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282 ALIYAH, RESCUE, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1942 TO 1944
colleagues were pushing the President to declare heavy punishments for Nazis
and their collaborators involved directly or indirectly in the extermination of
the Jews. 41
The formulation of such a declaration had begun in late 1943. The British
did not believe that, apart from propaganda value, it would achieve anything
tangible. Some felt that such a pronouncement might even have adverse
effects, and they pointed to the precedent of December 1942, which had
certainly not prevented the escalation of anti-Jewish persecution. Britain also
knew that the Soviets would not sign a declaration that singled out the Jewish
issue and that had not been coordinated beforehand with them. 42 While London
pondered such weighty questions, however, Lord Halifax transmitted the
text of the declaration as drafted by the WRB. This gave British officials the
opportunity to amend the text, focusing the declaration on the conduct of
the Axis satellites and presenting victimization of the Jews as just another
example of Nazi tyranny.
While such ideas continued to simmer in London, however, Roosevelt at
last issued his long-awaited declaration on 22 March. This was three days
after the invasion of Hungary, an event that aroused the Jews' worst fears. 41
Knatchbull-Hugessen in Ankara was also pushed into action by Ira Hirschmann,
the WRB's reprcsentaivc in Turkey. The British embassy's displeasure
both with Hirschmann and with the support he received from the American
ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt, emerges plainly from dispatches forwarded
to London. Embassy officials angrily complained that the Americans took
credit for every concession won from the Turks, without acknowledging British
efforts. The Milca passengers, in Istanbul on March 31, would have been
deported back to Rumania, the British embassy contended, had the consulate
there not issued them visas for Palestine. Without those, Steinhardt would
have pleaded in vain with the Turks to allow the refugees to stay in Istanbul.
The mutual backslapping of Hirschmann and Steinhardt in the American press
was typical of the American one-sidedness and self-satisfaction. 44
Yet the Refugee Desk at the Foreign Office could not hide its displeasure
that in two months' time four refugee boats bearing 1,200 Jewish refugees
had left Rumania without any British help. 45 There was renewed apprehension
that the ceiling on Palestine certificates issued might be reached before the
war ended, when Britain would still be obliged to cooperate in rescuing Jews.
Plans for transit camps in Tripolitania, Cyprus, Egypt and elsewhere were
once again put on the agenda. It was decided not to grant entry to Palestine
to Jews who were not in immediate danger. This applied to Jews in Turkey
and Yemen, and to Jewish refugees in Italy and Mauritius. 46
British misgivings reached their peak in the second part of July 1944, after
Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian dictator, proclaimed an end to the deportations
and allowed Jews with certificates to emigrate to Palestine and holders
of foreign passports to depart for other countries. This announcment was
transmitted to the Allies through the Red Cross. The Hungarian envoy in
Constantinople himself delivered the message to the representatives of Palestine
Jewry there, Haim Barlas and Eliezer Kaplan.