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272 ALIYAH, RESCUE, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1942 TO 1944
tionship with Joe Schwartz, a New York Times correspondent in Ankara who
became his principal adviser.
Shortly after his arrival, Hirschmann forwarded a lengthy report to Washington,
detailing rescue-related matters. 9 This illustrates just where he differed
from Ambassador Steinhardt; as Hirschmann clearly felt no obligation to
preserve previous American policies, neither was he concerned about Turkish
sensitivities. He tended to be far more critical than Steinhardt of the Turkish
government. He was, in fact, convinced that Ankara would not be won over
by humanitarian arguments, given the rather harsh Turkish attitude to minorities
in their country—Jews included. It would therefore be best to present
rescue as part of the American political interest in achieving its war aims.
This, in turn, would mean that rescue and refugee immigration would be
perceived as falling in the context of Turkey's own political interests. Hirschmann,
unlike Steinhardt, felt that Turkish resistance to granting transit visas
had played a significant role in halting the emigration of Jews with valid
certificates for Palestine. It was intolerable that processing a transit visa took
fourteen to seventeen weeks, during which the applicants often lost the chance
to emigrate. In addition, the Turks were far from flexible even with regard
to their permission for nine Jewish families per week to enter the country en
route to Palestine. The permits were granted on condition that the families
leave Turkey within twenty-four hours. 10
Hirschmann assumed that it was possible to maneuver with the Balkan
countries because they sought a new tactical position. He believed that his
duties should include establishing contact with various political forces inside
the Balkan countries with a view toward expanding rescue work (about which
more will be discussed shortly). But, in addition, Hirschmann felt that it was
up to the Allies to provide transportation facilities and to declare their intention
to allow large numbers of refugees to enter their countries for a defined
period. Such a step, even if impractical, would have propaganda value in
neutral states like Turkey, whose rescue aid was crucial.11 Exit from Europe
and arrangements for entry to safe havens had to be coordinated, and therefore
the two problems had to be dealt with simultaneously, in order to assure
success.
These two problems—opening discussions with representatives of the Balkan
countries and arranging for transportation with the help of Britain and
the United States—formed the focal points of Hirschmann's activity during
his first stint in Turkey. He proved to be only partially successful in both
areas.
The Tari Affair
Hirschmann's arrival in Turkey coincided with that of two new representatives
from the Yishuv, whose aim was to advance the cause of rescue. The party
from Palestine consisted of Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Herzog and a lawyer, Mordckhai
Eliash, known as an able organizer and skillful mediator. High on
their agenda was the acquisition of Turkish boats for Jewish refugees. Hirsch-