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38 or problems in capability development. Conversely, timeline C suggests that a significant change has occurred in the strategic environment, resulting in a 20-year reduction in strategic warning, which has rapidly increased the ADF’s risk of having to engage in a defence of Australia campaign. Finally, timeline D represents a situation in which the threat is assessed to have dissipated. This simplistic representation illustrates how changes in Australia’s strategic environment impact on strategic warning time, with significant repercussions for Defence’s baseline preparedness requirements and ability to mobilise. It also highlights the increased risks inherent to basing preparedness posture around operational trends rather than the defence of Australia principle. Should Defence adopt an approach to preparedness that placed Australia’s ‘black swan’ contingency to the periphery in order to focus on the ebb and flow of operational activities (short-term preparedness requirements), it risks doing so at the cost of sustaining the baseline preparedness requirements necessary to effectively mobilise within a strategic warning time. Preparedness for short-term and baseline requirements are often mutually supportive but the distinction unclear, as the former is often the ‘free good’ of preparing for the latter. For instance, as represented in Figure 1, many of the ADF’s current operations (for example, peace and stability operations in Afghanistan) provide personnel with opportunities to use capabilities and enhance their skills and knowledge that support the maintenance of baseline requirements. Without the maintenance of baseline capabilities and capacities during benign strategic periods, Defence is unlikely to have a sufficient base from which to mobilise if required in the future. Mobilisation Mobilisation is intimately tied to Defence’s preparedness requirements (see Figure 4). The exact capabilities, capacities, skills and knowledge of the mobilised JFIB will depend on the military threat in response to which Australia is mobilising. In other words, the nature of force expansion and mobilisation will be dependent on the assessed threat and strategic warning time generated by Australia’s intelligence services. However, the capabilities on which defence bases its mobilisation plans need to provide a credible force both in terms of effect in the battle space and as a foundation for force expansion. For example, reservists are often identified as a capability ready-made for force expansion. However, given that 14 per cent of reservists are either employees or volunteer members of civilian emergency services (Department of Defence Census 2011 Public Report 2012, p. 31), this may diminish their mobilisation potential. Figure 6 illustrates the three ‘Bs’ of preparedness management with respect to mobilisation: bought, built and brought. Baseline preparedness is the foundation for force expansion with regard to the capabilities and capacities bought by the government. Mobilisation builds on this base to generate a mobilised joint force. Finally, the capabilities and capacities brought by Australia’s partners represent the final component of a joint force mobilised for the defence of Australia. The exact capabilities and capacities required for such a campaign would be informed by intelligence assessments. Intelligence reporting not only shapes planning for what is bought as baseline and built during mobilisation but also the contributions potentially brought by coalition forces.
Capacity Summary Mobilisation of additional capacity (more of the same) Joint Force-In-Being Capability $AUD Bought by the Budget Australian Mobilised Joint Force Mobilisation of additional capabilities $AUD Built through Mobilisation Figure 6: Bought, Built and Brought Brought by Allies Coalition Forces in support of a defence of Australia campaign Time The defence of Australia principle underpinning Defence’s preparedness and mobilisation activities and planning exemplifies the risk-based focus of the ADF and the central guiding principle of Australia’s approach to national security (see Rudd 2008). Preparedness acts as a unifying mechanism to connect policy, military strategy and cost realities. In return for its annual budgetary allocation, Defence maintains ‘baseline’ preparedness requirements while remaining postured to meet the preparedness contingencies more probable in the short term. To be effective, strategic hedging requires the ADF to both engage in operational activities