electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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10 6.4 The top-down view on EWSP ....................................................................129 6.5 Modeling the EWSP capability level.........................................................130 6.5.1 The conceptual model ...............................................................................................130 6.5.2 The problem...............................................................................................................131 6.5.3 Discussion on the Capability Model.........................................................................131 6.5.4 Discussion on Capability Model simulations ..........................................................133 6.5.5 Lessons from building the Capability Model..........................................................135 6.6 Modeling the EWSP campaign level.........................................................136 6.6.1 Conceptualization......................................................................................................136 6.6.2 Discussion on the Campaign Model.........................................................................138 6.6.3 Discussion of simulation results ...............................................................................140 6.6.4 Lessons from building the Campaign Model ..........................................................142 6.7 Modeling the EWSP mission level.............................................................144 6.7.1 Conceptualization......................................................................................................144 6.7.2 Discussion on the Mission Model .............................................................................147 6.7.3 Discussion on simulations and results......................................................................148 6.7.4 Lessons from building the Mission Model...............................................................151 6.8 The holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters, a resolve.............153 6.8.1 The survivability paradigm ......................................................................................153 6.8.2 Additional observations ............................................................................................155 7 DISCUSSION..................................................................................................157 7.1 Description of results..................................................................................157 7.1.1 Recollection of objectives..........................................................................................157 7.1.2 Description of results in the light of the objectives.................................................157 Objective 2: Uniting information on and factors contributing to EWSP ..............................157 Objective 3: Tools or methodologies for communication on EWSP ....................................158 Objective 1: Improved understanding on EWSP of battlefield helicopters ..........................159 Objective 4: The notion “holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters” .......................159 Secondary objectives ............................................................................................................159 Discussion on other issues of concern ..................................................................................160 Discussion on the bottom-up approach.................................................................................161 Summary of experiences from FSD......................................................................................161 7.2 Importance of results, generality, author’s contribution........................161 7.2.1 Importance of results ................................................................................................161 7.2.2 Generality of the work ..............................................................................................162 7.2.3 Author’s contribution ...............................................................................................162 7.3 Conclusion, suggestion for further research ............................................163 Acknowledgements References Appendices
11 SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS SYMBOL DESIGNATION a Attrition rate (coefficient) of enemy forces, Arbitrary (CLD links) b Attrition rate (coefficient) of friendly forces c Attrition rate (coefficient) of enemy by friendly support fire d Attrition rate (coefficient) of friendly forces by enemy support fire k Number of nodes n Refractive index Pfa Probability of false alarm Pd Probability of detection PH Probability of hit PH,m Probability of hit per mission Pk Probability of kill Pk/H Probability of kill, given a hit x Number of enemy forces xs Number of enemy support forces y Number of friendly forces ys Number of friendly support forces Emissivity Reflectivity Pulse/code element length ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION AA Anti-Aircraft AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery AD Analogue-to-Digital AEW Airborne Early Warning AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle AGC Automatic Gain Control AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process AL Aft, Left AlGaN Aluminum Gallium Nitride Al2O3 Sapphire AM Amplitude Modulation AOA Angle of Arrival AOC Association of Old Crows AR Aft, Right ARM Anti-Radiation Missile ASPJ Airborne Self-Protection Jammer ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon BDR Battle Damage Repair BVR Beyond Visual Range BW Bandwidth CAS Close Air Support CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation CATWOE Customer, Actor, Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owner, Environmental Constraints C-band IEEE Std TM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 4-8 GHz CCD Charge-Coupled Device
Page 1 and 2: Helsinki University of Technology,
Page 3 and 4: 3 HELSINKI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Page 5: 5 PREFACE Illis quorum meruere labo
Page 8 and 9: 8 3 THE OPERATIONAL SETTING .......
Page 12 and 13: ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION CCM Counte
Page 14 and 15: ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 14 MMI Man
Page 17 and 18: 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Incentive for th
Page 19 and 20: 19 According to Regev [Reg01] a fun
Page 21 and 22: 21 alternatives and their possible
Page 23 and 24: 23 The second cornerstone for the p
Page 25 and 26: 25 uninteresting to the layman. It
Page 27 and 28: 27 and application of the whole as
Page 29 and 30: 29 relevance to the holistic view.
