Dalia Ofer.pdf - WNLibrary

172 ALIYAH, RESCUE, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1942 TO 1944
at the Colonial Office was almost audible as a new round of communications
and notes were sent out. Lord Cranborne instructed MacMichael to intern
the refugees temporarily at Atlit, where the Darien group had been held.
Word was sent to the ambassador in Ankara, so that he might inform the
Turks. 18 At that time, too, the Euxine reached Constantinople with thirteen
people aboard. The British proposed to deal with this on the same basis as
the Michai group. 19
A short respite followed, though reports were constantly received about
Jews planning to leave from Rumania. Cranborne therefore continued to
design his next move. The Jewish Agency pressed the Colonial Office to issue
Palestine visas upon refugee arrival in Turkey. Such visas would ostensibly
simplify arrangements for rail passage to Palestine, thus avoiding the problems
and fears associated with sea transport. The idea met with stiff opposition
from the Foreign Office. 20
Meanwhile, the Mirchea was commencing its difficult journey. As noted,
the British did not have clear instructions on how to respond to MirchecCs
plans. Should they request permission from the Turkish government for the
boat and its passengers to remain in Turkish ports? Or should they pass in
silence over Turkish orders to move the boat from one port to another?
Cranborne was determined to achieve a clear and stated policy. Talks
were held with the Foreign and War Offices over possible places of refuge,
such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Cyprus. The proximity of such locations to the
Mediterranean was Cranborne's chief criterion, as this would enable the boats
to reach their destination safely and under their own steam, with British naval
escorts. 21 The round of discussions on the matter forced Cranborne to the
conclusion that he would have to return to the ideas outlined in his memorandum
of 5 March, and to attempt once again to win support among the
various government offices. In an attempt to cut the Gordian knot once and
for all, MacMichael was summoned to London in late April to take part
personally in the discussions, which were punctiliously prepared by the secretary's
staff. 22
Cranborne and MacMichael reached agreement over the policy changes
to be sought, based on the earlier memorandum to the Cabinet and the cable
that the secretary had sent to Jerusalem on 19 March. They decided to call
upon the Cabinet to reopen the issue—under the government's provision for
renewed discussion of 5 March—and circulated a draft of their proposed plan.
The Foreign Office, in response, noted its preference for a one-time concession
(release of the Darien group from detention) rather than a full-fledged
policy change. Cranborne was opposed: such a course had already proved
incapable of preventing disasters at sea. To win over the Foreign Office,
Cranborne cited MacMichael's support for his position. He particularly emphasized
the high commissioner's fear of possible violence in the Yishuv if
the government failed to provide safe transit for the refugees. 23
Cranborne also sought to allay Foreign Office fears of hostile Arab reactions,
citing MacMichael's opinion that such meetings could be handled
without much difficulty. Cranborne's basic argument was that there could be