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conference proceedings - Australian Army

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PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSeAS SeRVICe<br />

A tank has a crew of four, an APC two. An addition to both for many operations were<br />

the mini-teams, usually two sappers from the engineer Field Squadron who searched<br />

for concealed mines and warned the crew commanders. Usually, they were carried on<br />

the point vehicles only, or in the case of the tanks on an ARV until they were needed.<br />

Their help was invaluable and since they were exposed at the front of both tanks and<br />

carriers, they suffered many casualties.<br />

Collective Training<br />

Because the crewman’s basic training and Individual employment Training had already<br />

been done somewhere else it might be thought that the squadrons had no further<br />

responsibilities here. It was not the case. The Armoured Corps expansion—like the<br />

infantry—had been so rapid that some tasks were left to units to pick up. We certainly<br />

ran our own crew commander’s courses to make up the shortfall, and in any case,<br />

individual refresher training in areas of skill, like shooting, is always necessary. But<br />

our main responsibility was to progressively train people through crew, section (in the<br />

case of cavalry), troop, and finally squadron level drills, tactics, and procedures to fit<br />

them for their task in Vietnam. It is fair to say that doctrine always lagged behind actual<br />

practice in Vietnam. The <strong>Army</strong> did not have a well-developed system for gathering<br />

lessons from Vietnam and disseminating them to those preparing to go there. The process<br />

improved over time but only because individuals passed information back, mostly in<br />

the form of personal correspondence. There was no system for ‘capturing’ information<br />

from individuals who had loads of experience and were on the point of repatriating to<br />

Australia. However, one initiative that helped immeasurably was that every OC went<br />

up there for an orientation visit of about ten days before finally deploying for a year.<br />

That single experience enabled him to focus training in Australia more cogently than<br />

normal peacetime training, where the effort has to be spread over a greater number of<br />

possible scenarios.<br />

The old adage about armoured skills is that you must be able to MOVe, SHOOT,<br />

and COMMuNICATe. If only it was that simple. I would add a further three qualities<br />

immediately. You need to be able to See, SuRVIVe, and MAINTAIN, 18 and I could<br />

add others. Counterinsurgency, or Low Intensity Operations as it is sometimes called,<br />

has traditionally been a most demanding type of conflict. In Vietnam, troops were<br />

18. This has contemporary relevance of a special dimension. A tank or APC has to be able to fight around<br />

the clock. The night fighting capability of the Leopard I has been allowed to lapse. To be operationally<br />

compatible with uS, uK, or, say, German armour, in an overseas deployment, it has to be equipped<br />

with passive TI (thermal imaging) sights of two types: gunner’s sight, and a commander’s hunter/killer<br />

sight which can be scanning for future targets while the gunner engages the existing target. Its existing<br />

active-Infra Red equipment makes it highly vulnerable because an enemy vehicle can trace IR to its<br />

source and destroy it.<br />

83

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