conference proceedings - Australian Army

54
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972
of one battalion, even with the proviso of an American battalion being made available,
was ‘the only appropriate solution or indeed whether … it is relevant’. For planning
purpose the chiefs should be considering a much lower level of threat in Phuoc Tuy
Province. More effort should be put into training the South Vietnamese in the Province,
and as ‘we develop a training role there should be a lesser requirement for our forces to
continue in their current roles’. 87 The course was set for the withdrawal of one battalion
before the end of 1970.
High Command Problems
This brief discussion of some of the key decisions and issues concerning Australian
operations in Vietnam reveals the difficulties faced by the Australian high command in
Canberra. The first of these concerned the coalition nature of the war. The strategic policy
for the war was made in Washington, and Australia was not consulted. As mentioned,
perhaps the Honolulu conference in March/April 1965 provided an opportunity to
influence American strategy, but the reality was that given the disparity in the size of
the American and Australian commitments perhaps Australia could not have expected
to be consulted.
From 1965 to 1972 the Australian forces in Vietnam came under the operational
control of an American commander. The conditions under which they operated were spelt
out in directives that were agreed between the US commander in Vietnam and General
Wilton, acting on behalf of the Australian Chiefs of Staff and the Australian government.
From 1966 onwards the directive concerning the operations of 1ATF remained largely
unchanged. It seems that little thought was given in Australia towards changing the
directive, which adequately dealt with the Australian government’s concerns to protect
the Australian force and limit casualties that might have been incurred on adventurous
American operations.
The second difficulty was caused by the Australian command structure. As the
commander of 1ATF came under the operational control of the commander of II FFV
the Australian higher commanders—COMAFV, the CGS and Wilton—were reluctant
to interfere in his tactical handling of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. COMAFV
had no direct operational authority over 1ATF, although he certainly retained national
command of the force.
The higher command structure back in Australia posed even more difficulties.
Wilton, as Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, had no statutory command authority,
87. Fraser to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 December 1969, CCOSC Files, Box 26, File 1858
Part 1.