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Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

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The Mossad and Aliyah bet from Rumania 245<br />

Contested Authority: Bucharest and the Yishuv's Delegation<br />

The optimistic assessment of Kaplan and others in the beginning of 1943 that<br />

organizing transport from the Balkans to Constantinople would prove relatively<br />

simple, and that Turkish boats would be made available, turned out to<br />

be groundless. Despite a report by Misho Benvenisti, chairman of the Zionist<br />

Organization in Rumania (confirmed by the Red Cross in Bucharest), that<br />

Ion Antonescu had requested and received Berlin's permission for the shipping<br />

out of 8,000 children, no boats were available in Rumania. 13 The rescue<br />

mission in Constantinople urged the Rumanian Jewish leaders to acquire<br />

vessels on the local market, but precious little was achieved.<br />

Yet it was the belief of the Mossad that Rumania—even more than Bulgaria—was<br />

a fertile field for the strong strategy of combined legal and illegal<br />

operations. It was difficult to distinguish between substantive objections to<br />

sea transport and objections deriving basically from personal antipathies.<br />

Shind and his colleagues therefore sought to mobilize both Enzer and Benvenisti—who<br />

respectively supported and opposed aliyah bet—for combined<br />

legal and illegal transports. This modus operandi also seemed to fit the Rumanian<br />

context, where so much already depended upon bribe-taking and<br />

other illegal activities.<br />

In the summer of 1943, Enzer had been offered a chance to purchase a<br />

Greek-registered barge, the Smyrni, that could be refitted for use on the open<br />

sea. The aliyah committee of the Rumanian Zionist Organization had no<br />

reason to believe, however, that Rumania would permit a transport to sail<br />

under a Greek flag. In addition, the price being asked for the vessel was<br />

steep. It was necessary in any case to consult Constantinople over the advisability<br />

of buying it. It was decided to send a delegation of committee members—Benvenisti,<br />

Enzer, and Moritz Geiger—to Braila to inspect the boat.<br />

Their hope was that, if the Smyrni could indeed be made seaworthy, an exit<br />

permit could be obtained for it. That would make the transport more or less<br />

legal.<br />

In late August or September, Constantinople sent word recommending<br />

the purchase, with Shind's promise to provide the necessary funds. He and<br />

the other mission members misread the joint action that was taken to inspect<br />

the boat as a sign that Enzer and Benvenisti had resolved their costly dispute<br />

over sea transport. They believed that one successful transport would open<br />

the way to others.<br />

In the fall of 1943, it seemed that conditions were once again favorable<br />

for aliyah bet, but plans fell afoul of political exigencies. Both the Rumanians<br />

and the British were willing to allow children onto the transports, with accompanying<br />

adults. This stipulation revived internal struggles over the composition<br />

of the passenger lists. Shaul Avigur, who arrived in Constantinople<br />

in October to help coordinate operations, dispatched a stern message to the<br />

Jewish leaders in Rumania demanding greater cooperation and unity. He<br />

lectured them about the responsibility they bore and appealed to their historical<br />

sense by reminding them of the collapse of the ancient Jewish revolt

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