the sydney 2000 olympic and paralympic games - Australian Sports ...

PART FOUR : NSW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GAMES SUPPORT SERVICES
• Ensure all accredited persons were subjected to appropriate background checking procedures.
• Restrict sensitive areas to accredited persons.
• Sanitise all Olympic venues and sites for the presence of explosive devices prior to ‘lockdown’ of the
venue by SOCOG, and re-sanitise as required on the basis of specific risk.
• Impose screening procedures using metal detectors and searches of hand-carried items, under the
supervision of NSW Police officers, for all spectators entering Olympic venues and sites.
• Apply more thorough checking procedures of all people and items entering higher risk areas such as
the Athletes Village.
• Apply strict and consistent zone controls within each venue and site, aimed primarily at the protection
of the Olympic Family and VIPs.
• Impose strict and consistent controls on the entry of vehicles and commercial materials into all
Olympic venues and sites.
Clear points of reference between OSCC, SOCOG and OCA at strategic, operational and tactical levels
were identified. A basic tenet of this framework was the integration of all Olympic Security personnel under
the command of the NSW Police Service with the Commissioner of Police in operational control. This
included ADF, private security and volunteers who, with police officers, made a security workforce of
approximately 11,500 on peak days. Operational tasking of specialist military personnel was under police
command by agreement.
As the torch relay and some sporting events extended beyond the boundaries of NSW, OSCC provided all
security operational plans and models to interstate and Oceania police services hosting the Olympic
football competition and the torch relay to promote consistency in the security overlay and share the
intensive planning that had been undertaken in NSW.
Games-time Framework
The development of the Games-time command, control and co-ordination framework was based on
centralisation of operational elements and delivery of a rapid response capability, through co-location of
elements in a single operational command facility, known as Olympic Precinct and Regional Operations
(OPRO). Any public safety or security incident occurring in the greater Olympic environment, requiring a
comprehensive on-ground capability to resolve, was notified to OPRO.
OPRO captured operational information through radio communications, closed circuit television (CCTV),
audio conferencing, surveillance and satellite, which made the Olympic environment highly visible. These
arrangements enabled a flexible decision making framework based on directive leadership and a flat
command structure. Contract security staff in Games-time police operations involving the public were
under direct line command of the police to ensure the level of accountability and control expected in the
Australian context.
The NSW emergency service agencies worked closely with OSCC to ensure effective integration of
services throughout the Games. The NSW Fire Brigades had an Olympic Planning Team at OSCC and the
NSW Fire Brigades and Ambulance Service also had security liaison officers.
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