Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

350 NOTES
45. ODC, interviews with Ginsburg and Ueberall (Avricl). The testimony of these
men bears clear witness to their negative attitude toward Storfer even today. Ginsburg
describes Storfer as a slick and power-hungry sycophant, and Ueberall stresses that
if the Germans chose Storfer they had their reasons—clearly implying that Storfer
was a collaborator.
46. We have only Yehieli's account of these meetings. Storfer mentions his trips
to Bucharest and Geneva, but he visited these cities on numerous occasions, and he
made no mention of meeting Yehieli. Yehieli presented himself as a potential mediator
between the Mossad and Storfer, not as a Mossad agent himself. It should be pointed
out that Yehieli is unusually accurate and reliable in his reports. Many details mentioned
by him are corroborated by sources in the Vienna Archive (CAHJP AW/2515).
47. On Edelstein's attitude to Storfer, see HA 14/152, Yehieli report, p. 101; also
see Bondy 1981, pp. 184-249, on this and on the problems of emigration from the
Czech Protectorate.
48. See Chapter 3.
49. HA 14/152 pp. 26-27. Yehieli reported as follows: "On my third day in Bucharest
Spitzer called me from Belgrade to let me know that the 'counsellor' [Storfer]
had called on him and that he was most insistent upon arranging a meeting with us.
I told Spitzer that we had no interest in such a meeting at the moment because E-n
[Edelstein] had told me he had full autonomy in carrying out aliyah activities in the
Czech Protectorate and that the refugees from Vienna now at Kladovo had no longer
any link with the Vienna authorities. That day S-r [Spitzer] called again to say that
the 'counsellor' had threatened to interfere in the Czech operation and that in his
opinion a meeting was necessary; otherwise, the whole effort to resolve the Kladovo
problem might be lost. S-r [Spitzer] told me that the 'counsellor' would arrive by night
train and that I might find him at the Athens Palace hotel in Bucharest."
It is worth adding that the Mossad agents were also angry with Loewenhcrz
for having refused to allocate funds for the Kladovo group even though these were
Viennese Jews. The Vienna community had allocated £6,500 for a group of 750
people—a meager sum, given prices of the time. Loewenherz even refused to approach
the JDC with a request for additional aid for the group, reasoning (accurately)
that the JDC would subtract any such amount from the Vienna allocation (ibid.,
p. 10). The Mossad agents undoubtedly associated Storfer with this approach, which
they considered extremely narrow-minded, or, as Yehieli quoted Loewenherz as saying:
"My shirt is closer to me than my coat" (ibid., p. 17).
50. CAHJP AW/2515, 2/1/40 and 3/18/40. On this, see also the testimony of Braun
and Kornfeld, HA 14/417.
51. Compare the testimony of Kornfeld, HA 14/417. He cites both Storfer and
Edelstein on a meeting in Berlin at the Zentralstelle, at which each one tried to argue
the case for his own control over emigration activity and to undermine the Revisionists.
Of course, Storfer and Edelstein contradict each other on the episode.
52. HA 14/153, p. 29.
53. CAHJP AW/2515, 3/31/40, Aktion Notiz, ibid., 4/27/40, Mitteilung 56.
54. HA 14/153, Yehieli, p. 37. This final point is rather astonishing since the chief
point of contention between Storfer and the Mossad, selection of candidates, was the
part of the operation that took place entirely inside the Reich. Organizational work
outside the Reich consisted chiefly of foreign-currency transactions, and this only
allowed them to keep closer watch over Storfer's activities. With regard to Yehieli's
contention that the meeting was at Storfer's request, the contrary is true. According