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6 Figure 1: South-east Asia Sovereignty and Resources
But in examining the notion of a maritime strategy, we really need to understand the strength of the foundations that our strategic discourse is built on. Sadly for us, those foundations are like old wooden piles that hold up a wharf. They support the edifice most of the time but fail when they get the slightest bump or when subjected to a rigorous engineering inspection. A big problem for us in thinking through these issues is that our national security discourse has been overwhelmingly land-centric—and please be assured I do not use this term in a pejorative sense. In some ways this is inevitable. Most human activity takes place ashore and that is where decisions are made. But our national security debate has been a largely binary discussion between the disciples of the ‘continental’ and the ‘expeditionary’ schools of thought. This is a discussion which skews the overall debate and ignores some important changes to our circumstances. As Michael Wesley said recently, what Australia needs is a ‘well developed maritime imagination’. 2 The very notion that we have a term such as ‘the sea-air gap’ in regular use and the fact that the concept has been sustained, at least in academic discourse, for many years now is concerning. The term implies that this area of mixed sovereignty and critical communications routes is both featureless and a valueless space. The Chief of Army’s description of a ‘sea-airland bridge’, used recently in an address to the National Security Institute, 3 at least brings the notions of connectivity and value into play. I have suggested in the past that we need a genuine maritime school of thought to provide the intellectual basis for a maritime strategy. 4 A school of strategic thought relevant to Australia should have an appreciation of our geographic, economic and diplomatic situation; it should include an appreciation of our interests, relative strengths and weakness; and it must be framed by a clear statement of our national aims—and the manner in which we wish to pursue them. Australian strategic thinking often starts with the fact that we are an island continent and that our international trade is overwhelmingly maritime. But it often does not go much further than that. In fact, it is a bit like the mandatory foreword to a document—quickly read and then never considered again. In framing a maritime school of thought, there are a few things that must be recognised. Firstly, it must recognise the sheer scale of our sovereignty and the area where we can exercise sovereign rights. It must recognise the increased pervasiveness of maritime trade and our national dependence on it for our ongoing prosperity. It must recognise the increased value of activity in our maritime environment, be it oil and gas installations, alternative energy generation or the value of maritime biodiversity, reflected in both tourism and food security, particularly the value of farmed and wild fish stocks. It must also recognise that our terms of trade play a significant role in the growth of our real gross national income. But it must also recognise the fundamental vulnerabilities that our geostrategic situation exposes us to in such a highly-interconnected and just-in-time economic system. Finally, it also must recognise the importance of collaboration and cooperation in keeping our global maritime trading system free and open. No single maritime-focused force can achieve this mission, there must be cooperative arrangements and contributions across the whole system. And, of course, this mission cannot be achieved solely with the military instrument, as the ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ White Paper reinforces. 5 Importantly, no school of thought should be reverse-engineered to prop up existing force structures or used as a crutch to justify reductions when times are tight. What 7
Page 1 and 2: Australia’s Maritime Strategy Vic
Page 3: CONTENTS Australian Defence Force I
Page 6 and 7: 4 As usual, we have a selection of
Page 10 and 11: 8 does this mean for a maritime str
Page 12 and 13: 10 Vice Admiral Griggs joined the R
Page 14 and 15: 12 As you have all undoubtedly obse
Page 16 and 17: 14 the word ‘choice’. Does anyo
Page 18 and 19: 16 to the school inspired by the Pr
Page 20 and 21: 18 He was the Commanding Officer of
Page 22 and 23: 20 Continental versus maritime stra
Page 24 and 25: 22 MacArthur’s island-hopping cam
Page 26 and 27: 24 As we look into the future, chan
Page 28 and 29: 26 We proved the effectiveness of t
Page 30 and 31: 28 Hornets from 75 Squadron. Our re
Page 32 and 33: 30 Reframing the Defence Discourse:
Page 34 and 35: 32 This perception is reinforced by
Page 36 and 37: 34 However, the exact nature of a d
Page 38 and 39: 36 Capability Joint Force-In- Being
Page 40 and 41: 38 or problems in capability develo
Page 42 and 43: 40 The budget debate: contextualisi
Page 44 and 45: 42 will mean that Defence may only
Page 46 and 47: 44 Counterinsurgency Lessons from t
Page 48 and 49: 46 only in a selective sense. They
Page 50 and 51: 48 Although there were miscalculati
Page 52 and 53: 50 For these tribal societies, the
Page 54 and 55: 52 10. Effendi, ‘Military Operati
Page 56 and 57: 54 An overview of strategic air pow
Page 58 and 59:
56 control, oil industry and electr
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58 basis, the effectiveness of atte
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60 31. T.M. Biddle, ‘Chapter 25 -
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62 The US Submarine Campaign in the
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64 The submarines were a mix of cla
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66 based on sound bearings. Similar
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68 Wolf packs. Early in hostilities
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70 As Figure 4 shows, the submarine
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72 NOTES 1. This article is an edit
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74 33. Samuel Morrison, History of
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76 Sea Control in Amphibious Operat
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78 operations with some level of se
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80 The forces of a major Asia-Pacif
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82 20. This is based on the Governm
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84 Coal 22 % Natural Gas 18 % Nucle
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86 Japan has also worked hard to di
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88 The most significant impediment
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90 Other environmental and economic
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92 NOTES 1. This is an abridged ver
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94 45. ‘Last Japan nuclear reacto
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96 This doctrine is an indicator of
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98 addressing the challenges of the
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100 contemporary strategic environm
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102 11. D. Showater, ‘Prussian-Ge
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104 Refocusing the Australia-PNG Re
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106 and effort. Particularly within
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108 as support to PNGDF operations,
Page 112 and 113:
110 NOTES 1. Comments by the newly-
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112 Operating in a Degraded Informa
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114 This increased reliance has exc
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116 At the tactical level, there ar
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118 2015. One year later, he advanc
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120 Book reviews In Business and Ba
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122 Starting with the Portuguese at
Page 126 and 127:
124 Dogfight: the Battle of Britain
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126 Masters’ heartening conclusio
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128 The impending centenary of the
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130 highest level, and early German
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132 Overall, the reader is left wit
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134 It is a very personal history,
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS The Australian
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