Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

208 ALIYAH, RESCUE, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1942 TO 1944
on the home front. Other plans involved the establishment of other centers
for communication and rescue work, in Spain and Sweden, although this
much-discussed idea was never adopted. 17
In late 1942, and even in January 1943, the feeling that no one in the
Allied governments was receptive to Jewish demands had not yet taken hold.
British opinion was aroused and lent moral force to Jewish demands for rescue
activity, as expressed by such prominent figures as the Archbishop of Canterbury
and Cardinal Hinsley, as well as many members of Parliament. The
foreign secretary, at a special session of Parliament on 17 December, read
the joint Allied declaration that stated the intention to prosecute war criminals,
and explicitly mentioned the persecution of Jews for the first time. In
an extraordinary gesture, the House rose to honor the memory of countless
murdered Jewish victims. 18 President Roosevelt repeated this declaration.
Thus, there seemed reason to hope that, this time, the Allies would surge
beyond mere lip service.
As Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok saw it, the Jews of the Yishuv, who
had first grasped the terrible implications of the tragedy, had the duty not
only to initiate and keep up pressure for rescue activity, but also to educate
the greater public about the situation. 19 In retrospect, their trust in the power
of an informed world opinion appears to have been exaggerated, perhaps
even naive; but at the time, there seemed to be a basis for optimism. Under
the circumstances, Zionist leaders were willing to overlook certain ideological
tenets in order to allow the favorable climate of opinion to have maximum
effect. Recall the proposal, accepted in principle by Shertok, that the British
government try to bring Jews out of Nazi Europe while Zionist leaders would
relax the demand to send them on to Palestine. The idea was put forward by
members of the British Parliament, a rescue lobby led by Mrs. Eleanor Rathbone
(MP), who hoped to facilitate rescue work by separating it from the
Palestine question. Shertok's attitude was also approved by the London office
of the Agency. 20
Shertok's assent to a formula implying that Zionist political demands
constituted a practical obstacle to greater rescue efforts deserves close attention.
The Zionist movement had throughout the 1930s insisted on viewing
the fate of Jews as inseparable from the Palestine question. Shertok's position
demonstrated his laudable sensitivity to these extraordinary circumstances,
in which normal procedure had to be overruled.
It also demonstrated his magnificently firm confidence that Zionism, as
the ideal political solution for the Jews, would eventually see vindication. We
may, therefore, conceive of him as a faithful advocate of what we have
described as the realist approach within the Zionist leadership. He was willing
to exploit any opportunity to facilitate rescue, which unavoidably meant cooperating
with the British. He suffered no anxiety that alternative sites for
refugee shelters might someday pose a serious challenge to Zionism. Moreover,
past experience had shown that it was quite difficult to find such sites.
Indeed, Shertok was certain that Britain would have to turn to Palestine as
a solution should a large-scale exit of Jewish refugees from Europe become