electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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market developmental equipment as fielded systems. 20 A major risk in analyzing
information lies in “circular intelligence”, with information of questionable origin
being repeated by more reliable sources and therefore becoming more credible
[Hug99 pp.250-251]. An example of this behavior was quantitative data produced by
the Ansbach trials (discussed later) that was commonly used by Soviet writers to
support their own conclusions, and which caused Western writers to imagine that
these figures had come from Soviet experiments [All93 p.249]. For the present work
this highlights the need to ferret out relevant information from the offered lot by
critical analysis and by cross-checking one’s sources to any possible extent. 21
1.4.2 Tentative idea on information for the present work
Information searches for this study have not turned up a single comprehensive
treatment of the discipline of EWSP of battlefield helicopters. There is a hint at such
a study from the 1990s, which the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) sponsored and
which has been briefly reported in Haynes et al. [Hay98], and some results of a
Russian study on helicopter survivability which are given in Platunov [Pla01].
Swedish studies “HKP99352S(F), VMS för helikopter” have also been reported, but
are on a more detailed level than the present work [Ros03]. Useful contributions are
Zanker’s [Zan99] treatise on EWSP integration and Carpers’ [Car84] recapitulation
of aircraft survivability. Some hints at holistic thinking in EW are given in Pywell et
al. [Pyw02]. Pywell et al. is in fact most closely related to the present work. Doctoral
dissertations in the field of EW with some interest to this study have been presented
by Albegami [Alb93] and Santoso [San84]. As the amount of unclassified
information on helicopter EWSP is limited, most examples quoted in the present
work are on fixed-wing aircraft. This introduces a bias, but the assumption is that
despite differences the rotary-wing community can learn by analyzing experiences of
fixed-wing counterparts.
The lack of earlier work that could have acted as a model for a research approach to
this study led to form a tentative idea of information that possibly could be of
being developed in the late 1990s. The Soviet Union was notoriously reluctant to publish any
information, and Russia still does not publish information on systems and technologies that have been
thoroughly investigated by NATO countries. Similarly the US has not published detailed information
e.g. on the track-via missile system of the Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which is claimed to
have been copied into the Soviet/Russian S-300P (SA-10 Grumble) [Fis02a]. Such examples
notwithstanding, military and other government agencies are making increasing use of open source
intelligence [Tur99].
20 There is also a positive side to information coming from manufacturers. Suitably filtered the
message from the industry is a fairly reliable source on development trends in EWSP; particularly if
several companies can be heard on the same subject.
21 An example is shown in the series of speculations on the downing of the F-117A stealth fighter
over Serbia in 1999. The first guess was that the aircraft was targeted with an electro-optical (EO) fire
control system of an S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) battery [Sco99]. A later report suggested that it was
detected by the radar blip of an S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa) battery and downed by a lucky salvo of
missiles, fired in the general direction of the aircraft [Ful99]. A still later report proposed either an S-
125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) or Kub/Kvadrant (SA-6 Gainful) missile system, to which the Serbs had
been offering upgrade packages including optical fire control [Zal00]. The last report agrees with
Russian claims that the honor of the first stealth kill goes to two Kub (SA-6 Gainful) missiles
[Anon03]. According to Pitts [Pit00], inadequate stand-off jamming directly contributed to the loss,
while Lambeth [Lam02] mentions failed ELINT (electronic intelligence) and weaknesses in
operational procedures.