Page 31: 1.4.4 Organization of the present w
Page 34 and 35: 34 The last objective, to “resolv
Page 36 and 37: 36 of their usability (Table 1). Ho
Page 38 and 39: 38 maps of the Axelrod type are use
Page 40 and 41: 2.3.7 Forrester system dynamics 40
Page 42 and 43: 42 its usefulness to the present wo
Page 44 and 45: 44 When judging the models and simu
Page 46 and 47: 46 reconnaissance role rotorcraft h
Page 48 and 49: 48 popularity over Clausewitz’, g
Page 50 and 51: 3.2.2 Helicopter operations and tac
Page 52 and 53: 52 Weapon Take-off and landing Tran
Page 54 and 55: 54 identification. Also, as a conse
Page 56 and 57: 56 Traditional survivability thinki
Page 58 and 59: 58 3.3.3 Additional considerations
Page 60 and 61:
60 As a conclusion on the discussio
Page 62 and 63:
3.4.2 Helicopter signatures 62 Tabl
Page 64 and 65:
3.4.3 Background signatures 64 NATU
Page 66 and 67:
3.4.5 Summary of phenomenology 66 T
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4.1.2 Non-terminal threat systems 6
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70 MBT to be the prominent killer o
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Missile system Spectral wavelength
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74 Aircraft rockets and guns Fixed-
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76 Weapons technology relies ever m
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78 alternatives is presented in App
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80 Laser technology and guidance La
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82 the attention had been on the S-
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84 4.2.5 Threat technology developm
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86 4.2.7 Conclusions and implicatio
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88 RWR issue Contemplation Threat s
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90 Laser warning receivers The chan
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92 guidance methods and classic ECM
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94 EO countermeasures Some ideas ha
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Examples: - AN/ALQ-144A (US) - L-16
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98 Development of countermeasures f
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100 countermeasures develop in para
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5.2 Support factors 5.2.1 Support f
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104 Figures 42 and 43 make it clear
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Strategic/operational intelligence
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108 fratricide, with one example be
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110 continues throughout the missio
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112 Platform installation is an eng
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114 requires that the helicopter wi
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116 M&S Ground tests OAR flight tes
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118 Platform installation requires
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120
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122 Figure 58 reviews earlier discu
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124 One approach to susceptibility
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126 Based on Figure 59, events last
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HIERARCHY LEVELS Level 7: Strategic
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130 6.5 Modeling the EWSP capabilit
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THREAT DEVELOPMENT DELAY threat dev
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6,000 3,000 0 Threats with CMs 134
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136 3. The model becomes generic wh
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138 6.6.2 Discussion on the Campaig
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140 The influence of EWSP is twofol
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142 Simulation Dynamic behavior Bas
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144 6.7 Modeling the EWSP mission l
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146 Figure 74: Text in figure. Figu
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148 3. Cost-benefit considerations
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150 In the next two simulations—S
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152 for simulations, but better dat
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154 By Definition 2 the survivabili
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156 and 58), without which EWSP can
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158 Chapters 3 through 5 are a syst
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160 In conclusion, the insight gain
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162 paradigm is the most viable alt
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164 when modeling different EWSP sy
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166 16. Ormondroyd, Richard, Profes
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168 Anon95a Anonymous: Additional P
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170 Bil02 Billingsley, D.: Choppers
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172 Col99 Colucci, F.: Smart Surviv
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174 Erw04 Erwin, S.: Army Rushes to
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176 Gol87 Golden, A. jr.: Radar Ele
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178 How90b Howell, G.T., McCord, J.
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180 Kra92 Krabbendam, A.J.: System
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182 Mil74 Miller, W.E. et al.: Beam
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184 Pol97 Polmar, N., Allen, T.B.:
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186 Ros03 Rosander, A.: Statusberä
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188 Ste98 Stevens, R. et al.: Syste
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190 Wil93b Wiley, R.G.: Electronic
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192 APPENDIX 1: AUXILIARY FIGURES A
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Details in Figure 1-1 Wavelength 10
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Sun: Strong emitter with approx. 60
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Target IR detector 1 2 198 Prism 1
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Separation from the aircraft Chaff
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202 Type Table 1-1: IR DETECTORS De
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204 Type Table 1-2b: SCANNING RF RE
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CVR IFM Superheterodyne Channelized
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208 Table 1-3: RADAR SELECTIVITY Se
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Appendix 1, References 210 Ald02 Al
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212 Sch86 Schleher, D.C.: Introduct
Page 214 and 215:
214 Parameters used in the Capabili
Page 216 and 217:
216 Parameter Value Motivation MAXI
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