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This increased reliance has exceeded the capacity of the existing military satellite system. To
meet the demand, the US Department of Defense has partnered with a range of allied military,
commercial and civil systems. However, this has introduced further potential vulnerabilities. 19
One such vulnerability was exploited on multiple occasions in 2007 and 2008 when computer
hackers, allegedly linked to the Chinese military, interfered with two US Government satellites
used for climate and terrain observation through a ground station in Norway. 20
Under international law, all space powers have unimpeded satellite over-flight of all other
nations, as well as the freedom to manoeuvre their satellites close to another state’s space
assets. The US approach has been to achieve information and space dominance by fielding a
greater number of more advanced technologies than its competitors. 21 However, it is evident
that several other states are increasingly intent on developing the capability to degrade
satellite-enabled systems. 22
The five major disruption methods are anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, high altitude
electromagnetic pulse weapons, high-power microwave weapons, jamming and spoofing,
and cyber-attacks. The world has already seen the results of some of these capabilities. For
example, China proved its ASAT capabilities with the destruction of one of its own weather
satellites in 2007 and by the manoeuvring of its own satellites next to one another in 2010. 23
The rate of Chinese advancements in ASAT technologies, including ground-based laser systems,
makes it inevitable that they will possess the ability to target the mid-earth orbit, where GPS
satellites are located. The ability of China to identify and track satellites is also improving—a
prerequisite for conducting counter-space operations.
These abilities, combined with the space-based systems that China is currently establishing in
order to become self-reliant, mean that the threat of a degraded information environment is
very real. 24
Impact on the battlefield
The impact of degraded space systems will vary, depending on the scale and type of attack.
A small-scale strike may consist of limited electronic-warfare jamming, using relatively
inexpensive equipment with effective ranges up to 200 kilometres. 25 Such an attack could
degrade GPS and communication signals within an area of operations. A large-scale attack,
where both ground-based and space-based platforms are disabled or destroyed, could result
in the almost total elimination of space-enabled capabilities in an area of operations. If caught
unprepared, the latter scenario—while probably not achievable by any potential adversary
until later this decade at the earliest—would certainly cripple most allied operations. 26
The effects of disrupting GPS, by targeting satellite-enabled systems, would be felt most in the
C 2 of allied forces in a theatre of operations. Yet US operating concepts such as network-centric
warfare 27 and ‘Enhanced Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations’ 28 are largely based on the
assumption of assured C 2 . The reality, which potential adversaries clearly realise, is that these
concepts may become untenable in a degraded information environment. Recent Chinese
doctrine, for example, has identified information warfare as integral to achieving information
dominance by targeting C 2 networks. 29 Indeed, China’s emergent ability to destroy or disrupt
key elements of an adversary’s battle network has the potential to seriously degrade allied
power-projection operations. 30