Constraints to Increasing Agricultural Productivity in Nigeria: A Review

Table 17. Distribution of farmers by commodity and farm size, southwest Nigeria
Study Commodity Activity Farm size (ha) NO % %
Adesokan (2007) Cassava Production
Ajibola (2006) Cassava Production
Murana (2005) Maize/ Sorghum Production
Oladele (2006) Rice Production
Erhoyoma (2003) Cassava Production
Kukoyi (2005) Maize Production
0-2.00
2.01-3.00
3.01 or more
Total
0-2.00
2.01-3.00
3.01 or more
Total
0-3.00
3.01-7.00
7.01 or more
Total
0-1.00
1.01-2.00
2.01 or more
Total
0-2.00
2.01-4.00
4.01 or more
Total
0-1.50
1.51-2.00
2.01 or more
Total
Women’s access to land is through their household membership as wives, daughters, or sisters.
Under Islamic law, which applies in most of the north of Nigeria, women are entitled to inherit
half of the share of their male counterparts in the family. Women often end up surrendering such
inherited lands when they marry outside their own community (NARP 1994).
36
52
8
20
80
77
17
6
100
69
22
4
95
39
24
17
80
47
25
12
84
76
4
0
80
65
10
25
100
77
17
6
100
72.7
23.2
4.2
100
48.8
30
21.2
100
Subdivision of holdings among household members prevails as a consequence of the
inheritance system. But the size of land per capita depends ultimately on population pressure,
the amount of land available to each household, and the specifics of the inheritance law in each
community. In the former Kaduna state (now Kaduna and Katsina states), the average farm size
was found to be 3.3 ha (NARP 1994). In Bauchi state, the same study found average farm size
to be 2.9 ha (Table 18).
56
29.8
14.2
100
Table 18. Distribution of farm size (%) in Kaduna/Katsina, Sokoto/Kebbi, and Bauchi states
Percentage of farms
less than
Kaduna/ Katsina
(formerly Kaduna state)
Sokoto/ Kebbi (formerly
Sokoto state)
2.0 ha 47.1 41.2
Bauchi state
25.0
95
5
0
100
4.0 ha 76.5 77.7 58.3
6.0 ha 87.1 89.2 80.0
Source: NARP 1994.
An important institutional constraint is absence of clear title to land. This may limit access to
formal credit since the farmer cannot use land as collateral, and may reduce incentives to invest
in land-quality maintenance and improvement. Because poor farmers cannot afford alternative
farmlands, nor do they have customary access to lands not inherited, they remain on depleted
lands and further degrade such resources. Thus, poverty and custom may constrain farmers’
ability and willingness to mitigate land degradation, leading to declining productivity.