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At the tactical level, there are also a number of measures that can be undertaken to reduce the
reliance on degradable communications. Firstly, commanders can physically move between
their formations, directly monitoring progress and concentrating on decisive points at critical
times. For example, during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and again in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM in 2003, the coalition’s forward corps commanders successfully employed this
technique, using helicopters as a highly mobile command post. 39
Another technique, used by both corps headquarters in the example above, 40 is for the
higher headquarters to establish multiple tactical command posts to facilitate the presence
of key members of the headquarters staff close to the battle—in effect, creating a ‘two-way
directed telescope’. 41 The intent of these tactical command posts is not to direct the actions of
subordinate formations but rather monitor and report to the commander to facilitate greater
situational awareness. Also, in the event that subordinates are unable to communicate with
the commander and require guidance regarding a changed situation, the staff can respond
based on what they know of the current situation and the designs of the commander.
More broadly, the best way of improving the effectiveness of C 2 in a degraded information
environment is to emphasise the philosophy of what the US Marine Corps calls ‘mission
command’, which empowers ‘subordinates exercising initiative in accord with the superior
commander’s intent’. 42 Mission command is dependent, however, on subordinates providing
situational awareness to the higher commander. 43 Thus, mission command still heavily relies
on two-way communication between commanders, their staff and their subordinates.
Moreover, in its currently-practised form, mission command can only go so far—once
subordinates have achieved their initial goals, what happens next is unknown without further
command guidance. That is because most operational orders and briefs omit the basis for
understanding the environment and problem, such as the relationships between actors or the
rationale for decisions and undesired outcomes. At a minimum, commanders must ensure
their subordinates know what is required for operational and strategic success. Subordinate
commanders and their key staffs must know how they and all other formations fit into the
bigger plan, and they must be intimately involved in the design and planning for operations to
ensure they understand the vision of their higher commander and staff.
Conclusion
The ADF and allied militaries have acknowledged the likelihood of conducting future operations
in a degraded information environment. However, they have invested limited thought and
resources into developing ways to mitigate information degradation. Nevertheless, the threat
is very real, including potential attacks on computer and space-based systems, which would
impair significantly the ability of Australia and its allies to conduct military operations. At best,
local degradation would retard tactical actions and be an annoyance. At worst, whole units
could be rendered ineffective.
Australia and its allies must therefore immediately prepare to operate in a degraded information
environment by planning and training for such scenarios. They must reinvigorate older C 2 and
communications systems and processes, complementing existing space-based technologies to
achieve redundancy and ensure situational awareness. They must also develop the capability
to deny an adversary information superiority by developing cyber-warfare and counter-space
systems. Most importantly, Australia and its allied partners must enhance ‘mission command’