electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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Role
TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS
Mission goal Implication
Transport Transport of troops to/from combat area, Threat level depends on depth of pene-
also deep attacks behind enemy lines. tration.
Threat reduction a prime consideration.
52 Threat increases when hovering
(fast roping) and with increased height/
slow speed (underslung cargo). Mission
planning required for threat avoidance.
CSAR Typically search and rescue of pilots
downed behind enemy lines. Stealth, fast
execution, and local air superiority are
essential for success. [Whi00] 53
Need for speed of execution prohibits
accurate planning, support by ownship
and other weapon assets required for
protection.
CASEVAC Evacuation of wounded from combat area Threat level depends on evacuation site,
or its immediate vicinity.
and can be very high in the immediate
combat area. Support from weapon
assets important for protection.
SEAD Location and identification of enemy air High-threat role as operation close to
defenses, destruction by soft- and hard- enemy air defense is required, intellikill
on-board assets.
gence is vital for threat avoidance. Other
weapon assets can increase protection.
SIGINT Intelligence collection with passive radio Intelligence footprint depends on flight
sensors at some distance from FEBA. height, which increases the otherwise
low to medium risks of SIGINT
missions.
Battlefield Surveillance with SAR radar or other Effectiveness requires sufficient flight
surveillance sensors at some distance from enemy height, which combined with active
lines.
sensors attract fire from ground and air.
Table 6: Summary of the most important roles of transport helicopters, relevant mission goals
and their implications. The SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) role is presently only
discussed for transport helicopters. Legend: FEBA=forward extension of battlefield area.
Threat types and probability of occurrence depends on the helicopter’s location
relative to the combat area. Table 7 gives an estimation of how various threats relate
to different mission stages [Kit02]. Major uncertainties related to this estimation are
the nature of conflict and, in case of an armed conflict, the fragmented battlefield of
today with no clear demarcation line between friends and foes [Kan97]. FEBA is
therefore a diffuse notion. The estimation on threats in various situations can also be
challenged. For instance, according to the table threat from direct fire is very low
even at FEBA, but if the enemy has MBTs with advance fire control systems the
threat from MBT main guns must be taken as high. Table 7 allows quantification of
risks by applying, for instance, the Delphi technique or the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP).
52 According to one view deep attack task forces should be placed in a cocoon of protecting assets
(sensors, SEAD aircraft, artillery, etc.) that increases survivability [Jam02].
53 Hewish [Hew00], with reference to an unidentified study in 1996, reports that the combined total of
search parties, anti-aircraft units and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that would
probably be deployed by Iraq were expected to rise from virtually zero after 30 minutes to about 13
within an hour, and approach 25 within 2.5 hours.