Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

216 ALIYAH, RESCUE, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1942 TO 1944
would agree not to seize the vessels in the Mediterranean. The source of this
information also intimated that Rumania would see in the safe voyage of one
refugee transport a sign that subsequent ships could pass on. Rumanian shipping
companies were willing to offer a variety of ships for this purpose. 37
British approval was needed in order to secure a Soviet guarantee of safe
passage in the Black Sea. (Sea voyage became even riskier after 1942, owing
to Soviet-German naval battles that claimed many neutral vessels.) Had the
Rumanian ships actually been made available, it would have been possible
to transport the 5,000 orphans of Transnistria whom the Rumanian government
had first offered to release, even when the plan as a whole ran into
some difficulties. 38 Such a step might have served as precedent for all future
rescue activity, including immigration from Bulgaria.
The ability to arrange aliyah from Rumania with the help of Rumanian
ships would also have solved the terror of sea transport that affected Jews in
Bulgaria and other Balkan countries, well aware as they were of the disasters
of the Salvador and the Struma. Some were convinced that the only way out
was to pressure the governments involved to provide a safe overland route,
such as by rail from Rumania via Bulgaria and Turkey to Palestine. There
were several groups of children from Hungary whose exit was planned exactly
this way. 39 One group indeed completed its journey in January 1943. Yet, as
noted, the number of immigrants that could be accommodated overland was
severely limited. Rail transport in Turkey was so heavily taxed that freight
and military supplies were kept waiting for weeks in harbors and depots.
Thus, despite all the dangers of sea travel, it was an indispensable element
in any plan that involved large numbers of emigrants. This made it seem
worthwhile to maximize the security of shipping arrangements and allay the
fears and suspicions of the various governments. Britain's participation, if
only indirect, would have impressed upon all concerned, including local Jewish
leaders, the gravity of the commitments behind the plan and the measure of
safety required for the sea journey.
Fear of untoward wartime developments interfered with carrying out plans
that seemed, on paper, well thought out. Speedy implementation was of the
utmost importance. During this period, Turkey came under increasing pressure
from both sides to enter the war. It was difficult to know just how long
Turkey would maintain its neutrality, on which so much of the rescue activity
depended.
Throughout this period, many contended that the type of approach being
proposed was unfeasible. Legal and illegal operations, they argued, must
remain separate, since cooperation with Haim Barlas, who was responsible
for handling immigration for the Jewish Agency, would lead the Mossad to
lose some freedom of maneuvering by going through formal channels, both
British and Zionist. They argued that any cooperation with the British would
end in a failure, as was the case in the Kladovo Darien incident. 40
Nevertheless, in early 1943 the advantages of combining legal and illegal
immigration still seemed to outweigh the disadvantages, particularly since this