keyboar
Page 661 and 662:
f[c + 2] = '>'; } else snprintf(bf,
Page 663 and 664:
SpcGatherKeyboardEntropy( ) uses th
Page 665 and 666:
} } if (hWndParent) EnableWindow(hW
Page 667 and 668:
number of bits of entropy has been
Page 669 and 670:
} return TRUE; pDlgData->cbRequeste
Page 671 and 672:
See Also Recipes 11.19, 11.20 11.22
Page 673 and 674:
Discussion We strongly recommend th
Page 675 and 676:
Chapter 12 CHAPTER 12 Anti-Tamperin
Page 677 and 678:
tecture-specific checks to determin
Page 679 and 680:
ure or to examine a hardware valida
Page 681 and 682:
• Detecting modification to a com
Page 683 and 684:
for (j = 8; j > 0; j--) { if (crc &
Page 685 and 686:
#include CRC_START_BLOCK(test) int
Page 687 and 688:
Solution Obfuscating compiled code
Page 689 and 690:
" movl 0f( , %%ebx ), %%eax \n\t" \
Page 691 and 692:
Because library functions are loade
Page 693 and 694:
encoded as a series of 32 Obcode bi
Page 695 and 696:
12.5 Performing Constant Transforms
Page 697 and 698:
12.7 Splitting Variables Problem La
Page 699 and 700:
12.9 Using Function Pointers Proble
Page 701 and 702:
arrays. This array type will hide t
Page 703 and 704:
eak; case SPC_ARRAY_FOLD: index = (
Page 705 and 706:
The following example demonstrates
Page 707 and 708:
Discussion The techniques for hidin
Page 709 and 710:
12.12 Detecting Debuggers Problem S
Page 711 and 712:
Discussion The spc_trap_detect( ) f
Page 713 and 714:
12.14 Detecting Windows Debuggers P
Page 715 and 716:
The int3 interface can also be used
Page 717 and 718:
To demonstrate the effect this macr
Page 719 and 720:
08048388 83 db 83h ; â 08048389 7D
Page 721 and 722:
ine the instruction making the refe
Page 723 and 724:
mprotect(buf, buf_len, PROT_READ |
Page 725 and 726:
eturn 4; } /* get entry point : her
Page 727 and 728:
need to use one of the three ring3
Page 729 and 730:
cates failure, it’s likely that n
Page 731 and 732:
tion gets caught. The only ways to
Page 733 and 734:
memory location will generally stil
Page 735 and 736:
eturn dst; } volatile void *spc_mem
Page 737 and 738:
The mlock( ) system call on Unix im
Page 739 and 740:
Discussion Both C and C++ allow the
Page 741 and 742:
Do not share signal handlers. Sever
Page 743 and 744:
#endif } static int signal_was_caug
Page 745 and 746:
paper reached the widest audience,
Page 747 and 748:
The proper way to handle a program
Page 749 and 750:
handles[0] = cond; handles[1] = mut
Page 751 and 752:
#ifndef WIN32 pool->tids = (pthread
Page 753 and 754:
#define SPC_ACQUIRE_MUTEX(mtx) pthr
Page 755 and 756:
if (socketpool_limit > 0 && socketp
Page 757 and 758:
Table 13-1. Resources that may be l
Page 759 and 760:
ability to run. The default limits
Page 761 and 762:
Note that the structures as present
Page 763 and 764:
access to the machine. This makes i
Page 765:
ing log entries. It is possible, ho
Page 768 and 769:
attacks (continued) capture replay
Page 770 and 771:
CFB (Cipher Feedback) mode, 167, 18
Page 772 and 773:
deriving symmetric keys from a pass
Page 774 and 775:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding( ), 227
Page 776 and 777:
integrity checking cipher modes, 16
Page 778 and 779:
message digests (continued) desirab
Page 780 and 781:
parallelizing MACs, 304 parent and
Page 782 and 783:
RAND_bytes( ), 604 RAND_load_file(
Page 784 and 785:
session ID context, 461 session IDs
Page 786 and 787:
spc_gather_keyboard_entropy( ), 631
Page 788 and 789:
symmetric cryptography, 116-154 alg
Page 790 and 791:
Windows (continued) Win 2000, restr
Page 792:
oads. They will often travel up to
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Problem - Kevin Tafuro

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