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basis, the effectiveness of attempting to target civilian morale with strategic bombing is
questionable—highlighting one reason why the past use of strategic air power has not met air
power theorists’ expectations.
Finally, the early theorists were overly optimistic about what technology could achieve. 78 All
underestimated the difficulties associated with bombing accuracy and overestimated the
damage that bombing would create. 79 . During the bomber offensive of World War 2, the US
Army Air Force was to discover that their precise attacks were not ‘precise’, while the RAF
was forced to adapt its bombing strategy in response to early poor results. 80 While precisionguided
munitions have improved the capabilities of air forces to strike targets precisely, the
experiences of early air power theorists should make modern theorists and practitioners wary
of making overly optimistic claims about the capabilities of strategic air power, both in a joint
setting and to government, lest they fall into the trap of their predecessors by over-promising
and under-delivering. 81
Conclusion
A key feature of strategic air power theories has been that strategic bombing would provide
the means to bypass an adversary’s fielded forces and directly attack their industrial and
population centres in order to collapse an adversary’s will to fight—meaning strategic
bombing could independently win wars. This article has tested this tenet by examining the
World War 2 combined bombing offensive, the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo conflict to
determine whether strategic air power had achieved this aim. The evidence suggests that while
air power made a significant contribution to these conflicts, there is no definitive evidence to
demonstrate that strategic air power was solely responsible for the outcomes.
In the absence of such evidence—and while the assumptions that more broadly underpin
the theories of strategic air power remain inconsistent with its practical application—it is
difficult to conclude that the use of strategic air power has ever realised the expectations of its
theorists. If this is the case, a fundamental question worthy of deeper exploration is raised—
how will current practitioners of strategic air power ensure its use realises the expectations,
not only of theorists, but also of their commanders and political masters into the future?
Squadron Leader Adrian Reeve joined the RAAF as an Intelligence Officer in 1995. He has served
in a range of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence postings. Graduating from the
Australian Command and Staff College in 2012, Squadron Leader Reeve is currently posted to
Headquarters Joint Operations Command.
NOTES
1. This article is an edited version of a paper, titled ‘The use of strategic air power has never realised
the expectations of air power theorists’, submitted by the author while attending the Australian
Command and Staff College at the Australian Defence College in 2012.
2. Air Power Development Centre, ‘The Concept of Strategic Bombing: Has it come of age?’, Pathfinder,
Issue 179, 2012.
3. M.J. Conversino, ‘The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack’, Parameters, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1998,
p. 29.