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War Refugee Board, Ira Hirschmann, Britain, Aliyah Activities in Istanbul, 1944 285
What was the contribution of the War Refugee Board to rescue and aliyah
work between the founding of the agency and the liberation of the Balkans?
It would appear that American involvement, and in particular the activity of
Hirschmann and Steinhardt, had a significant impact on the Turkish Foreign
Ministry and the Balkan governments. In the latter case, those elements
supporting a policy of rapprochement with the West combined with a relaxation
of anti-Jewish measures enjoyed a greater measure of influence and
credibility, because they pointed to tangible results like direct contact with
American representatives. Even when it was stressed (by Washington) that
these contacts were directed only to the humanitarian aspects of the Jewish
situation, and were not to be considered political, it was difficult for Balkan
statesmen to accept this at face value.
A mutual dependence developed between the success of Yishuv operations
and the interests of the WRB envoy. The rescue mission required the latter's
intervention with the Turkish authorities, without which it would have been
virtually impossible to carry out the transport of refugees, for the WRB
wanted tangible proof of the successful rescue of Jews from the Nazi grip. It
reaped the benefit of what the Mossad had been planning for long before the
Board and its representative reached Istanbul.
It must be asked, however, whether these achievements were what the
leaders of the WRB, and all those who rejoiced at what was to have been a
decisive change in the dimensions of rescue work, had hoped for. Ambitious
and far-reaching projects—free ports, refugee camps in neutral countries,
the assignment of large American and British ships to the transportation
of survivors, and a decisive attack against the German satellite countries to
liberate the Jews—were never implemented. These projects lay outside the
range of the Board's activity in Turkey, which was the result of the placement
of the WRB and its effectiveness within the overall policy framework
in Washington.
Rescue operations on a large scale might have been put into effect had
the policy of rescue moved from the realm of intent and declaration to the
plane of practical implementation. In March 1944, Reuven Resnick of the
JDC wrote from Istanbul to his colleagues in the United States: "Over a very
brief period the Allies were able to move 20,000 Yugoslavs from southern
Italy to Egypt. They used two troop ships for this. There are ways to move
people for non-military reasons if there is truly a desire to do so. This ought
to serve us as an example." 50 Such a thing did not occur. Despite the sincere
dedication of Hirschmann in Istanbul and of other WRB representatives, this
kind of approach to the rescue of Jews did not have the chance to develop.
Hirschmann's hope—"turning a window in the Balkans into a huge gate
through which masses will pass,"as he expressed it while in the United States
in the spring of 1944—was never realized. 51