electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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1.4.3 Specific and generic threat scenarios
During the Cold War the two blocks could declare the other part its potential enemy,
and the weapon systems of that enemy as the threat that would be encountered in an
armed conflict (cf. [Peo87]). This straightforward scene changed at the latest in 1991
with the Persian Gulf War, when the US lead coalition had to face weapon systems
manufactured by its member countries. 23 Earlier the British had to face the threat
from French Exocet missiles in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 and the Soviet
Union had to face its own MANPAD (man-portable air defense) missiles in
Afghanistan. More recently Swedish search radars were found to be a threat to the
NATO-led Bosnia campaign, and since 2001 the US had to worry about FIM-92A
Stinger missiles, which had been delivered to the Mudjahedeen guerilla in
Afghanistan for the fight against the Soviet Union and now were in the hands of
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. 24 A single threat scenario may still exist on the
national level for small countries, but in international operations the “rainbow threat”
of almost any possible weapon system is reality. [Pri00 pp.556-557] 25 An
intermediate construct is so-called generic threats, which are exemplified in
Canadian Generic Enemy documents [Anon02a]. 26 The Finnish Army has used
generic threats in simulator studies on attack helicopters in the Finnish environment
[Hei01a]. The limitation with available generic threat documents is that they focus on
traditional Soviet/Russian weapon systems.
As no EWSP system can cope with all eventualities, specifying EWSP systems
becomes guesswork and the use of generic data is both realistic and necessary. 27 The
opinion stated in Wright [Wri93 p.72], that the design of EWSP systems should be
based on complete intelligence on threat systems, is not realistic. Schlecher [Sch86
pp.28-29] reports that design approaches stemming from intelligence-based EOB
(electronic order of battle) tend to underestimate the threat, whereas generic design
approaches tend to overestimate the threat. Working on generic threats or scenarios
therefore should leave a margin for the unexpected and for future modifications.
23
In 1990 the US Joint Chief of Staff required capabilities-based planning instead of the threat-based
analysis that had governed the Cold War [Bon02, Loc99].
24
It has been suggested that the missiles delivered to the Mudjahedeen in the 1980’s were unusable
by 2001. Hunter, however, maintains that it is a popular misconception that MANPAD missiles
become unusable after several years due to battery or other systems failures. Often the batteries can be
replaced with commercially purchased batteries available on the open market. Technically proficient
terrorist groups might also be able to construct hybrid batteries to replace used ones. The shelf life of
missiles can be 22 years or longer if stored properly (the SA-7B missiles used in the attack on the
Israeli commercial aircraft in Kenya in 2002 are believed to have been 28 years old [Kuh03]), and in
any case most missiles have been hermetically sealed in launchers designed for rough handling by
soldiers in the field. [Hun01] A software defined life time seems more likely to be expected in
weapons of this type. Thus, since the failed attack on an Israeli civil airliner in Kenya on 28
November 2002 was conducted by the comparatively ineffective Strela-2/2M, it is believed that the
Mudjahedeen Stinger missiles are not operational any more [Hug02]. In any case, engagement of US
military aircraft with Stinger missiles requires that the missile’s IFF (identification friend or foe)
system has been bypassed.
25
The second edition of Ball’s The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and
Design, published in late 2003, is an example of the fixation on threats being equal to equipment of
Soviet/Russian origin [Bal03].
26
The Canadian B-SJ-100-002 Generic Enemy model is claimed to be similar to US Army and British
counterparts.
27
This view is underscored through generic countermeasures being frequently used. Noise jamming,
preemptive manual triggering of expendables, and generic infrared jamming codes are examples.