conference proceedings - Australian Army

THE mAKING OF TIGERS
in the south. 63 In a testimony to America’s reliance on the Koreans (and perhaps, to its
desperation to find any help possible), General William C. Westmoreland, commander
of US forces in Vietnam, remarked, ‘I would be happy with any additional Koreans,
regardless of what type or unit. The Koreans have done a magnificent job.’ 64
South Korean soldiers, who were instilled with their raison d’être—to make their
country a worth ally of the US by contributing visibly to the war effort—were told to
behave in the following manner: ‘Brave and fearsome to the enemy, polite and kind
to the Vietnamese, well disciplined and reliable to our allies.’ 65 Were they? In march
1966 about five months after the arrival of the first contingent of Korea’s combat
soldiers, Westmoreland’s mACV (military Assistance Command, Vietnam) conducted
a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the Korean units. The commander of
the American forces in Vietnam was impressed with the Koreans despite some problems.
First, in terms of their combat effectiveness, Koreans were reported have achieved a
kill ratio of about 16:1 against the enemy. They ‘excelled in defending and securing
installations and routes’. They were also ‘very effective in maintaining security over
an area, either alone or in coordination with ARVN units’. US officials as well as the
Vietnamese agreed that the ‘social behavior’ of the Koreans was ‘excellent’ and perhaps,
‘better than that of Americans’. The Koreans were observed to have spent leisure time
playing ‘volley-ball rather than in bars’, even in Saigon where there were, certainly,
‘more bars than volley[-]ball courts’. 66 In other words, they were satisfying the first
and third conditions—to be effective and dependable. The Korean forces’ record on the
second condition—to be polite and kind to the Vietnamese—however, did not receive
unanimous approval from their Vietnamese and American allies.
The Koreans’ skills and reliability as a fighting force were palpable at least in their
casualty reports. According to official accounts, after one year of operation, Korean
units in Vietnam recorded to have inflicted the following casualties on the enemy. 67
63. Stanley Larsen and James L. Collins Jr, Allied Participation in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Department
of Army, 1975), 136, 145.
64. ‘Background Briefing Presented By General Westmoreland’, 29 June 1967, ‘#18 History File, 1 June-1 July
67 [I]’, box 12, Papers of W.C. Westmoreland, National Security File (hereinafter cited as Westmoreland
Papers), LBJL.
65. The New York Times, 9 November 1972, 3.
66. Cable 3169 from Saigon, 2 march 1966, ‘Cables, Vol. XLVIII, 3/1-16/66’, Box 28, Vietnam Country
File, LBJL.
67. Gukje munje Yonguso (Institute for International Affairs), The Vietnam War and Korea’s National
Security (Seoul: Gukje munje Yonguso, 1966), 111. South Korea’s second division, the White Horse,
arrived in South Vietnam in August, 1966, which explains its insignificant combat contribution shown
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