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74 33. Samuel Morrison, History of the US Naval Operations in World War II: Coral Sea, Midway and submarine operations, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1988, p. 189. 34. Miller, War Plan Orange, p. 320. 35. However, Morrison in History of the US Naval Operations in World War II provides an additional driver for this rapid change in orientation towards unrestricted submarine operations. He asserts that Japan’s calculated breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor absolved the US from observing restrictions on naval warfare. While this may have played a small part in the calculations of US planners, the inherent logic of using submarines to choke off Japan’s supply of overseas materials—as had been required by continuous iterations of War Plan Orange—was the more likely reason. As Dean-Burns notes in ‘Regulating Submarine Warfare, 1921-41’, p. 60, ‘it was not reprisal so much as the military imperative that caused Washington to reverse its opinion on naval laws’. 36. These SORG groups employed IBM machines to analyse the debriefings of submarine crews. See Meigs, Slide Rules and Submarines, pp. 169-75. For the impact of the SORG, see also Friedman, US Submarines Through 1945, p. 234. 37. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 236. 38. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation 1941-1945, Transportation Division: Washington DC, May 1947, p. 114. 39. Arthur Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, Peter Davies: London, 1967, p. 215. 40. DeRose, Unrestricted Warfare, p. 170. 41. Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, p. 215. 42. Parrish, The Submarine, p. 407. 43. Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, pp. 219-20. 44. Blair, Silent Victory, p. 552. 45. From 19.4 to 16.4 million tons 46. The situation with tankers saw a net increase in tonnage from 686,000 tons to 863,000 tons. See Blair, Silent Victory, p. 552. 47. Lautenschlager, ‘The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001’, p. 120. 48. Imports of bulk commodities in 1943 showed a sharp drop, from 19.4 million tons in 1942 to 16.4 million tons in 1943. As Atsushi Oi has noted, in August 1943 the Japanese also discovered that the sinking rate of torpedoed ships had drastically increased. Oi was a Japanese naval officer during the Second World War and served on the Grand Escort Fleet headquarters. See Atushi Oi, ‘Why Japan’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Failed’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 78, No. 6, June, 1952, p. 593. 49. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 273. 50. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 276. See also Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, p. 225. When organised in December 1943, the 901st Air Flotilla was composed of one unit equipped with 48 land-based twin-engine bombers and another unit equipped with 32 four-engine flying boats. In January 1945, it reached its maximum strength of 168 aircraft of various types. See US Government, ‘Interrogation Nav No. 74, Anti Submarine Warfare – Captain Kamide, 12 November 1943’ in The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: interrogations of Japanese officials, OPNAV-P-03-100. 51. After the death of Admiral Kogo in 1944, his replacement Admiral Toyoda retained this concept, while revising it as the ‘A-Go’ operational plan. See Samuel Morrison, History of the US Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VIII: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1989, pp. 12-4. Also Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 357. 52. Holmes, Undersea Victory, pp. 302-29. 53. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 273. 54. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation 1941-1945, p. 49.
55. Holmes, Undersea Victory, p. 329. 56. Blair, Silent Victory, p. 816. 57. Overy, Why the Allies Won, p. 229. 58. The Kongo on 21 Nov 1944. Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes, Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee: Washington DC, February 1947, p. 18. 59. These were fleet carriers Shokako (30,000 tons) on June 19, Taiho (31,000 tons) on 19 June, Shinano (59,000 tons) on November 29 and Unryu (18,500 tons) on December 19; and the escort carriers Otaka (20,000 tons) on August 18, Unyo (20,000 tons) on September 16 and the Jinyo (21,000 tons) on November 17. See Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes, pp. 11-20. 60. Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes, pp. 8-20. 61. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation 1941-1945, p. 5. 62. Blair, Silent Victory, p. 877. 63. Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power, pp. 223-7. 64. The performance of the smaller US submarine fleet in the Pacific was significantly better than that of the larger German submarine fleets in the Atlantic in both World Wars. 65. Blair, Silent Victory, pp. 877 and 991. 