Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

34 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE FIRST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II
he feared a great public outcry in the event of deportation, but that he was
attempting to calm aroused passions. He also stressed that there was no
problem with spies among the refugees, an abiding British fear, and that, as
in the past, the Jewish Agency would cooperate fully with the government
in this matter.3 5 Yet Shertok was not encouraged by these meetings; if anything,
they convinced him of Britain's determination to carry out the deportation
policy. Likewise, the responses to his frequent telegrams to London
asking for intervention with the Cabinet gave him little cause to hope.3 6
Believing that all possible appeals had been exhausted, Shertok proposed no
further or more militant action on the part of the Yishuv.
A letter from Shertok to Weizmann, written in mid-December, describes
the atmosphere of tension at the time. 37
The Yishuv and its constituted bodies accepted the verdict. After a series of
tense meetings and angry sessions of the Zionist Executive and the Delegates'
Council, and after the illegal publication of pamphlets aimed at defying censorship
regulations . . . there was a peaceful and dignified strike on 20 November
as a sign of protest and of mourning, a sign of identification with the sad
fate of those to be deported rather than a declaration of war [emphasis addcdj.
Shertok refused to consider any further actions even after the government
announced on November 24 that the deportees were to be banned from ever
entering Palestine.
Within the Zionist leadership, there were those who championed the idea
of militancy and mass actions as a means of resisting British policy. Yitzhak
Grucnbaum, head of the Agency's settlement department, thought that the
Agency should pledge itself to a full-scale anti-British campaign to prevent
the deportation. The most extreme position was taken by Eliyahu Golomb,
the head of the Haganah. Golomb called for firm action—not just diplomacy—
to stop the deportation and expressed his views both in meetings of the Mapai
political committee and in telegrams to his colleagues in London. To the latter
he indicated that the Yishuv's response was unpredictable and that Britain
would bear sole responsibility for any consequences. He instructed the London
Zionists to convey this message to the British authorities. 38
The plan to sabotage the Patria was put into effect on November 25, after
it became clear that all diplomatic efforts to abort the deportation had failed.
The plan was to prevent the ship from sailing by placing a bomb on board;
the ship would be disabled and forced to remain in Palestine. 39 The operation
was organized in absolute secrecy—not only from the British, but from the
Zionist establishment as well. Neither the Agency executive nor the political
committee of Mapai was permitted to know of it. The decision was apparently
made by the top leaders of the Haganah: Golomb along with Shaul Avigur
and Yisrael Galili, and with the support of Katznelson. There was no true
consultation with the Agency leadership.
From the evidence available, it seems that even Shertok was unaware of
the details of the plan. In the summer of f977, Shaul Avigur related that