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20. This is based on the Government’s commitment to stability and security within the South Pacific
and East Timor area, as outlined in Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific
Century: Force 2030, p. 54.
21. Such a requirement is argued to extend from the previously-stated desire to disrupt possible military
bases and staging areas: see Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century:
Force 2030, p. 53.
22. Based on government guidance stating the possibility that Australia may have to contend with
a major power operating in the approaches to Australia, and may need to meet such a situation
without combat support from other nations: see Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the
Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 65.
23. Of all the nations within the ADF’s primary operating environment, only Indonesia has a submarine
or air strike capability: see, for example, Jane’s, World Navies, 2012: see accessed 14 July 2012.
24. Jane’s, World Navies.
25. Department of Defence, Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 107.
26. In this case, despite having practically no naval forces, the North Koreans were able to deny the
allied forces sea control in a region through their use of mines: see Till, Seapower: a guide for the
21st century, p. 219.
27. Current estimates give JSF a combat radius of 580 nm without tanker support. The KC-30 refuelling
capability would extend this range, allowing airpower to be projected from bases in Australia into
Indonesia and West Papua: see A. Borgu, A Big Deal, Australia’s Future Air Combat Capability,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI): Canberra, 2004, p. 42.
28. C. Kopp, ‘SU 30 vs. RAAF Alternatives’, Australian Aviation, September 2003, p. 37.
29. Sea Power Centre-Australia, ‘The Navy’s New Aegis’, Semaphore, No. 7, 2009, p. 2.
30. Jane’s, World Navies.
31. J.R. Hill, Air Defence at Sea, Ian Allan: London, 1988, p. 13.
32. A. Preston, Sea Combat off the Falklands, Collins: London, 1982, pp. 113-14. Preston argues the
modern Seawolf armed units performed well against Argentinian forces and that the majority of
failures in the performance of naval surface-to-air missiles were attributable to the older Seacat and
Seaslug missiles.
33. H. White, Buying Air Warfare Destroyers: a strategic decision, Lowy Institute for International Policy:
Sydney, 2005, p. 6.
34. A. Davies, ‘Navy Capability Review 2010’, ASPI Policy Analysis, 2010, No. 65, p. 6; also A. Davies,
‘The Enemy Below: Anti-Submarine Warfare and the ADF’, ASPI Special Report, Vol. 2, 2007, p. 20.
35. Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 72.
36. Davies, ‘The Enemy Below: Anti-Submarine Warfare and the ADF’, p. 23.
37. C. Kopp, ‘Chengdu J-XX Stealth Fighter Prototype’, Air Power Australia, 2011: accessed 14 July 2012.
38. H.J. Kearsley, Maritime Power in the Twenty First Century, Dartmouth Publishing Company:
Dartmouth, 1992, p. 103.
39. B. Pacey, ‘Australia’s Future Surface Combatants’, Kokoda Foundation Papers, No 11, June 2010,
p. 25.
40. Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 53.