electronic warfare self-protection of battlefield helicopters - Aaltodoc

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The analysis above, including Table 4, is strongly influenced by US actions; but it
must be expected that US domination in military operations and military technology
will continue in the foreseeable future. Examples of attack helicopter losses in
military operations are given in Table 5. The Karbala operation was a failed deep
attack, conducted with AH-64 Apache helicopters. The ongoing Iraq conflict has
seen numerous helicopter losses, both to accidents and to hostile fire, but official
information—“lessons learned”—is still scanty (July 2004).
Conflict Helicopter losses
Vietnam (1961-1973) 2,587 helicopters lost to enemy action; 2,282 lost to “operational
mishaps”. One hit by enemy fire for every 1,147 sorties; one shot
down per 13,461 sorties; one shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties
PH,m = 0.09 %, Pk/H = 13.7%.
Grenada 1983 7 killed, 11 damaged Pk/H = 38.9 %.
Panama 1989 4 killed, 45 damaged (out of 170) PH = 26.5 %, Pk/H = 8.2 %. 49
Somalia 1993 2 killed, 2 damaged in Mogadishu raid on 3 October (out of 17)
PH = 23.5 %, Pk/H = 50 %.
Chechnya (December Unconfirmed estimations claim that 1 helicopter in 10 was lost, 1 in 4
1994 to August 1996) was damaged PH = 35%, Pk/H = 28.6%.
Afghanistan 2002 Operation “Anaconda” on 2 March: 7 attack helicopters took part in
the operation; all were damaged, 4 had to withdraw from the fight
PH,m = 100% (Pk/H = 57.1 % if withdrawn are considered killed).
Iraq 2003 Karbala operation on 23-24 March: 31 helicopters damaged out of 32,
some seriously ( PH,m = 96.9 %); 1 crashed on landing, 1 forced to
land on enemy ground ( Pk/H = 6.5 % if losses were related to
hits). 50
Table 5: Most likely data for helicopter losses in some conflicts and missions [Anon84, Bal03
p.86, Bil02, Col04, Ell02, Hew03, Nay02, Tat00, Tho97, Tol73 p.153]. The “operational mishaps”
are defined “principally mechanical and electrical failures” in Augustine [Aug72]. The number
of helicopters killed or damaged by sophisticated weapons is small, but accurate data is not
available. Legend: PH=probability of hit (in conflict); PH,m=probability of hit per mission;
Pk/H=probability of kill, given a hit.
The increased number of joint international operations in conflicts lesser than war
has implications for EWSP through rules of engagement (ROE) and “electronic
fratricide”. ROE may for instance prohibit the use of flares over urban areas. 51
“Electronic fratricide” includes the risk of electromagnetic interference among
friendly forces, wrong identification leading to attack on friendly units, etc. [Coo99c,
Spe93]
49 As an example of battle damage repair timelines: 24 out of 25 damaged Black Hawks were
returned to service within 24 hours [Bal03 p.105].
50 A) Apart from being a tactical victory for the Iraqis it was also an intelligence scoop: The Apache
Longbow that was forced to land on enemy territory did so with its classified radar and was fully
armed. No attempts are known to have been made to destroy the wreckage. [Hew03]
B) Of the damaged Apaches all but five were operating the next day; the rest within four days
[Har03]. Wilson [Wil04] claims that the total number of helicopters was 33.
51 It has been suggested that a reason for the failed Karbala mission was that ROEs required target
identification from 1 km; which completely negated the advantages of the Longbow radar and the
range of Hellfire missiles. Intelligence failure, overconfidence, and hasty planning have also been
blamed. The true merits of the Apache helicopter have come under scrutiny, and US Army training
practices have been particularly criticized. [Har03, Hew03, New03]