in support of the national interest while maintaining an adequate foundation from which to mobilise. For government, the decision to strategically hedge against a future ‘black swan’ contingency means that constraints on the Defence budget during benign strategic periods will require a much greater fiscal commitment in the future should mobilisation be necessary. Ultimately, strategic hedging is only appropriate if the budgetary allocations during strategically-benign periods ensure the sustainment of appropriate baseline preparedness. Under circumstances in which Australia is under direct military threat, future mobilisation would be reliant on significant access to government outlay to effectively transform capabilities and capacities necessary for the defence of Australia. The critical challenge here is determining what is (and what is not) possible through mobilisation, and understanding the implications for the force structure design of the joint force. 39
Page 1 and 2: Australia’s Maritime Strategy Vic
Page 3: CONTENTS Australian Defence Force I
Page 6 and 7: 4 As usual, we have a selection of
Page 8 and 9: 6 Figure 1: South-east Asia Soverei
Page 10 and 11: 8 does this mean for a maritime str
Page 12 and 13: 10 Vice Admiral Griggs joined the R
Page 14 and 15: 12 As you have all undoubtedly obse
Page 16 and 17: 14 the word ‘choice’. Does anyo
Page 18 and 19: 16 to the school inspired by the Pr
Page 20 and 21: 18 He was the Commanding Officer of
Page 22 and 23: 20 Continental versus maritime stra
Page 24 and 25: 22 MacArthur’s island-hopping cam
Page 26 and 27: 24 As we look into the future, chan
Page 28 and 29: 26 We proved the effectiveness of t
Page 30 and 31: 28 Hornets from 75 Squadron. Our re
Page 32 and 33: 30 Reframing the Defence Discourse:
Page 34 and 35: 32 This perception is reinforced by
Page 36 and 37: 34 However, the exact nature of a d
Page 38 and 39: 36 Capability Joint Force-In- Being
Page 42 and 43: 40 The budget debate: contextualisi
Page 44 and 45: 42 will mean that Defence may only
Page 46 and 47: 44 Counterinsurgency Lessons from t
Page 48 and 49: 46 only in a selective sense. They
Page 50 and 51: 48 Although there were miscalculati
Page 52 and 53: 50 For these tribal societies, the
Page 54 and 55: 52 10. Effendi, ‘Military Operati
Page 56 and 57: 54 An overview of strategic air pow
Page 58 and 59: 56 control, oil industry and electr
Page 60 and 61: 58 basis, the effectiveness of atte
Page 62 and 63: 60 31. T.M. Biddle, ‘Chapter 25 -
Page 64 and 65: 62 The US Submarine Campaign in the
Page 66 and 67: 64 The submarines were a mix of cla
Page 68 and 69: 66 based on sound bearings. Similar
Page 70 and 71: 68 Wolf packs. Early in hostilities
Page 72 and 73: 70 As Figure 4 shows, the submarine
Page 74 and 75: 72 NOTES 1. This article is an edit
Page 76 and 77: 74 33. Samuel Morrison, History of
Page 78 and 79: 76 Sea Control in Amphibious Operat
Page 80 and 81: 78 operations with some level of se
Page 82 and 83: 80 The forces of a major Asia-Pacif
Page 84 and 85: 82 20. This is based on the Governm
Page 86 and 87: 84 Coal 22 % Natural Gas 18 % Nucle
Page 88 and 89: 86 Japan has also worked hard to di
Page 90 and 91:
88 The most significant impediment
Page 92 and 93:
90 Other environmental and economic
Page 94 and 95:
92 NOTES 1. This is an abridged ver
Page 96 and 97:
94 45. ‘Last Japan nuclear reacto
Page 98 and 99:
96 This doctrine is an indicator of
Page 100 and 101:
98 addressing the challenges of the
Page 102 and 103:
100 contemporary strategic environm
Page 104 and 105:
102 11. D. Showater, ‘Prussian-Ge
Page 106 and 107:
104 Refocusing the Australia-PNG Re
Page 108 and 109:
106 and effort. Particularly within
Page 110 and 111:
108 as support to PNGDF operations,
Page 112 and 113:
110 NOTES 1. Comments by the newly-
Page 114 and 115:
112 Operating in a Degraded Informa
Page 116 and 117:
114 This increased reliance has exc
Page 118 and 119:
116 At the tactical level, there ar
Page 120 and 121:
118 2015. One year later, he advanc
Page 122 and 123:
120 Book reviews In Business and Ba
Page 124 and 125:
122 Starting with the Portuguese at
Page 126 and 127:
124 Dogfight: the Battle of Britain
Page 128 and 129:
126 Masters’ heartening conclusio
Page 130 and 131:
128 The impending centenary of the
Page 132 and 133:
130 highest level, and early German
Page 134 and 135:
132 Overall, the reader is left wit
Page 136 and 137:
134 It is a very personal history,
Page 138:
GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS The Australian
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