Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

110 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE FIRST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II
trate the ever-widening rift between the two parties and the irreconcilable
positions they held. The first of these meetings took place in Bucharest in
February 1940, and the second in Geneva in May of that year. 46
On the first of these occasions, Yehieli was heavily influenced by the
substance of Edelstein's report to Geneva several weeks earlier. Edelstein
had castigated the Viennese leadership for what he regarded as its abject
acquiescence to Nazi demands and warned of dire consequences should Storfer
take control of aliyah operations in the Reich, including Czechoslovakia. 47
He warned the Mossad that there was good reason to fear that refugee groups
might be infiltrated by German spies, since Storfer was incapable of standing
up to the Gestapo.
Edelstein also described deteriorating circumstances that lent themselves
to a takeover by Storfer. He spoke of an impending plan to prevent those of
working age from leaving the country and permitting only the aged and
children to emigrate. Yet, within the Czech community, the role of the Zionist
Palestine Office in Prague had been undermined because of its inability to
organize aliyah. Moreover, the Kladovo group had not left Yugoslavia, and
large groups already organized in Bratislava and Prague were still waiting.
Edelstein demanded that the Mossad take responsibility for getting these
groups out and that it resist any attempt by Storfer to broaden his authority.
The meeting between Yehieli and Storfer took place at the same time as
the Prague community was preparing to transfer £44,000 to the Mossad for
the purchase of a ship (the Wetan), on which the Mossad intended to transport
1,500 Hehalutz members and older Zionists from Prague. The Mossad hoped
that this ship would also provide a solution to the Kladovo problem. 48
This was the background for Yehieli and Storfer's first meeting. It was
arranged at Storfer's insistence, and Yehieli opposed the meeting. 49 The two
men met at the Hotel Athens in Bucharest in February 1940. According to
Yehieli, Storfer made an effort to be cordial, explaining the nature of his
work and expressing his desire to cooperate with the Mossad. The gist of
Storfer's message (again, according to Yehieli) was that emigration was absolutely
essential given the threat of mass expulsion to Lublin, but that "irresponsible"
aliyah operations, as in the case of the Kladovo group, had
endangered all efforts. Storfer contended that since he had been authorized
by the Nazis to organize Jewish emigration, he was responsible for ensuring
that aliyah activities were properly carried out and past errors corrected. For
this purpose he required not only that all aliyah operations be coordinated,
but that he supervise the initial stages of each one as well. He expressed the
desire that this could be done in cooperation with Yehieli and his group.
To Yehieli, Storfer's bid to cooperate with the Mossad was a ploy to
facilitate his work within the Reich—to legitimate his refugee selection process,
to ease his relations with the JDC, and to secure disembarkation arrangements
in Palestine. Today, however, Storfer's proposal comes across as
a sincere effort to establish dialogue. From the information available, it would
appear that in February 1940 Storfer himself was not certain that he could
control all emigration activity alone, although he was in the process of taking