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included the planned Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—it arguably would be capable of attaining air
and sea control over any potential regional adversary. 27 Indeed, while some have argued that
aircraft such as the Su-30 Mk2 may be of equal or even superior capability to the JSF or Super
Hornet, the latter are only one element of a highly-capable ADF ‘package’, incorporating such
capabilities as air-to-air refuelling, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), and the air
warfare destroyer (AWD)-based phased-array radar system. 28
Moreover, even in an environment where the ADF’s access to airpower may be limited, Force
2030 would likely still have the ability to exercise sufficient air denial in the short term to allow
the attainment of sea control for such amphibious operations as raids and withdrawals. This
is based on the capability proposed in the AWD and future frigates. Together with AEW&C
aircraft, these warships will have the ability to detect and engage aircraft out to 300 nautical
miles through the use of phased-array radars, cooperative engagement capabilities and the
use of SM-6 surface-to-air missiles. 29
Such a system also has significant capability to detect and destroy sea-skimming missiles at
beyond-the-horizon ranges, particularly when operating against current-generation missile
systems. 30 As demonstrated during the Falklands War, surface ships are vulnerable to seaskimming
missiles and most have limited inventories of surface-to-air missiles to counter
them. 31 However, analysis of the Falklands War has shown that units armed with then-modern
air warfare systems were quite capable against the Argentine missile threat and that it was older
units with less capable systems that were particularly vulnerable. 32 Force 2030’s inventory of
surface-to-air missiles would, of course, be a factor in assessing its ‘persistence’ and its ability
to successfully exercise air denial for more than a limited duration.
Having identified airpower projection as a limiting factor in achieving sea control, are there
any other factors which may affect Force 2030? An argument has been made by strategists
such as Hugh White that Force 2030 would be vulnerable to submarine attack and that this
will limit its ability to achieve sea control. 33 However, on current planning, Force 2030 will
have a fleet of up to twelve submarines (often touted as the best platform to counter opposing
submarines), which would provide a significant numerical advantage over any regional state. 34
Added to this is the additional anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability proposed in Force
2030, including SH-60R helicopters with dipping sonar, the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and the
improved sonar suites of the AWD and future frigates. 35
All this adds up to a significant capability to locate and neutralise any regional ASW threat.
Arguments against this capability—based on the difficulties of ASW in the littoral and the time
that may be required to locate a submarine in this environment—are valid but fail to recognise
that the environment also poses significant challenges for submarine operations. 36 When this
is coupled with the technologically-integrated and numerically-superior capabilities of Force
2030, the argument for the littoral advantage of potential adversaries arguably lacks credibility.
The one limiting factor on the ability of Force 2030 to conduct ASW relates to its heavy reliance
on airborne assets. As previously indicated, Force 2030 could face limitations in its ability to
achieve air control. If this is the case, there is some prospect that the impact of airborne ASW
assets would be negated. While surface units and submarines would remain capable, they
would require extended times to cover distance and face elevated risk in intercepting and
neutralising an adversary’s submarines. This is conceded but in the context of Force 2030’s
airpower projection shortfalls, rather than its actual ASW capability to achieve sea control.
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