190%202013%20Mar_Apr

100
contemporary strategic environment. 45 Without adapting expeditionary warfare to the point
where its concepts reflect the type of small wars and crises that modern Western militaries
now generally face, the original concepts and ideas of expeditionary warfare would offer little
and risk being discarded.
The way in which its ideas have been voraciously embraced by such militaries suggests the
opposite. Despite the often fair criticism directed at modern expeditionary concepts, such ideas
remain important in providing militaries with the context by which their doctrinal choices can
be made. Provided the strategic circumstances of the present age remain consistent, there is
no reason why the post-Cold War ideas and concepts of expeditionary warfare, which envision
small force operations against varied opponents, will evaporate into obscurity.
Yet the unfolding strategic environment does give reason to question the permanency and
indeed relevance of the contemporary fascination in expeditionary operations by Western
militaries. 46 If the US strategic dominance declines relative to rising powers such as China, its
strategic freedom of action is likely to similarly decline, conspiring to limit the ability of it—
and the military forces of its allies—to execute effective expeditionary operations. Concern for
addressing the challenges of anti-access, area-denial weaponry is already having a considerable
effect on US military posture, with new concepts such as ‘AirSea Battle’ reinvigorating theatre
warfare, arguably at the expense of modern forms of expeditionary operations. 47
With the US still seeking to retain its pre-eminent position as a world superpower, and with
increasing budgetary pressure, in a ‘strategic reset’ it is conceivable that the way expeditionary
warfare is conducted in the future will be very different to the present. 48 Offensively-oriented
expeditionary forces could once again be relegated to being a symbol of force posture,
prestige and coercive influence in peace—as they were during the Cold War—rather than
as a realistic tool for projecting power. 49 So it may seem that in moving into a possibly ‘postexpeditionary’
era, strategic circumstances will once again influence how expeditionary
warfare’s core ideas will be expressed. It is even possible that the question will be asked as to
whether expeditionary warfare, and post-Cold War style expeditionary operations, will be a
viable operational option in the future at all.
Conclusion
The concepts and ideas of any form of warfare are often adapted or invented to suit strategic
necessities and, in the case of modern expeditionary warfare, the correlation between the
two is quite clear. While the post-Cold War strategic environment has certainly given reason
for militaries to focus their attention on expeditionary warfare, it has also given them cause
to adapt historical concepts and introduce new ideas to suit the unique features of modern
wars and crises.
In the main, this is a logical, mature and indeed expected way for such militaries to act.
Had the Cold War continued, it is likely that expeditionary warfare would have remained
an underinvested operational concept—and with good reason. Instead, the turmoil of the
modern era, characterised by transnational conflicts and the influence of a variety of state and
non-state actors, has ensured the opposite. From amphibious roots, expeditionary warfare has
been adapted to suit militaries and coalition organisations in this tumultuous time.