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32 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE FIRST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II
immigration quota had been issued for the first half of 1941. 28 The British
shortly unveiled a plan to deport the ships' passengers from Palestine. The
plan epitomized British immigration policy in general and posed the question
once again of how the Yishuv leadership would respond.
On 3 November 1940, twelve days before the first of the ships, the Pacific,
arrived in Haifa Harbor, Moshe Shcrtok reported to the Jewish Agency
executive that an illegal immigrant ship carrying one thousand passengers
would soon arrive offshore and that others would soon follow. 29 He noted
that there was reason to fear that the British would not grant new entry
permits for the period October 1940 to April 1941, and thus the arrival of an
illegal ship was a partial consolation. The British practice since the summer
of 1939 had been to subtract illegal entrants from the quota of permits (or
from future quotas in the case of the many periods for which no schedules
were issued), thus allowing them to remain in the country. However, before
the three ships even arrived in port, the British revealed a seemingly draconian
plan to discourage further immigration: to transfer the illegal immigrants on
an old vessel, the Patria, to Mauritius, an island under British control that
had been prepared as a center for detainees—political exiles and refugees.
The new British policy constituted a strict formulation of the White Paper,
against which the Zionist leadership felt compelled to protest vigorously.
Shcrtok, in an effort to prevent the pending deportation, contacted Berl
Locker, head of the Agency's political office in London, on November 7.
Shertok urged that the Zionist leaders in London make representations to
the Cabinet, recruit the aid of public figures and friendly members of Parliament,
and attempt to rally public opinion against the scheme. 30 (Similar requests
to arouse public opinion were also made to the American Zionists.)
However, Shertok felt pessimistic about the chances of success. From his talks
with British officials, he knew quite well that the plan to send Jewish refugees
to Mauritius would cause little or no outcry in government circles and among
the British public while London was in the middle of the Blitz. British officials
informed Shertok to that effect, stating that their consciences were perfectly
clear on the issue of the deportations to Mauritius. The lives of the refugees
were certainly not being placed at risk. 31
Shertok was also aware that Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist
Organization and its most influential member in London, looked askance on
illegal immigration and would be reluctant to provoke the British at such a
time. Shertok voiced his doubts about Weizmann's effectiveness in this matter
at a meeting of the Mapai political committee on November 7:
Weizmann has always recoiled at the idea of illegal immigration, and he still
does. It was always a burden to him, and he never speaks of it in meetings
with the government. He will likely tell us that he is in the midst of delicate
talks with the government on an issue of prime concern . . . and cannot take
issue with them now over refugees who left Germany two months ago. 32
Weizmann was not alone in his reluctance to press the British government
on the issue of illegal immigration. Many among the Jewish Agency executive