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An overview of strategic air power theories
The prominent strategic air power theories focus on its use to conduct strategic bombing.
The strategic bombing theories of three early air power theorists—Douhet, Trenchard and
Mitchell 13 —and the modern theorist Warden are dominant in the discourse and debate over
whether strategic air power has met the expectations of theorists. 14
Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell each advocated theories of strategic bombing which would
provide a nation with the means to bypass an enemy’s defences and allow attacks against
population and industrial centres in order to collapse an enemy’s will and ability to fight. 15
They believed strategic bombing would prove to be the most decisive form of future warfare,
allowing for quick victories without the need to defeat an adversary’s ground forces or mount
an invasion. The use of strategic bombing would also avoid the attrition of World War 1-type
trench warfare. 16 Common to each of the theories was the concept that strategic bombing
could independently win wars. 17
Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell’s strategic bombing theories were a product of their time.
All were strong advocates of independent air forces following World War 1. 18 For Clark,
Trenchard’s advocacy of strategic bombing ‘seems not to have stemmed from some deeplyheld
and reasoned conviction’ but rather to ensure the continued independent survival of
the RAF during the 1920s. 19 Arguably, the early theorists’ desire for independent air forces
influenced their theories—and their claims about what strategic bombing could achieve. For
Kainikara, the early theorists were guilty of overstating the case for air power. 20
The most significant differences between the theories espoused by Douhet, Trenchard and
Mitchell lay in the targeting strategies they advocated. For Douhet, the civilian population
was the ultimate target of strategic bombing. 21 He considered high-explosive, incendiary and
poison gas bombs should be used in order to create panic among the population targeted
so they would turn against their government and demand hostilities cease. For Conversino,
Douhet’s theory involved ‘widespread destruction and indiscriminate slaughter’. 22
Trenchard proposed an approach where civilian morale could be indirectly undermined
by attacking supporting infrastructure, including industry, economy, communications or
transportation networks. 23 He considered the impact of bombing on morale was greater
than the destruction achieved and did not advocate the direct targeting of civilians. 24 For
Mitchell, civilian morale was to be broken by targeting an enemy’s industry, infrastructure
or agricultural interests. 25 Mitchell’s theory would contribute to the development of the
US Army Air Force’s precision attack doctrine, where strategic bombing was used to target key
nodes or bottlenecks in an enemy’s industry. 26
Warden rose to prominence as a modern air power theorist following the 1991 Gulf War. 27 His
theory viewed the adversary as a ‘system of systems’ and relied on improvements in air attack
capabilities, including precision-guided munitions to allow selective targeting of decisive
centres of gravity. 28 Warden’s targeting strategy—the five rings model—conceptualised a
series of five concentric rings radiating out in priority order, from leadership in the centre and
processes, infrastructure, population and fielded forces forming the outer rings respectively. 29
Warden’s strategic air power theory involves ‘parallel warfare’—simultaneous air strikes
focused on leadership, and command and control targets—aimed at achieving strategic
paralysis rather than attacking the enemy’s economy as proposed by Mitchell. 30 Similar to
early air power theorists, Warden believed his theory would allow the use of air power to