electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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rotorcrafts have distinct advantages over helicopters, particularly in being faster and
less noisy in vertical flight. On the other hand, “flying around threats” is equivalent
to loss in useful combat radius, the flight profile in landing zones is not unlike that of
a helicopter and therefore introduces similar susceptibility concerns, and the acoustic
signature of tilt-wing aircraft increases significantly when transiting to hover profile.
[Hed00 pp.51-54, Kan97] The future may see cooperation between unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and attack helicopters [Col99], where UAVs provide real-time
surveillance information and perform high risk reconnaissance and jamming
support. 45 Despite the advantages of attack helicopters, they should not be expected
to replace main battle tanks (MBTs) in the near future [Blu99]. MBTs have
advantage over helicopters in being able to take and hold objectives. For instance, the
Danish experience from deploying six MBTs to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998 showed
that the Danish force received respect from opposing forces in the conflict [Lak01]. 46
3.1.5 Conclusions on helicopters
Battlefield helicopters have advantages that make them attractive for use on the
battlefield in various tasks. From the survivability standpoint their strength lies in
their ability to utilize terrain masking; simultaneously this advantage makes them
prone to encounter ground fire. Helicopter technology will not see any major changes
in the foreseeable future; this conclusion is evident also in a RAND study on heavy
transport rotorcraft [Gro03]. Helicopters face competition from other types of
platforms, but it can be expected that present platform types will coexist on the
battlefield during the time frame of interest for the present work although the number
of UAVs increases.
3.2 The battlefield
3.2.1 Conflicts and threats
Security thinking prior to the demise of the Soviet Union was dominated by ideas of
a major war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Local wars—e.g. the Yom Kippur
War in 1973, the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, and the Grenada invasion in
1983—were short but saw intensive fighting. UN mandated peace support operations
(PSOs) were mostly guard duties aimed at separating antagonists, and carried out
with their consent. Western military thinking was focused on Clausewitz’s theories
that had become fashionable in the aftermath of the US defeat in Vietnam. In the
1990s the risk of a major global conflict was replaced by a surge of ethnic and civil
wars. The interest of theoreticians shifted to the latest revolution in military affairs
(RMA) and to information warfare [Fit87, Fit94, Mur97]. Sun Tzu’s thinking gained
45 A partial reason for canceling the RAH-66 Comanche armed scout helicopter program was to free
funds for development of UAVs [Scu03b, Way04].
46 Redman [Red98] argues strongly in favor of the attack helicopter and does not accept the idea that
tanks are needed to hold objectives, but accepts that tanks will be needed in the future since fiscal
realities do not allow an all-out helicopter combat force.