66. For a total of 5,320,000 tons. See Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes, p. vii. It is also estimated that submarines were responsible for the death of 67,000 Japanese merchant seamen during the war: see Y. Horie, ‘The Failure of the Japanese Convoy Escort’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1956, p. 1081. 67. Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes, p. v. 68. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation 1941-1945, pp. 2-4. 69. US Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: the war against Japanese transportation 1941-1945, pp. 2-4. 70. Robert Pape, ‘Why Japan Surrendered’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 1993, p. 160. 71. See Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan: Report by the Combined Staff Planners, 2 December 1943 (CCS 417), contained in Louis Morton, The United States Army in World War Two: strategy and command – the first two years, Center of Military History: Washington DC, 1962, Appendix T. 72. Lautenschlager, ‘The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001’, p. 119. 75
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Australia’s Maritime Strategy Vic
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CONTENTS Australian Defence Force I
Page 6 and 7:
4 As usual, we have a selection of
Page 8 and 9:
6 Figure 1: South-east Asia Soverei
Page 10 and 11:
8 does this mean for a maritime str
Page 12 and 13:
10 Vice Admiral Griggs joined the R
Page 14 and 15:
12 As you have all undoubtedly obse
Page 16 and 17:
14 the word ‘choice’. Does anyo
Page 18 and 19:
16 to the school inspired by the Pr
Page 20 and 21:
18 He was the Commanding Officer of
Page 22 and 23:
20 Continental versus maritime stra
Page 24 and 25:
22 MacArthur’s island-hopping cam
Page 26 and 27: 24 As we look into the future, chan
Page 28 and 29: 26 We proved the effectiveness of t
Page 30 and 31: 28 Hornets from 75 Squadron. Our re
Page 32 and 33: 30 Reframing the Defence Discourse:
Page 34 and 35: 32 This perception is reinforced by
Page 36 and 37: 34 However, the exact nature of a d
Page 38 and 39: 36 Capability Joint Force-In- Being
Page 40 and 41: 38 or problems in capability develo
Page 42 and 43: 40 The budget debate: contextualisi
Page 44 and 45: 42 will mean that Defence may only
Page 46 and 47: 44 Counterinsurgency Lessons from t
Page 48 and 49: 46 only in a selective sense. They
Page 50 and 51: 48 Although there were miscalculati
Page 52 and 53: 50 For these tribal societies, the
Page 54 and 55: 52 10. Effendi, ‘Military Operati
Page 56 and 57: 54 An overview of strategic air pow
Page 58 and 59: 56 control, oil industry and electr
Page 60 and 61: 58 basis, the effectiveness of atte
Page 62 and 63: 60 31. T.M. Biddle, ‘Chapter 25 -
Page 64 and 65: 62 The US Submarine Campaign in the
Page 66 and 67: 64 The submarines were a mix of cla
Page 68 and 69: 66 based on sound bearings. Similar
Page 70 and 71: 68 Wolf packs. Early in hostilities
Page 72 and 73: 70 As Figure 4 shows, the submarine
Page 74 and 75: 72 NOTES 1. This article is an edit
Page 78 and 79: 76 Sea Control in Amphibious Operat
Page 80 and 81: 78 operations with some level of se
Page 82 and 83: 80 The forces of a major Asia-Pacif
Page 84 and 85: 82 20. This is based on the Governm
Page 86 and 87: 84 Coal 22 % Natural Gas 18 % Nucle
Page 88 and 89: 86 Japan has also worked hard to di
Page 90 and 91: 88 The most significant impediment
Page 92 and 93: 90 Other environmental and economic
Page 94 and 95: 92 NOTES 1. This is an abridged ver
Page 96 and 97: 94 45. ‘Last Japan nuclear reacto
Page 98 and 99: 96 This doctrine is an indicator of
Page 100 and 101: 98 addressing the challenges of the
Page 102 and 103: 100 contemporary strategic environm
Page 104 and 105: 102 11. D. Showater, ‘Prussian-Ge
Page 106 and 107: 104 Refocusing the Australia-PNG Re
Page 108 and 109: 106 and effort. Particularly within
Page 110 and 111: 108 as support to PNGDF operations,
Page 112 and 113: 110 NOTES 1. Comments by the newly-
Page 114 and 115: 112 Operating in a Degraded Informa
Page 116 and 117: 114 This increased reliance has exc
Page 118 and 119: 116 At the tactical level, there ar
Page 120 and 121: 118 2015. One year later, he advanc
Page 122 and 123: 120 Book reviews In Business and Ba
Page 124 and 125: 122 Starting with the Portuguese at
Page 126 and 127:
124 Dogfight: the Battle of Britain
Page 128 and 129:
126 Masters’ heartening conclusio
Page 130 and 131:
128 The impending centenary of the
Page 132 and 133:
130 highest level, and early German
Page 134 and 135:
132 Overall, the reader is left wit
Page 136 and 137:
134 It is a very personal history,
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS The Australian
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